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Abortion and Moral Context: Human Beings in a Moral Community 
Abstract: In this dissertation, I urge that ethical discussions of abortion remain dissatisfying in 
large part because they conduct the debate in terms of the contested concept of the ‘person.’ 
Building on the reflections of MacIntyre, I will argue that the loss of ethical context to which he 
refers has also meant that we have come to view ‘persons’ and human beings as individual, 
independent units, abstracted from their relations with others. Philosophers have sought to 
analyse and elevate the concept of ‘person’; competing conceptions of personhood have pursued 
the specific individual qualities that grounds a being's claim to having a morally significant life. 
This predilection of the personhood literature has often severely limited the abortion dialogue 
and prevented richer and varied understandings of our layered nature from emerging.  I contend 
that the deadlock, to which Ruth Macklin refers, within the personhood dialogue means that we 
need to broaden our moral vocabulary and give a much more central place to the notion of the 
socialised human being. Rather than place personhood at the heart of the debate, I would 
suggest we should emphasise our relationships and our membership in an already-existing moral 
context and community, and that we should reflect far more fully on these settings. Rather than 
considering what kinds of entities qualify as ‘persons,’ we should instead consider the notion of 
the human being existing in a moral community and thereby situated in a wide and complex web 
of relationships. I argue that an ethic of care, coupled with a phenomenological approach, will 
provide the most fruitful framework when responding to ethical issues generated by the abortion 
dialogue.  Taking account of our nature as socialised beings, in relationship with other beings is, I 
shall try to show, key to understanding our moral existence in general and to grasping the 
intricacies of the moral debate over abortion in particular. Membership within a social network 
or moral community is fundamentally a moral issue where certain experiences and conditions 
can threaten what really matters.  
When providing us with accounts of the moral community, philosophers have often put forward 
very particular qualifications for membership. To underscore the need to explore further 
accounts of moral communities I consider the work of cultural and philosophical anthropology 
where we find that observations relating to the distinctly human life remain pertinent for our 
current ethical climate. Philosophical anthropology reveals just how complex the idea of moral 
community is and hints at the broader moral vocabulary I believe is required. I argue that it is 
crucial that we understand the ethical consequences of choosing to see someone as being either a 
member or not a member of the moral community and as Eva Feder Kittay argues, there are a 
range of morally repugnant current moral exclusions. I believe this discussion has considerable 
bearing on the abortion debate, and I provide two specific examples of the marginalisations that 
a moral community can create: recent empirical studies into abortion stigma and Judith Butler’s 
considerations on vulnerability and female sexuality. We need to address these exclusions and 
consider the ways we define the moral agent, and consider how we make assumptions about 
which human lives have value. With an ever-expanding and complex ‘moral community’ under 
review I would argue that recognizing ourselves as human beings, participants in a moral 
community, must be our starting point. It is from this platform that we can then refuse to enact 
exclusions and try to live out Butler’s call to make a concern for all human lives a real and valid 
ethical concern.  
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Abortion and Moral Context: Human Beings in a Moral Community  
Introduction: 
Ethical and legal concerns surrounding abortion procedures remain one of the most contested 
debates of this age. ‘The abortion debate’ has been raging since the early 1960s and the initial 
hope that philosophers would help lead the debate towards some sort of consensus appears 
unrealised; the phrase ‘respect for the autonomous being’ has been used as if some sort of 
talisman to not only ward off unethical action, but also as one of the approaches that would 
guide the dialogue to some sense of resolution.1 Whereas, in fact, the reliance on the rational, 
separate, autonomous being has far too regularly reduced the discussion,2 and led to pregnancy 
sometimes being viewed, and therefore referred to, as nothing more than a physical or bodily 
condition, and the morality of abortion was seen first and foremost as a rights debate where one 
competing rights claim would triumph.3  ‘The abortion debate,’ as this phrasing reveals, has 
become unhelpfully unified and this particular phrasing, along with other assumptions, is 
something this dissertation seeks to challenge. 
The topic of abortion regularly makes its way into the newspapers and reports currently range 
from the European Union suggesting that abortion on demand is a human right,4 to suggesting 
that the risks resulting from an abortion are acute and that the increased risk of negative impact 
on mental health cannot be ignored.5 It is often impossible to escape the pro-life and pro-choice 
rhetoric within abortion literature; Mary Anne Warren notes that we have opponents of abortion 
suggesting the widest possible criterion to grant personhood and protection within a moral 
community (and thus foetuses are included) and at the other end of the spectrum we have those 
who argue for the moral permissibility of abortion proposing narrower and more particular 
criteria.6 Those writing about abortion have often painted an abstract, public ethical setting, 
where abstract principles, rights or rules can be applied more easily, and where we speak of 
knowing or rational beings that are fully operating agents within such a moral community. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Joel Feinberg (ed.), The Problem of Abortion, California, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1984, p.1. 
 
2 Shannon M. Jordan, ‘The Moral Community and Persons’, Philosophy Today, Vol. 30, no. 2, 1986, p.110.   
2 Shannon M. Jordan, ‘The Moral Community and Persons’, Philosophy Today, Vol. 30, no. 2, 1986, p.110.  
 
3 Joel Feinberg (ed.), The Problem of Abortion, California, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1984, p.1. 
 
4 Christina Zampas  and Jamie M. Gher, ‘Abortion as a Human Right - International and Regional Standards’, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 8, 
no.2, 2008, pp.249-294. http://www.ejiltalk.org/abortion-on-demand-and-the-european-convention-on-human-rights/	  
 
5 Priscilla K. Coleman, ‘Abortion and mental health: quantitative synthesis and analysis of research published 1995–2009’, The British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 199, 2011, pp.180-186. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/8734378/Abortion-increases-risk-of-mental-health-problems-new-
research-finds.html  
6 Mary Anne Warren, ‘On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion’, in Hugh LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice, London, Blackwell, 2002, pp. 72-83.  
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Human life is, in fact, far more complex and dynamic than that description allows and as 
Zygmunt Bauman writes, ‘Human reality is messy and ambiguous - and so modern decisions, 
unlike abstract ethical principles, are ambivalent.’7   
The pursuit for the determination of personhood is undeniably a controversial matter as it is a 
process about asking how and where we are to fix the boundaries at the beginning and at the end 
of life. Who, or what, is a person? When does a person begin or cease to exist? A variety of 
positions have been assumed within this debate, and in fact a variety of questions are being asked 
both consciously and unconsciously within this complex dialogue. The conception of 
personhood is certainly pivotal to discussions relating to beginning of life ethics, but also 
susceptible to many varying obstructions when trying to move the dialogue forward. This is in 
part due to the origin and evolution of the ‘contested concept of the person’8 and the fact that 
the term ‘person’ cannot attend to the many varied aspects of our nature.9 Many conceptions of 
personhood are in fact trying to attend (both directly and indirectly) to many varied questions 
relating to our identity. For example are we seeking to unpack what a person is, and explore what 
it is that I am in an ontological sense?10 Or rather are we asking ‘who am I?’ an approach which 
seeks to identify a specific function or activity or state of mind that must be in place for the 
entity under consideration to be classed a ‘person’ or ‘human being?’11 Is the central question 
‘why am I?’, and thus the exploration of the engagement of the person in the human condition as 
they work out their individual life projects.12 Or perhaps the personhood debate demands we 
take a strictly materialist or scientifically reductionist approach, an approach that seeks to ask 
‘what am I?’13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, Oxford, Blackwell, 1993, p.32. 
 
8 W.B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LVI, 1956, pp.167–198; Susanne Gibson, ‘The Problem of 
Abortion: Essentially Contested Concepts and Moral Autonomy’, in Ruth Chadwick et al (eds.), The Bioethics Reader: Editor’s Choice, Oxford, 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007, pp.447-458. 
 
9 J. P. Lizza, ‘Persons: Natural, Functional, or Ethical Kind?’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 66, 2007, pp.195–216. 
 
10 Ontological approaches to personhood seek to identify a particular ‘substance’ that must be present in order for the being/entity under 
consideration to qualify as a person. This has a long and varied tradition often associated with Thomas Aquinas and the soul, Cartesianism’s res 
cogitans and more recently Lynne Ruder Baker’s view that persons are constituted by human beings.  
 
11 The question ‘who am I?’ and psychological approaches have sought function, activity or state of mind as a central focus and criteria for 
personhood. These personhood conceptions are best associated with John Locke’s memory ‘standard account’ or forensic position, also 
constitutionalism’s first person perspective or Aristotelian rationality.   
 
12 For example Sartre’s condemned to freedom, de Beauvoir’s the ‘Other’ of man, Heidegger’s being-towards-death, Ortega y Gasset’s my life, Levinas’ naked 
face of the other and Marcel’s being in a situation.  
13 ‘Strictly materialist’ or ‘strictly scientifically reductive’ approaches are those that tend to simply affirm the ‘fact’ of the human being’s bodily 
existence without any appeal to factors beyond those associated with the operation of the human organism – particularly cognitive operations. 
For example, physicalism, behaviourism, materialism and functionalism.  
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Philosophers have sought, confusingly, to analyse and elevate the concept of ‘person’; competing 
conceptions of personhood have pursued the specific individual qualities that grounds a being's 
claim to having a morally significant life. This predilection of the personhood literature has often 
severely limited the dialogue and prevented richer and varied understandings of our layered 
nature from emerging.  Within this dissertation I argue that greater headway would be made 
within the personhood debate if we were to accept that there are these wider questions relating 
to our nature; we cannot expect to have a metaphysical and value free conception of ourselves. 
The dissertation seeks to explain how the nature of personhood and abortion debates have been 
mischaracterised because of the influence of inappropriate assumptions; those giving a privileged 
place to metaphysical aspects of personhood. The dissertation argues forcefully for a pluralistic 
approach to what is taken into consideration when reflecting on the nature of abortion.  Moral 
philosophy, and our moral agency, cannot be disconnected from our social, political, historical 
factors. It also cannot operate or fail to acknowledge important moves made within other areas 
of study, most notably anthropology, sociology and psychology. I contend that the oft-cited 
deadlock within the personhood dialogue means that we need to broaden our moral vocabulary 
and give a much more central place to the notion of the socialised human being. Rather than 
place personhood at the heart of the debate, I would suggest we should emphasise our 
relationships and our membership in an already-existing moral context and community, and that 
we should reflect more fully on these settings. As Carol Gilligan reminds us, moral problems are 
problems of human relations.14 I recommend that in certain debates moral philosophers should 
stop thinking about entities such as persons and human beings in highly abstract terms and 
instead pay more attention to the concrete moral communities of which we are members. Rather 
than seeking definitions and trying to find out what criterion is sufficient for a being to qualify as 
a person, and grant one a place within a moral community,15 we should instead begin by 
considering our social and cultural setting and the idea of our moral community first, and thus 
consider what sort of beings reside within this context. Such an approach would consider who is 
already present within a moral community rather than seeking to see who is accorded or denied 
membership.16  
In a similar vein to Val Plumwood, I would argue that trying to identify the properties an entity 
must possess, if it is to be a member of the moral community, can lead to the creation of an ‘us-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, Cambridge: Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1993, p.xix.  
 
15 Eva Feder Kittay, ‘At the Margins of Moral Personhood’, Ethics, 116, 2005, pp.100-131. 
 
16 Michael Allen Fox, ‘The Moral Community,’ in Hugh LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002, pp.117-127; Shannon M. 
Jordan, ‘The Moral Community and Persons’, Philosophy Today, Vol. 30, no. 2, 1986. 
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and-them’ mentality which can, of course, be criticised heavily on moral grounds.17 Plumwood, 
like Judith Butler, has made important moves within recent ethical discussion in that she 
challenges so many of the stifling dualisms present within Western Philosophy and develops a 
robust critique of this bifurcation; Butler focuses on the fixed masculine/feminine gender binary, 
and thus seeks to deconstruct and reconstruct the idea of ‘who we are’ as something that is not 
unified, but rather diverse and that as beings we behave within a time and a place.18 Abortion 
debates often fall prey to the central concerns of Butler and Plumwood, in that the dialogue has 
become an uncomfortable battlefield between two warring camps,19 or principles, and the debate 
can often entirely operate around the issue of categories, inclusion and membership criterion. We 
find an ethical arena of either ‘knowing’ or reason centred beings that are ‘in’ and are fully 
operating agents, or instead we have incomplete, passive, moral patients whose membership can 
be secured by others on their behalf. Unsurprisingly writers within the field of environmental 
and animal ethics have tended to explore conceptions of a moral community more regularly and 
extensively than those working within medical and sexual ethics. Plumwood, Singer and other 
ethicists are right to impress upon us the importance of expanding our moral circle,20 but surely 
more work is required within the setting of the moral community of human beings, as being 
‘human’ does not secure a satisfactory form of membership as many writers often assume. I do 
not just mean cases such as very young infants, or those lacking certain capacities or beings that 
are dependent (although I do explore a range of unsatisfactory marginalisations within the 
dissertation), but rather those beings that are ‘fully human’ but socially marginalised and 
stigmatised. In Britain, and much of the Western world today, most of the legislative obstacles to 
female membership and participation in the public sphere could be viewed as having been 
removed, and yet inequalities still remain.  
Appeals to personhood and human dignity are commonplace in a range of philosophical and 
public debates in bioethics to the foundation of universal human rights, but to speak of 
someone’s dignity, personhood and inclusion is not the same as someone having it or securing 
such a position. Recent events in Egypt saw an Al-Garf style female politician who heads the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Val Plumwood, Environmental Culture, New York, Routledge, 2002, p.100. Plumwood develops a full critique of anthropocentrism and Western 
dualisms that creates privileged human groups and thus dismisses or ignores the concerns of marginalized human groups. She argues that the 
‘reason-centred’ Western worldview fully divides the world into separate realms of active, knowing ‘subjects’ and passive, knowable ‘objects.’ The 
result is a ‘radical discontinuity’ between humans (as the sole possessors of reason) and their nature and non-human nature.  
 
18 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, London, Routledge, 1999, p.11. 
	  
19 Mary Anne Warren describes the ‘stand-off’ and illustrates how the debate continues to rest on a conflict of rights, with each ‘camp’ arguing for 
either a right to life as a stronger claim or a right to choice or control of one’s body.  Mary Anne Warren, ‘An Argument that Abortion is Wrong’, 
in Hugh LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002, pp.83-93. 
 
20 Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Socio-biology, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981. 
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Freedom and Justice Party’s women’s committee state that ‘women should not march or protest 
as it is more ‘dignified’ to let their husbands and brothers demonstrate for them.’21 However, this 
leads to the question of why non-violent protests could harm a woman’s dignity. Journalist Ellen 
McLarney argued that legislatively the FJP have made unprecedented advances, primarily in 
having the first Constitution to ‘explicitly establish – without qualification – ‘equality and equal 
opportunities for all men and women… without distinction, favouritism, or partiality, in rights 
and duties’.’22 However, this does not change the status of the FJP as a traditionalist and hard-
line Islamist party, with some members condemning more forward thinking reforms, and others 
condoning practices such as female genital mutilation which has been banned since 2008. And 
so, written legislation does not change people’s attitudes, legislation doesn’t have significant 
impact when the people creating and enforcing it do not endorse it, in fact can undermine it, 
thus reducing citizen responsibility to live up to it. Martha Nussbaum also recently stressed a 
similar point when she reflected on the well-written and extensive constitutions found in India 
and South Africa in that they make the ‘fundamental rights of citizens and their equality 
explicit,’23 and yet we find terrible marginalisations in terms of the concrete experiences of 
certain minority groups. This makes reflection on peoples’ social groups and social contexts all 
the more urgent if we are to change things, as to many it seems that communal ties play a more 
substantial role in the experience of morality, and this particular debate is explored later within 
this dissertation.24 The fact that philosophers have so regularly drawn very particular lines at the 
margins of their conceptions of the moral community warrants reflection as the personhood 
criteria, which often accords this membership, creates an ‘urgency in the real life stakes.’25 
However, if we start with ‘real life’ moral communities, we will find a range of wider exclusions 
emerging from the ways we define the person and define that membership and inclusion.  
 
Most practitioners working to eliminate poverty regularly flag up the continued historical reality 
that women (and their children) have been, and remain, the most vulnerable members of their 
own communities and that this reality demands urgent response.26 The effects of poverty and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Mona Elthaways’ controversial article in Foreign Policy 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/23/why_do_they_hate_us?page=0,3# 
	  
22 http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11852/womens-rights-in-the-egyptian-constitution_%28neo%29li 
 
23 Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, Paper Presented at Bedales Philosophy Society, Hampshire, 9th May, 2014. A similar point is made here: 
http://www.india-seminar.com/2008/581/581_martha_nussbaum.htm 
	  
24 Carla Bagnoli, ‘Respect and Membership in the Moral Community’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 10, no.2, 2006, pp.113-128. 
25 Eva Feder Kittay, ‘At the Margins of Moral Personhood’, Ethics , 116, 2005, pp.100-131. 
 
26 http://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/ 
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gender inequality are often linked to the body of a woman; the ways in which policy makers’ 
attempts to control women’s bodies politically and culturally serve to preserve their highly 
vulnerable positions in society.27 Similarly Bina Agrawal has explored the link between the low 
status accorded to women and increasing population and environmental degradation.28 Aruna 
Gnanadson argues that in an Indian context women are always the worst affected by poverty and 
environmental depletion and stresses the need for an ethical approach that focuses on an 
interdependent and fully participating community, among other useful strategies to which I will 
return to throughout the dissertation.29And so, we need to be careful when speaking of ‘being 
human’ as securing membership within a moral community, as there are a range of implicit and 
wider exclusions and stigmas that can be seen when we explore particular moral communities.  
Abortion debates, therefore, cannot be resolved in the abstract any more than issues relating to 
gender politics and poverty can, and especially not given the very real and current concerns 
relating to abortion guilt and stigma,30 feminine (and masculine) cultural ideals and general health 
concerns relating to abortion and sexual behaviours. The World Health Organisation offers the 
following definition relating to what constitutes health, ‘a complete state of physical, mental and 
social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.’31 This definition may well 
be over a decade old and considered by some to be utopian, but what is clear is that the focus on 
the socialised human being, and their social health, is central to any ethical discussion relating to 
abortion debates. I do not forward a framework based on the socialised human being in order to 
bolster arguments in favour of medical progress or the liberation of women solely; it is 
abundantly clear that abortion for the woman and her partner, medical practitioners and policy 
makers is less ideological and more nuanced and complex.	  The cultural constructions of men and 
women’s moral identities have significant implications for the way in which they reflect on 
themselves as moral agents and in the way they are treated by others in abortion contexts. There 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The Global Justice Network cites issues relating to mandatory breastfeeding laws and population control measures. Edward Shorter, Women's 
Bodies: A Social History of Women's Encounter with Health, Ill-Health, and Medicine, New York, Basic Books, 1982. 
28 Bina Agrawal, ‘The Gender and Environment Debate: Lessons from India’, Vachy Study Circle Readings, no.16, SETV Centre for Social 
Knowledge and Action, 1992, pp.131-35. 
 
29 Aruna Gnanadson, ‘Women, Economy and Ecology’, in David G. Hallman (ed.), Ecotheology: Voices from South and North, Generva, World 
Council of Churches, 1994, pp.79-185. 
30 Anuradha Kumara, Leila Hessini and Ellen M H. Mitchell, ‘Conceptualising Abortion Stigma’, Culture, Health & Sexuality, iFirst, 2009, pp.1–15; 
B Major  and R Gramzow, ‘Abortion as Stigma: Cognitive and Emotional Implications of Concealment’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
77, 4, 1999, pp.735-745. 
31 http://www.who.int/bulletin/bulletin_board/83/ustun11051/en/ 
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are socially pervasive expectations of both men and women in terms of their roles within sexual 
behaviours and procreation.  
Conceptions of personhood, and associated abortion debates, have often failed to recognise that 
it is our moral culture, or moral community, which creates who we are. As Shannon M. Jordan 
and Frank Bouchier-Hayes argue, human beings do not exist in a relational vacuum they exist 
through their relationships with others.32 I too would reject any conception which conceives of 
individual human beings as independent units, abstracted from their relations with others; 
human beings exist through their varied relationships and are layered in nature, and are therefore 
best understood as relational, embedded and fractured beings in a concrete world.33 Butler is 
right to hold us back from our intuitive desire to unify and view women as a group; women are 
so very diverse and as such we cannot define them as some sort of bonded group as ‘the very 
subject of women is no longer understood in stable or abiding terms.’34 We do not necessarily 
help a woman in one culture facing radical marginalisation by drawing tenuous parallels with a 
woman in a vastly different context. Simone de Beauvoir’s notion of the ‘lived experience’ is 
informative here when she explores the idea of you as your lived experiences and these lived 
experiences relating to a particular body in a particular time and place or rather culture. The 
relevance of sex and gender can impact our lived experiences, but it depends very much on the 
situation and the culture in question.35 Considerations on the task of defining gender are 
explored in order to help us see both the strengths and truths relating to women as beings that 
give birth, but also the dangers and subsequent exclusions that can result with such an 
‘essentialist’ approach. What is required is a reflection on the ways we draw lines for membership 
and that we not only consider the marginal cases on the boundaries, but also keep alert to the 
very subtle and wider exclusions caused by stigmatisation and subordination.36 
Linked with my recommendation to focus on the relational and socialised human being and its 
relating moral communities, I suggest that rather than assuming that there is one big moral 
community, I propose that we must speak in terms of different moral communities in different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
32 Shannon M. Jordan. ‘The Moral Community and Persons’, Philosophy Today, Vol. 30, no. 2, 1986; Frank Bouchier-Hayes, ‘Philosophers on 
Abortion.’ presented to the Limerick Philosophical Society in 1998. http://www.minerva.mic.ul.ie//vol2/bh.html 
 
33 Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, New York, Citadel Press, 1987, p.15. 
 
34 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, London, Routledge, 1999, p.11. 
 
35 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, London, Vintage Classics, 1997. 
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contexts. Multiple moralities exist within any given society and as such the moral community, 
and the conception of it forwarded within this dissertation, is a moral community that is varied 
and not fixed; varied due to our, the human beings, changing cultural contexts, and therefore, 
multi-layered identity. However, that is not to say that a global network of relationships is not 
possible, but what is central to any conception of a moral community under this framework is 
the idea of the relational and ‘nested’37 being and the conception of permeating and interlocking 
moral communities; the moral community of human beings is not about neat linear bonds and 
connections or evolving concentric circles, where one bond leads to another bond or set of 
bonds, it is far more complex, interrelated, and even ‘messy.’38  
As Abraham Edel and other philosophical anthropologists have suggested, ethics and our sense 
of morality must be seen in the full and varied context of our human life, grounded in human 
experience.39 I believe that any ethical approach needs to springboard from human experiences 
and from our complex and diverse situations and relationships. Edel sought to embrace the 
widest possible information about various existing moralities, and he lamented the limited ethical 
outlook taken by so many writers.40 MacIntyre’s oft quoted loss of cultural context, and the shrill 
and barren state41 of moral dialogue, has considerable bearing on this debate, as without 
awareness of our particular cultural setting I do not think we can adequately explore the ethical 
dilemmas we might face. The debate becomes impoverished and severely lacking without proper 
reflection on our nature within the total social-cultural-historical context; it is this context that 
writers such as Lawrence C. Becker, Tove Pettersen and John P. Liza all remind us that forms 
and creates not only our shell, but our very nature.42 Detaching ourselves from our own very 
unique social, cultural and moral contexts is not a satisfactory method for ethical reflection. 
Whilst I would concede that this makes the debate ‘labyrinthian’ in nature, to use one of Edel’s 
reflections on the nature of ethical theory and social practice, that is no reason to avoid this 
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minefield, as to do so is likely to reduce our understanding of our varied nature and will also 
mean we are not fully alert to the reality of our socialised identity, a reality that leaves human 
beings vulnerable and exposed to exclusions.  
Chapter One of the dissertation, Moving on from Personhood, explores some of the varying 
conceptions of personhood before considering some of the major concerns with these 
approaches and ‘personhood’ in general. As David Wiggins has suggested, philosophers have 
tried to hold together three main aspects within their conceptions of personhood: an object of 
biological, anatomical and neurophysiological inquiry; a subject of consciousness; and a locus of 
all sorts of moral attributes and the source or conceptual origin of value.43 What has resulted is a 
focus on one of these aspects at the expense of the other, or at best a writer may bolt on other 
considerations at certain junctures - and this is has been most notable within the philosophical 
discussion about personal identity, where very often the discussion has dislocated human identity 
from its cultural context. This is not to embrace the ‘healthy tension’ to which Robert Spaeman 
refers; he also writes that when we speak of personhood, we must acknowledge that personhood 
is situated quite firmly in the lives of human beings.44 I have particularly drawn on the way Butler 
and other sociologists have approached the issue of our so called ‘essential nature’ within the 
dissertation; demonstrations and reflections that reveal how difficult it is to give an account of 
oneself. Our identity is opaque and complex and our ‘situation’ is in fact crucial to an ethical 
understanding of the human being. I would agree that we can know ourselves only incompletely, 
and only in relation to our context or moral culture - a culture or moral world that has always 
preceded us and already shaped us in ways we cannot always grasp.45   
We cannot promote a concept of personhood that abstracts persons from the cultural and moral 
settings from which they operate. Instead a more complex and layered appreciation for the lives 
of others, which enriches our understanding of the self, is required. I would recommend that 
philosophers cut loose from the personhood, criteria driven, approach to the self. Rather than 
offering a new discourse of persons understood as human beings qua social, community bound 
beings, I feel it is essential to use the term ‘human being’ and not the term ‘person.’ We operate 
in a human culture and setting as human beings and it is from here that we have constructed the 
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and Personality, Oxford, Blackwell, 1987. 
 
44 Robert Spaeman, Persons: The Difference between ‘Someone' and ‘Something’, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006.  
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idea of personhood and the moral agent. The use of the term person is to stress the individual 
being and the accountable and autonomous nature of a being, and as such it suits legal and 
highly formal or metaphysical contexts.  
The term ‘human being’ suits the ethically ‘given’ or ‘bottom-up’ approach and framework I wish 
to endorse within this dissertation as opposed to an ethically ‘demanding’ or ‘top-down’ position, 
which should still have a place within ethical dialogue but a very different role. To extrapolate 
briefly, when referring to ethically given positions, I mean those facts about human nature that 
we can know to be features of human lives due to our biology but also due to our lived 
experiences, and certainly the labelling of something as a person is a characteristically 
anthropological use of the term. Ethically ‘given’ positions must draw on social and cultural 
factors and also other fields of study such as psychology and, most importantly, anthropology. 
Ethically demanding positions require a more demanding test for personhood to be bestowed 
and such a position often involves drawing a line around a group of beings due to the certain 
capacities that they can exhibit. The defining of personhood has come to refer to some particular 
quality or set of qualities that all persons are said to have in common, but it has also become 
much more, in that this quality or set of qualities has become a test and accords with certain 
rights being accorded and membership within a particular type of moral community.  
Kant famously attributed rationality to humans as it served as an indicator of moral agency and 
the personhood rhetoric has involved the drawing of distinctions and the testing and checking 
for capacities. John Locke, to with which whom one of the most famous personhood definitions 
is attributed,46 has written that the faculty of thinking separates the meaning of ‘man’ from 
‘person.’ ‘Man according to Locke, is ‘nothing but a participation of the same continued 
Life.....united to the same organised Body.’47 A person, however, is ‘a thinking, intelligent being 
that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself.’48 Personhood status for Locke, 
and for a large number of philosophers, hinges on reason, because ‘reason is that faculty which 
comes nearest the excellency of (God’s) own incomprehensible being.’ And so the ability to 
reason and think abstractly enables him to come to believe in God, enables him to be morally 
accountable and it is that quality which is shared between God and some men, and so for Locke, 
personhood is a rhetoric of status and elevation. We witness that certain types of capacities such 
as the ability to reason and think abstractly become the ‘gold-stamps’ for moral agency. Likewise, 
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autonomy and impartiality have something of a stronghold on the personhood and ethical 
dialogue. That is not to say that I do not think reason and autonomy cease to be important 
within ethical dialogue, far from it, but I do think they need to be recast alongside Gilligan’s 
notions of mature care and the morally mature agent who balances and embraces, rather than 
distances, ideas about the self and the other, and where reason is not pitted against, or elevated 
above, the emotions. There is a danger with seeing reason as abstract and disembodied49 and 
instead I endorse an embodied understanding of ourselves.  
The competing personhood theories often seek to elevate the person from the very factors we 
should be giving our full attention; factors such as the social and cultural, or an individual’s 
relations to others which may determine the nature and identity of the being residing within a 
moral community. We must not look to see what type of being is accorded membership within a 
moral community, but instead look at varying moral communities and see that the human being 
in a moral community is effectively one word, and that the human being is always operating in a 
moral context. Gilligan states that ‘deciding about abortion is not a unique problem disconnected 
from all other decisions and moral settings, but rather a dramatic and intensely lit example of 
choices people must make throughout their lives.’50  
Gilligan and Kittay, and those who seek an ethic and justice of care echo such feelings; such an 
approach moves away from equality of capacities and instead towards the fact that each of us is 
some mother’s child51 and that we are all given over to each other from the start due to our 
vulnerable and bodily nature.52 I develop the idea and relevance of being human and human birth 
in relation to conceptions of the moral community. Any position or definition of personhood 
has immediate practical significance and what we observe from some of the literature, is an 
author defining the beginning and ending of personhood in order to allow for certain moral 
behaviours; we act according to how personhood has been defined and so the personhood 
dialogue is often caught within a hermeneutic circle. As Ruth Macklin referred, ‘the antecedent 
values writers embrace determine the definition or criteria they arrive at by way of conclusion.’53 
Therefore, the question ‘who or what is a person?’ takes on new and more urgent meaning in 
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light of contemporary biomedical opportunities and this question needs to be placed within a 
social, rather than an individualistic framework.54 Personhood and abortion debates cannot 
languor in the abstract. Over-simplifying ‘the abortion debate,’ situating it in the realm of the 
abstract, denying the frequency with which abortions occur, failing to reflect on the varying 
cultural dimensions, focussing on one being’s rights over another and not fully exploring the 
experiences of all those concerned are all fundamental to the creation of marked categories and 
the morally repugnant exclusions to which Kittay refers.55 
Chapter Two, The Moral Community of Human Beings, further explores the themes of 
membership within a moral community and what exactly is meant by a moral community. I 
referenced Kant above and the idea that rationality was the indicator of moral agency; all rational 
beings should be treated never as a mere means but always as ends in themselves. Kantian ideas 
about rational moral agency or moral autonomy means that agents with such capacities can be 
the bearers of moral obligations and as such can function in a type of moral community. Many 
writers consider the idea of moral community in a similar way to how they approach personhood 
conceptions; they consider who qualifies for membership within the group and they tend to 
focus on a set of abilities in order for the inclusion of that being. Instead we should be 
considering moral communities from the perspective of context in the sense that moral 
communities are concrete and they emerge from our social settings. The human being is always 
in a moral community and this intimately overlaps with their particular social groupings (whether 
that is a natural, conventional or arbitrary social grouping) that figure so largely in our actual 
lives.  The socialised human being is both created by and left vulnerable by our social nature. 
Recent studies into abortion stigma reveal the process of favourable similarities and also 
unsavoury differences between human beings being labelled. What then follows is the creation of 
the ‘us-and-them’ culture, referred to already in this introduction, in that these labelled persons 
are effectively replaced within a separate category outside of the in-group and their moral 
community. This then leads to practical exclusions given that the person will feel this status loss, 
but they will also face ‘real’ and unequal outcomes and discrimination necessarily follows.56 This 
loss of status within a social network is ‘fundamentally a moral issue in which stigmatised 
conditions threaten what really matters.’57 The being at the heart of any moral community is a 
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55 Eva Feder Kittay, ‘At the Margins of Moral Personhood’, Ethics, 116, 2005, pp.100-131. 
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socialised human being and any understanding of a moral community must draw on social 
groups.  
In this Chapter, I explore philosophical and anthropological conceptions of community and a 
moral community. As stated above, I move away from the language of the moral community, as 
if there is just one ideal and mythical realm and instead explore just how complex the idea of a 
moral community is. We need to appreciate the complexities of talking about any moral 
community but also embrace the idea of lots of different moral communities in different 
contexts.  Abraham Edel’s work with his wife Mary Edel in Anthropology and Ethics is explored, as 
is the way that anthropology embraces a bottom up approach to ethics, in the sense that it is a 
descriptive process of reflecting on what is done in a particular setting and this helps me to 
bolster my argument about moral context.58 Clifford Geertz is a writer to whom I return 
regularly throughout the dissertation as he looks to the empirical studies of anthropology and he 
argues that what is important is that in order to understand the person or human being we must 
firmly position the inquiry within the presence of each human beings distinct human moral 
community or moral culture. Geertz quite rightly stresses that man is what he is, and what he 
becomes, by virtue of his culture.59 
Applying the context of the moral community of human beings to abortion debates will ensure 
that we consider moral codes that have emerged within our varying social and cultural contexts 
and will also demand that we reflect, and perhaps, even alter them. This approach immediately 
makes relevant not just our biological status as a human being and facts about the body, 
reproduction and pregnancy, but a whole range of factors relating to our emotions, sexual 
behaviours, parenting and also gender and cultural constructions relating to these ideas.60 
Abortion stigma and the impact of gendered norms has an important place within this 
dissertation as does the writings by those working within the field of the ethics of vulnerability 
and care ethics; care ethicists seek to attend to certain key areas, such as our nature as embedded 
beings, that certain emotions are valued (and of relevance to ethical dialogue) and that the 
morality of creative nurturance is transformative.61 The issue of abortion stigma and ‘unliveable 
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human lives’62 are further marginalisations that can emerge from a type of moral community, in 
that many people face a severe type of isolation because of this decision and because of their 
bodily constructs,63 and this is taken up in the final chapter of the dissertation  
In Chapter 3, Care Ethics, Phenomenology and Abortion, I argue that an ethic of care, 
coupled with a phenomenological approach, will provide the most fruitful framework when 
responding to ethical issues generated by abortion debates. As noted above, persons have come 
to be viewed and understood as beings that are rational, independent, autonomous agents and 
this is certainly the view found within the two predominant ethical theories of Utilitarianism and 
Kantian Deontology. As Virginia Held notes, ‘this conception of the person provides moralities 
highly suitable for legal, political and economic interactions between abstracted beings.’64 
Whereas Care Ethics is an ethical framework that understands that human beings are situated 
and operating within a web of complex networks and ‘nested dependencies.’65 Agency, for the 
care ethicist, is not criteria driven, and thus viewing the moral agent as either having capacities or 
failing to have them, but agency is seen as existing on a continuum66 and very much within the 
context of relationships. Gilligan and Nel Noddings astutely reflect on how capacities and 
abilities do not develop as an individualised activity or process, but rather in relation with 
others.67  
Proposing an ethic of care framework for the abortion debate is not, I believe, to forward a 
solely female perspective when considering the ethical considerations surrounding abortion 
debates. Gilligan and others68 have generated a general account of feminine identity which could 
be criticised as being ‘essentialist’ and as elevating the sacred mother69 metaphor as a defining 
experience for women.  However, I wish to use an ethic of care framework in order to consider 
a wide and varied range of social and cultural communities and moral identities.  An ethic of care 
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69 Jacqueline Davies is quoted in Amy Mullin, Reconceiving Pregnancy and Childcare: Ethics, Experience, and Reproductive Labour, Cambridge Studies in 
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approach values caring and interpersonal relationships – full and varied types of relationships 
must be acknowledged and valued. Care Ethics, like Communitarian Ethics, stresses the 
interdependence of human beings and thus takes relationships seriously, especially relationships 
within the family and a range of communities if developed effectively. The importance of taking 
relationships seriously cannot be underestimated, in that relationships are essential to agency and 
our moral lives. The cultural constructions of male and female moral identities have significant 
implications for the way in which they reflect on themselves as moral agents and in the way they 
are treated by others in abortion contexts.   
Care Ethics considers the full range of possible relationships, both intimate or within the wider 
community, but the approach also considers the context of a particular relationship. Care Ethics 
naturally encourages sympathy, empathy and care for others, but that is not without, or at the 
cost of, caring for oneself. Gilligan speaks of the importance of ‘mature care’70 which sees that 
authentic living requires there to be some moral equality between caring for the self and caring 
for others.  In terms of abortion debates, an ethic of care could add some complications in that 
this approach could perhaps reduce the ethical decision to that of deciding whether to nurture or 
not nurture, and given the value placed on the sentiment of care and nurture it may appear as if 
care ethics would foster an opportunity for this type of experience.  However, if we consider 
abortion in terms of Gilligan’s mature care, we should be reminded of the reality that you cannot 
do anything to the foetus without doing something to the mother and as such her lived 
experience, feelings, emotions and contextual settings need to be considered in full.  
Care Ethics naturally lends itself to being considered alongside a phenomenological approach in 
that a person’s own internal existence requires reflection. A phenomenological approach requires 
that we value relationships in a very particular sense in that we should learn about another 
person by listening to their descriptions of what their subjective world is like for them on the 
inside. A phenomenological approach demands that we have an encounter and that we listen as 
fully as possible, without interference, bias and preconceived ideas. Noddings writes that our 
ability to empathise with others is the finest and most important quality to being human.71 
Empathy is fully fostered within the phenomenological approach which stresses that we need to 
continually examine and re-examine our biases and presuppositions. The approach seeks to find 
the fullest possible understanding, but it starts with the co-enquirer wanting to understand 
another person’s world through experiences and social reality. In terms of abortion debates this 
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approach can help to give some value to the father or partner within the pregnancy and abortion 
dialogue, as this is an area that ethicists and society need to navigate more effectively and as such 
seek to include his voice in the process of decision making. This fundamental social reality to all 
our experiences transforms how we communicate and engage with others and it points towards 
interdependence between social beings. The phenomenologist sees that social reality is always 
composed of persons in society, people are always in some sense in a society, and are also always 
in a situation.72  
Tove Petterson takes up this strand in Care Ethics when she develops Gilligan’s mature care and 
says that co-feeling is essential for ethical dialogue.73 Co-feeling is the seeking to understand the 
full complexity of the other person’s situation. To return to the woman within the abortion 
dialogue, we ought to ask ourselves how we would respond to a woman who does not want a 
child. The care ethicist would stress understanding, support and guidance - there is no room for 
chastising and prescribing set behaviours. We are not the knowing agent that knows best; care 
would involve participating and engaging in that person’s feelings and that person’s life project 
and subjective and lived experiences. Petterson also steers away from a solely feminist ethic and I 
am in full support of such a move as it is essential to consider the situation and complexities 
facing men in society today, as Gilligan has since gone on to write about. Care needs to be 
appreciated and fostered by both boys and girls and men and women. Abortion is not a ‘typical’ 
or solely female dilemma because abortion is a connected and complex choice and whilst the 
woman’s role is undoubtedly unique there are still important factors related to masculine identity 
and parenting needing to be considered. Reproductive narratives and technological 
developments have transformed attitudes towards men and women and their roles and value in 
society and it is imperative that we reflect fully on these affects.74 
 
Butler offers further insight, which I think is imperative for the abortion narrative, when she 
speaks of liveable and unliveable lives and these themes are explored in Chapter Four, 
Vulnerability, Liveable Human Lives and Inclusivity. Butler’s approach to ethics demands 
we acknowledge our vulnerability; she argues that this fundamental vulnerability, and the extent 
to which we are all ‘given over to the other from the start, is the basis of our responsibility to 
respond ethically to the other and that which is human.’75 Similar ideas are explored by Robert 
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Goodin, who argues that our vulnerability and the vulnerability of others forms the moral basis 
of our moral responsibilities; his framework attends to our relational and embedded nature, the 
highly relative approach to caring for those closest to us as well as also effectively exploring our 
wider networks and circles of social responsibility.76 Butler observes that some societies 
‘construct’ bodies that are not ‘grieveable’ or worthy of mourning; these bodies ‘do not matter’ 
and they are not recognised as being human (having lives that are worthy of protection) and so 
not all lives are seen to be ‘liveable lives.’ The construction, and domain, of ‘liveable lives’ 
therefore constructs the realm of ‘unliveable lives’; those lives that are not afforded respect or 
the right to live according to one’s own way of being. Butler emphasises the importance of 
considering: ‘…what humans require in order to maintain and reproduce the conditions of their 
own liveability, and what are our politics such that we are, in whatever way possible, both 
conceptualizing the possibility of the liveable life and arranging for its institutional support.’77 In 
practice this demands that we seek to build moral communities and societies that are fully 
inclusive as consideration must also be given to how society can provide the space and support 
for different forms of ‘liveable lives’ to develop and be recognised. Again I return to the need for 
a more inclusive and broad definition and understanding of our human nature and, therefore, the 
communities we operate within.  
 
Vulnerability is what is common to the human being; human life is conditioned by 
vulnerability.78 Butler stresses that all human bodies are social and exposed to varying degrees of 
violence: ‘the body implies morality, vulnerability and agency: the skin and the flesh expose, us to 
the gaze of others, but also to touch and violence.’79 We are united by this exposure, but we are 
left vulnerable due to the fact that we are social in nature. Our social nature and certain social, 
cultural and political conditions need to be constantly reflected upon given that our ‘vulnerability 
becomes highly exacerbated under certain social conditions.’80 Certain human lives are certainly 
excluded according to Butler in that she recognises that whose lives matter depend on certain 
social and cultural norms and certain human bodies are not recognised as being human or as 
having lives worthy of protection and nurturing. Thus she questions: ‘Who counts as human? 
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Whose lives count as lives?’ Butler reminds us of the uniting truth of violence and vulnerability 
and that we are all bound together because of this. She writes that the human condition of 
interdependence and vulnerability should be the very basis of reimagining – instead of destroying 
– the possibility of community.81 
 
Chapter Five, Abortion Stigma and other Exclusions, explores the practical implications of 
the socialised human being and some of the exclusions a moral community can create; these 
include the vulnerability facing both males and females relating to violence and sexuality as well 
the real and current issue of abortion stigma.  
 
Abortion and unwanted pregnancies have generated ethical issues since time immemorial and 
there is evidence that abortion has been practiced throughout human history.82 George 
Devereux’s influential work on the history of abortion around the world, revealed both the 
regularity and variance relating to the practice.83 Today, there is a plethora of data and research to 
suggest that abortion is one of the most common gynaecological experiences and that perhaps 
the majority of women will undergo an abortion in their lifetimes.84 The research on the impact 
of abortion abounds: there is evidence that reveals dangerous health related stigma to the 
abortion procedure in some cultures; there are also considerable dangers for women who cannot 
seek an abortion easily; there are also articles indicating that, in opposition to stronghold views 
that abortion is stigmatised, within some age groups abortion is not only openly discussed but 
becoming normalised85and even glamorised.86  
 
The impact of abortion on women’s health confirmed my thoughts on the need for a contextual 
framework; the abortion dialogue needs the springboard of a uniquely human moral community. 
Such an approach is not to flatten out the abortion rhetoric, far from it, or to uphold the 
elevated position of the ‘person,’ but rather attends to the real thrust of the abortion narrative – 
that it is an ethical dilemma set within a very particular and complex human moral community. 
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As Tom Shakespeare so astutely reflects, ‘people are disabled by society and by their bodies.’87 
Many human beings face dangerous marginalisations and exclusions because of their decision to 
have an abortion, because they were trying to attend to their own complex set of health needs - 
health needs that relate to both their bodily nature, but also their wider social settings.  
With ever-expanding networks and ‘moral communities,’ the need to recognise ourselves as 
human beings - participants in a fluid and varied moral community - is essential. It is from this 
platform that we can then refuse to enact exclusions and try to live out Butler’s call to make a 
concern for all human lives a real and valid ethical concern. The moral status of the human 
foetus within this dynamic is certainly unique.  The foetus is most in a direct relationship with 
the woman and since no one else can do anything directly to the foetus without also doing 
something to the woman, the decision to continue with the pregnancy is rooted within her life 
experiences.88  That is not to reduce the role of the father within the abortion discussion, as an 
ethic of care and phenomenological approach seeks dialogue and the fullest possible picture 
when facing ethical decisions in social settings. Human beings are fundamentally relational 
beings and the moral agent is relational in that each of us develops through our relationships 
with others. The human being is both created and left vulnerable by our social nature and so the 
most important question for any ethical system and conception of a moral community is, does 
this approach give full inclusion and consideration to human beings and their varying and diverse 
lives?  
 
The screaming rhetoric about rights and murder89 remains a striking peculiarity within abortion 
debates; abortion is not an isolated abstract choice between rights claimants or the principles of 
sanctity and autonomy. In its simplest sense, abortion could be said to be about ‘the self,’ but 
more accurately it is about the self in context; in the context of relationships, in the context of 
our experiences and it should also be understood within the context of health and the prevention 
of harm in the fullest and most nuanced of senses.  
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Chapter One: Moving on From Personhood 
 
1.1 Conceptions of Personhood and related Abortion debates 
 
The literature on personhood certainly abounds, and it would be fair to say that writers have 
often embraced the idea of competing conceptions of personhood. This is not surprising, given 
the real life ‘urgency’ to which Eva Feder Kittay refers and yet many authors have been 
somewhat intrigued by the fascination with the term ‘person.’90 To argue for a broad and 
inclusive conception of personhood gives a maximum level of protection to certain beings, 
whereas traditionally conceptions of personhood have in fact been considerably narrower in their 
reach. Conceptions of personhood have generally argued that there is a particular ‘essence’ that a 
person possesses and that there is set of criteria that must, or should, be present for someone to 
be considered a person. Morality is anchored in respect and more specifically respect for the 
person; when philosophers use the term ‘person,’ they use it to make a distinction between being 
alive biologically and having a life that matters morally and is worthy of respect.91 If we ‘respect’ 
persons, then we have a moral duty to acknowledge that being’s, or agent’s, autonomy; we have 
obligations to persons, therefore, that we do not have to other beings and as such certain moral 
behaviour is not permitted by virtue of someone or something being granted personhood.  
 
‘The abortion debate’ is an area where the demarcation between the human being and the person 
is regularly cited and discussed (although there is also much interchangeable usage of the two 
terms). There are varying competing conceptions of personhood which tend to focus on the 
capacities a being must possess (often a human being opposed to other beings) in order for it to 
‘gain’ personhood or to be seen as a person, and therefore a bearer of certain moral rights. The 
importance for the abortion debate is clear, therefore, since to accord personhood at a certain 
stage is to then endow the foetus with certain levels of protection. This of course assumes then 
that personhood and a being with certain rights go hand in hand. Therefore, personhood 
becomes some sort of talisman to ward off unethical behaviour and the term to label a being 
with, if it is to be protected; there are things we do to non-persons that we would never do to 
persons. Philosophers have sought, confusingly, to analyse and elevate the concept of ‘person’ 
and competing conceptions of personhood have pursued the specific individual qualities that 
grounds a being's claim to having a morally significant life.  
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When the discussion of personhood and abortion was perhaps at its height, Ruth Macklin 
responded to this stand-off, or ‘impasse’92 within the debate and concluded that continued focus 
on personhood would be of little help in seeking any kind of consensus. I would certainly agree 
with Macklin’s concerns about hermeneutics and methodology within the dialogue; it is a striking 
feature of the abortion and personhood debate that authors have defined the ‘starting point’ of 
personhood so that we can act in a certain way, that is we act according to how we have defined 
it so. There are some serious problems with the personhood and abortion rhetoric, as I will 
explore shortly, and I believe that we need to disengage with the concept of the person (in the 
way that Judith Jarvis Thompson and Dom Marquis suggest93). In the case of the abortion 
rhetoric, so much of the problem surrounding the dialogue is that persons are very often seen as 
‘reason givers’ or the ‘bearers of moral obligations’ rather than a being in relation to another 
being. The term ‘person’ is, therefore, too narrow in its scope; it does not address the fullness of 
human nature and our layered moral identity. It is what I referred to in my introduction as an 
ethically demanding principle and it endorses a top-down approach to the issue of our nature 
opposed to an ethically given or bottom-up approach.  
 
Alasdair MacIntyre has explored the quite ‘remarkable history’94 of the term ‘person’ and his 
writings have been an important springboard for this dissertation. MacIntyre writes in his book 
Dependent Rational Animals that ‘human vulnerability and disability’ are the ‘central features of 
human life.’ He argues that the ‘Thomistic ‘virtues of dependency’ are needed for individual 
human beings to flourish in their passage from stages of infancy to adulthood and old age.’95 
Whilst Kantian ethics requires moral agents to be rational and autonomous, because a rational 
being has the ability to comprehend and implement the moral law, virtue ethics requires a focus 
on relationships in that practice and experience is essential to the developing character of the 
moral agent. The discussion about living an objectively desirable life is an ancient one; is this aim 
a chief human good? Authors’ views on human nature and human psyche vary enormously as I 
have stressed, but how can we know what it is to flourish without knowing what it is to be a 
human being.  
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The concept of personhood has been so visibly central to our moral, metaphysical and cultural 
systems of thought and, as we shall see, it has not only a historical depth to it, but also an 
evolving nature. The concept of the person falls into what W. B. Gallie terms an ‘essentially 
contested concept,’96that is, a concept over which there is disagreement over its proper use and 
where ‘there is no clearly definable general use....which can be set up as the correct or standard 
use.’ Each party continues to defend its case with what it claims to be convincing arguments, 
evidence and other forms of justification. 97 Some have argued that the concept of the person is 
an essentially contested concept and if it is fundamental to the abortion debate then the debate is 
therefore not able to be resolved. Whilst I would agree that the term ‘person’ is the major 
problem within the abortion dialogue I do not think the term is fundamental to the debate, and 
likewise I am not sure the language of ‘solving’ and ‘resolving’ the abortion problem really grasps 
the complexities of the issue. There are in fact good reasons to continue to engage with the 
dispute and not completely abandon the term ‘person’ however, the competing personhood 
theories have often sought to elevate the person from the very factors we should be giving our 
full attention. As Amélie Oksenberg Rorty writes ‘what is required is not more ingenuity for 
more elaborate strategies, but an understanding of the conflicting interpretation of what has been 
at issue.’98 To understand the conflicts and pitfalls will mean that the dialogue can move forward 
more effectively and, as I will try to show, using the term ‘person’ should be done within the 
context and setting from which the term derived.  
 
We cannot promote a narrow concept of personhood that abstracts persons from the cultural 
and moral settings from which they operate. We could have, and maintain, a narrower usage for 
the term ‘person’ but only if we then embrace a wider and richer moral vocabulary and one that 
makes central usage of the idea of the human being.  This vocabulary would endorse a more 
complex and layered appreciation for the lives of others and as such it would enrich our 
understanding of the self. I would recommend that philosophers cut loose from the personhood, 
criteria driven, approach to the self; rather than offering a new discourse of 'persons' understood 
as human beings qua social, community bound, beings I feel it is essential to use the term human 
being and not person (as the idea of the ‘person’ is not redundant, but rather specific and narrow 
in its scope). The socialised human being in a moral community needs to be the predominant 
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understanding we forward when considering ethical, social and political dilemmas. As stated in 
my introduction, abortion debates cannot be resolved in the abstract any more than issues 
relating to gender politics and poverty can. However, that is not to say that a more formal and 
individualised term such as the term ‘person’ should become redundant and I explore the use of 
the two terms, ‘person’ and the ‘human being’, at the end of this chapter.  
 
The abortion discussion requires a bottom-up approach and an ethically given understanding. 
Bottom-up thinking99 requires an approach that starts with the facts and is bound to the 
particulars – facts of time and context. A top-down approach and ethically demanding position, 
however, starts with higher principles or categorical formulations. However, definitions of 
personhood are not simply lofty speculations as they have immediate moral significance, if we 
equate personhood with a morally significant life. I do not believe that abortion debates can be 
addressed effectively by legislating definitions, but that has certainly been the method of choice 
for many philosophers. What follows in the section below is a summary of the predominant 
ways that personhood has been accounted for, and how these have informed abortion debates.  
 
1.1.1 Biological accounts of Personhood 
 
The biological understanding of personhood, or what Simon Evnine refers to as realism,100  
could be viewed as almost stunningly successful in that it has provided an observable framework 
as ‘science can tell us what is a human being’101and what is not. Science defines life as the 
possession of self-sustaining biological processes, and such a definition certainly helps to 
distinguish between the living and the dead.102 It is perhaps the most obvious way to see 
‘persons’ as constituting a real kind, this is to identify the kind person with the biological kind 
Homo sapiens.  
Much personhood criteria forwarded by authors hinges around our biological nature and this has 
strong historical roots in an Aristotelian and Thomistic framework, which holds that the human 
person is a composite of a biological organism and an intellective soul. We will consider 
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theological reflections on personhood and ideas about ensoulment specifically in section 1.1.4 
Theological accounts of Personhood below, and indeed I regularly draw on theological ideas 
within this dissertation. Biological approaches can result in views that accept or accord 
personhood at conception (although biology can define life at even the cellular level) or even at 
birth. John Noonan holds that a being is human or worthy of personhood if it was conceived by 
human parents, because then that being is also biologically human.  Noonan states, ‘that, if you 
are conceived of human parents, you are human.’103 Certainly it would be questionable to deny 
‘humanhood’ to a being born of human parents, but would the being also have personhood? He 
holds that unique and complete human genetic code is what serves to make an organism a 
human. The sort of code required for biological humanness will consist in one which is 
genetically identical with that of Homo sapiens. As we have seen, when debates ensue about the 
rights of the foetus against the rights of the mother, the actual life of the mother is compared 
with the potential life of the foetus in order to argue that the claims of either the mother 
supersedes those of the foetus or vice versa. Noonan makes strong use and reference to the 
potentiality of the embryo and foetus, given the probability that a foetus will develop into a full-
grown human and in that it has the potential to be a member of a society. In Noonan’s support 
of the right to life of the embryo and foetus he writes ‘it is wrong to kill humans, however poor, 
weak, defenceless, and lacking in opportunity to develop their potential they may be . . . similarly 
it is morally wrong to kill embryos.104 
Eric Olson has famously made a case for animalism:  ‘It is a truism that you and I are human 
beings. It is also a truism that a human being is a kind of animal: roughly a member of the 
primate species Homo sapiens. It would seem to follow that we are animals. Yet that claim is 
deeply controversial.’105 Olson and Norman Ford have both argued that the beginning of an 
individual human biological organism occurs at the moment when implantation of the zygote in 
the uterus occurs and the ‘primitive streak’ begins to form.106 Before this stage there is biological 
life at the cellular level, as described above, but this is not an individual human organism, 
because before this stage there is still the potential for a split and for one or more separate 
human organisms to emerge, for example identical twinning. The term for the human embryo at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 John T. Noonan, Jr., ‘An Almost Absolute Value in History,’ in John T. Noonan (ed.), The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, 
Cambridge, Harvard University press, 1970, p.118. 
 
104 John T. Noonan, Jr., ‘Deciding Who Is Human’, Natural Law Forum, 13, 1968, p.134. 
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this stage is the blastocyst, a stage when the human embryo attaches or implants to the wall of 
the uterus.  
 
Now, certainly there has been a move away from the moment of conception for some wishing to 
promote a biological account of personhood given that conception is not a ‘moment,’ but rather 
a process and given the argument for twinning i.e. it can’t be a person because it might be two 
persons. Although many argue that given the moral dimension of the personhood discussion, if 
one’s practical intent is to protect the earliest stage of human life, then the possibility of twinning 
does not lessen, but rather doubles the status and dignity of the zygote. As Denis Sullivan writes: 
‘In a similar way, an embryo that splits is fully a person prior to twinning; a second person (also 
possessing the diploid condition) begins at the moment of the split. One of the two resulting 
embryos (it does not matter which) is ontologically continuous with the original fertilized 
ovum.’107 Here I am inclined to agree with Daniel Callahan, that when seeking to define or 
discover an account of the person, we should consider the entire career of ‘man’ (both man’s 
highs and lows in terms of their capacities) and he writes that to be human is ‘more than just 
displaying certain human characteristics at a set point.’108 
 
Here we get to the crux of the issue, is it clear that one’s biological status necessarily says 
anything about their moral or ontological status? Noonan’s position also reveals the 
interchangeable use of the terms ‘person’ and ‘human being.’ Does ‘being human’ mean 
genetically human, physically resembling a ‘normal adult human being, or something else?’109 
Noonan could be seen to be combing the two distinct categories of the biological and the moral, 
however, I am not remotely persuaded that the term ‘person’ describes one category whilst the 
human being is something entirely distinct from this, I do not think either conception can be 
grasped so neatly, but for different reasons. Noonan’s second strand to his argument refers to 
the probability of personhood, however there are considerable problems with using the 
probability of conception as the starting point for personhood as Michael Sandel reflects: ‘If the 
embryo loss that accompanies natural procreation were the moral equivalent of infant death, 
then pregnancy would have to be regarded as a public health crisis of epidemic proportions: 
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Alleviating natural embryo loss would be a more urgent moral cause than abortion, in vitro 
fertilization, and stem cell research combined.’110  
Evnine states, ‘even if we accept as a matter of fact rather than necessity that all persons are 
human beings, it may appear problematic for this version of ‘realism’ that not all human beings 
are obviously persons.’111 There is not in fact scientific consensus as to when personhood begins 
and scientists might in fact consider a range of positions as Scott Gilbert explores. He considers 
the following possible positions: fertilisation (an individual genotype and a cell capable of 
developing into human or humans); gastrulation (animal-specific movement and no longer an 
ability to form into twins, etc.); EEG perinatal period (an ability to breath or a form of legal 
personhood, when the infant becomes a distinct entity from the mother) and gradual 
humanisation during embryogenesis.112  
The biological approach to personhood leads undoubtedly to anthropomorphic speciesism, 
which is ethically suspicious; the solely biological approach does involve arbitrarily drawing lines 
around a certain group and as such may exclude a group that may well in fact deserve 
consideration. E. J. Lowe criticises the view of a person as a kind of species or animal, he 
suggests that this approach only allows for human beings as persons and he argues that this is 
not only ‘morally repugnant and dangerously arrogant, but also symptomatic of a philosophically 
inadequate imagination.’113  Equally concerning is the fact that part of what it is to be a human 
being is in fact something distinct from the biological substance that is their body. The biggest 
concern with the approach is that it reduces the notion of the human being, and, whilst I agree 
with MacIntyre that the aversion to our animal status cannot be continually blocked from the 
philosophical dialogue, the reductionist approach is equally alarming, particularly for feminists 
who are very alert to the dangers of associating women with their ‘biological destiny.’114 Roger 
Scruton writes that the scientific truth about Homo sapiens is not the whole truth about 
mankind: ‘We are members of the human species. But we are also persons and, as such, 
animated through and through by an ideal of what that species might achieve. The concept of 
the person has no place in biological science, for the term ‘person’ is not a biological category.115 
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Whilst I agree that the usage of person is not a biological category entirely, I do not think we 
help this dialogue by narrowly defining terms and as such placing them in one category opposed 
to another. I think that the term ‘person’ is something distinct from the idea of the human being 
in the sense that I do not think the two terms are interchangeable and there are beings that could 
be persons that are not human beings; a human organism is an entirely biological category, but a 
human being is not. However, I do not think the idea of the human being is an entirely biological 
category (although human beings are animals of the species Homo sapiens) and being human is 
far more than this and we must embrace a more layered understanding of our nature. 
A sole focus on our biological capacities can, as Ronald Dworkin describes, fail to appreciate the 
many dimensions of human life and ‘human investment.’116 I also think E. J. Lowe’s point is 
important and illuminating for moving the debate forward. I am entirely open to non-human 
beings being considered persons, but only if we clear up what is means to be a human being or a 
person first; do we mean genetically human or physically resembling a normal adult human? The 
two terms are not interchangeable, although likely to be related, and as I stated above, we may 
well wish to uphold the formal and more ethically demanding term ‘person,’ but only if we give 
more ethical space to the idea of human being.  Personhood perhaps should be defined narrowly 
and thus restricting its scope to include only those who have an actualized capacity for agency 
and rationality, but then this approach cannot be done so without a full understanding of the 
human being as the predominant ethical framework. Daniel Dennett has a similar reflection 
when he considers the idea of the moral and the metaphysical117 person; he does not use the 
terminology of the human being but his interconnected two notions of personhood are useful 
pointers and his conditions for personhood are explored below in the section on psychological 
accounts. Evnine uses the example of Martians who, whilst not belonging to the species Homo 
sapiens, may well have capacities commensurate, albeit distinct to ours and as such should be 
considered persons but not human beings. Martians could be included within the personhood 
category but not within the moral community of human beings, a conception I will forward 
within this dissertation as they would also be situated within a social and cultural context of their 
own and a moral community of their own  - a moral community of Martians!  
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Traditional definitions of biological humanness or personhood act as a pointer to what is a 
member of the human species, but they fail to define both what a human being is and what a 
person is. Human beings are more than simply biological entities, although their biological nature 
is a highly important layer, and it is clear that humans and persons cannot be distinguished solely 
by virtue of a biological feature, or for that matter a psychological feature as to do so will leave 
us with an impoverished understanding of human nature. Our biological nature and the 
biological basis for understanding the human being is essential for knowing what a human is but a 
human’s biological capacities are, as Geertz reminds us, transformed through the medium of 
culture and that biological factors can only prove to be useful if the links between these factors 
and others, such as his behaviours, are seen as unitary.118 The biological and the cultural are 
permeating layers when seeking to understand our nature. The widest variety of human 
characteristics need to given attention and in fact the genetic characteristics of being human are 
an important part of understanding our nature, but more appropriately our nature as human 
beings in a moral community, although in terms of the narrower personhood conception this is a 
more removed, although not a redundant, factor.  
 
1.1.2  Psychological accounts of Personhood  
As an alternative to the biological or realist conception of personhood, other philosophers have 
identified the person with a set of psychological functions and this position is often referred to 
as a functionalist or qualitative view. Such functions and abilities are usually present in actual, not 
potential form. The identification of the person is associated with a being having particular 
abilities or qualities of awareness and, as Wiggins suggests, this view sees the person as a subject 
of experience or consciousness. Advocates of the psychological criterion for personhood argue 
that persons are, by definition, psychological beings; this definition reveals that a person is being 
thought of as necessarily having a psychology and not merely just a human organism. Such 
advocates follow Locke’s famous forensic personhood definition: ‘a thinking intelligent being 
that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different 
times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, 
and, as it seems to me, essential to it...’119 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Clifford Geertz, ‘The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man’, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Chicago/Il./USA: The 
Atomic Scientists of Chicago, vol. 22 no. 4, 1966, pp.2-8. 
 
119 Book II, Chapter 27, 9. 
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1975, p.335. 
 
35	  
	  
In his article ‘Abortion and Infanticide’ Michael Tooley furthered the idea of self-awareness as 
the essential function that would accord a being the status of personhood. Tooley argued that 
there was not a person present, ‘unless there was a concept of a self, as a continuing subject of 
experiences and other mental states, and (it) believes that it is itself a continuing entity.’120 What 
we can see from Tooley’s essay is how the interest in capacities and the right to life idea 
forcefully entered the abortion dialogue. For Tooley, only beings that can have desires and 
interests can have rights and a right to life. Foetuses and newborn infants may well be potential 
persons and have the potential to have such rights, but his overall position is that they do not 
have a right to life as they lack essential self-consciousness. In the same year that Tooley’s 
infamous paper appeared on the scene, Joseph Fletcher, also outlined twenty criteria for human 
personhood or what he referred to as ‘humanhood.’ His list of criteria also included self-
awareness as well as the ability to comprehend a sense of time and also the ability to relate to 
others.  
 
Some definitions of personhood consider sentience as a key function or ability and Peter Singer 
and L. W. Sumner’s views are a good example of this kind of position. On this view, a ‘person’ 
equals a sentient being or this function offers a central part of the description of the person. 
According to Sumner, it is sentience that grants an organism the right to be acknowledged as a 
person. Sumner states that a ‘being is sentient when it has the capacity to experience pleasure and 
pain and thus the capacity for enjoyment and suffering.’121 Singer argues ‘the minimal 
characteristic which is needed to give the embryo a claim to consideration is sentience, or the 
capacity to feel pleasure or pain. Until the embryo reaches that point, there is nothing we can do 
which causes harm to it.’122 This stems from the utilitarian focus on sentience and a reduction in 
suffering. In attempting to provide the greatest happiness for the greatest number, we must take 
into account the happiness and suffering that would be accrued by all sentient beings. Singer 
however, is proposing a utilitarian system with the ‘best interests’ of the individual concerned at 
the heart of the ethical system. He replaces ‘pleasure’ in the traditional calculus with ‘best 
interests.’ For Singer, personhood and a right to life is bound up with a being’s ability to and 
capacity to hold preferences and/or have interests. Unlike Bentham and Mill’s utilitarianism, 
Singer is more individualistic and he focussed far more on rationality, although he views 
rationality as an evolved characteristic and not something associated only with humans. 
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Therefore, he uses the term ‘person’ in the sense of a ‘rational and self conscious being.’123 Singer 
suggests that a newborn’s legal right to life could begin a week or month after birth, and he and 
Helga Kushe write, ‘we must recall however, that when we kill a newborn infant there is no 
person whose life has begun. When I think of myself as the person I am now, I realise that I did 
not come into existence until sometime after my birth.’124 Singer’s functionalist view of 
personhood is in flux therefore, in that human beings can move towards full personhood and 
also gradually lose their personhood as their abilities and faculties decrease.125  
 
Tooley and Singer’s accounts of personhood are somewhat controversial when it comes to 
human beings at the boundaries of ‘life’, but they do allow for the possibility of animals being 
accorded personhood or membership within a moral community. Daniel Dennett makes a case 
for personhood, however, his position would exclude animals and also young children. Dennett’s 
position is part of what is referred to as the nominalist approach, where necessary and sufficient 
conditions are provided for personhood and aims to provide a more complete catalogue and 
analysis of criteria. Dennett includes six criteria including communication and narrative. 
Something is considered a person if it is rational; it is the subject of psychological, mental or 
intentional states; it is treated in a certain and personal way by others; it reciprocates this attitude; 
it is capable of verbal communication; it is conscious in some way (self conscious).126 Dennett’s 
inclusion of verbal communication is certainly something very unique to his work127 and it is 
what I have referred to as an ethically demanding approach in that in that many human beings 
cannot actualise (currently) this capacity due to their infantile stage or through loss. However we 
recall his interconnected and yet distinct notions of persons, the moral and the metaphysical 
person, and verbal communication would surely fall into the narrower metaphysical idea of 
personhood rather than something that would render a particular human a non-person or not a 
moral being or agent.128 Again, this is perhaps an important distinction and echoes my desire for 
a broader set of vocabulary when exploring our nature. The metaphysical idea of personhood is 
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an important one in that it grasps the desire for capacity advancement and what Scruton 
describes ‘as an animation through and through about what we might become’ and it is part of 
the ethically demanding and top-down approach I have outlined. And yet are we ever a 
completed member of the species? Surely we ‘err,’ and lack rationality and a range of capacities, 
and often we are entirely dependent, far from autonomous, for large stages of our human lives 
and we can face great loss in terms of our abilities as Cora Diamond discusses.129 Therefore I 
recommend this approach cannot maintain a stronghold position within practical ethics at the 
detriment of an ethically given and bottom-up approach to ethical dilemmas. There are 
‘metaphysical’ capacities espoused within the idea of the person which, whilst they are of moral 
relevance, are not found in all human beings such as the mentally disabled or young children. 
Diamond upholds the importance of the term human being for ethics and asks us to understand 
that notion not in a biological or psychological sense, but imaginatively.130  
 
The nominalist position espoused by Dennett is undoubtedly criteria driven and I would suggest 
that there are serious ethical concerns stemming from this approach; as Wiggins and others have 
suggested, what tends to happen is that the list of necessary or sufficient conditions are hard to 
draw up and so philosophers have either tended to ‘come down hard’ on certain select 
conditions (which would mean that many human beings, such as the very young or impaired, are 
not in fact persons despite the fact that many would have intuitively argued they are), or they 
instead have to reference regularly human beings ‘as we know them’ to determine the class 
person.131  
 
Tooley and Singer’s philosophical positions have faced considerable criticisms for a variety of  
reasons. Firstly, despite Tooley’s belief that such criteria are ‘properties of a purely descriptive 
sort’, how in fact are we to measure such psychological capacities? Do we in fact have adequate 
means of testing self consciousness? Not having a serious right to life due to a lack of self 
awareness would in fact impact upon a range of humans from young infants to a person under 
anaesthetics. Singer’s philosophy has been challenged by Scruton who has said it derives from 
‘radical moral conclusions from a vacuous utilitarianism that counts the pain and pleasure of all 
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living things as equally significant and that ignores just about everything that has been said in our 
philosophical tradition about the real distinction between humans and animals.’132 
 
For Singer, Tooley and Dennett a human person is defined by a list of functional traits which 
seem to exclude a newborn baby by definition. Tooley, Singer, and others would even use this as 
a justification for infanticide. Joel Feinberg argues that infanticide is wrong and that Singer and 
Tooley’s focus on a serious right to life completely misses the point; infanticide is wrong because 
of our social nature and that society’s protection of infants in fact has a social utility. R. N. 
Wennberg also finds their position on abortion and infanticide objectionable, and argues that 
there is a difference between those beings with a potential capacity for rationality and those with a 
developed capacity.133 Francis Beckwith would respond to the capacity driven functionalist account 
and argue that human beings have certain inherent capacities, which may currently not be fully 
realized: ‘It does not make sense to say that a person comes into existence when human function 
arises, but it does make sense to say that a fully human person is an entity who has the natural 
inherent capacity to give rise to human functions.’134 I think that the power of the gradualist 
position is undeniable, just as conception is a process not a moment, likewise it is strange to 
suggest a set of faculties that equate with personhood suddenly occurring. Again we are 
reminded of Callahan’s point relating to seeing ‘man’ in the context of his whole life or ‘career’ 
and appreciating that we are all vulnerable and imperfect. Brian Christian’s popular book The 
Most Human Human shows Christian appears more ‘human’ when competing against the ‘most 
human computers’, when he reveals himself to be the most ‘difficult and imperfect competitor’ 
and when his answers reveal more ambiguity, richness of context and an excess of context.135  
 
The psychological and qualitative accounts of personhood throw up certain problems in that it 
often conflicts quite strongly with what the layperson and the philosopher have said and 
understood about humanity and it can often exclude a large number of beings from its scope.  In 
addition to these concerns, there is still the problem that the moral and social dimension of being 
a person is sorely neglected.136 Christine Korsgaard in particular took up this strand of criticism 
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in response to Derek Parfit’s positions on personal identity relating to psychological continuity. 
She has objected to the thought experiments employed by Parfit and other writers within the 
field of personal identity. The use of thought experiments and conceptual puzzles within ethics 
and the personhood literature has resulted in much discussion. Whilst some would find 
philosophy unrecognisable137 without the use of thought experiments, I would wish to flag up 
some concerns I have with their usage, particularly within this area of ethical debate. Part of the 
problem with the use of thought experiments is that I do not think that they always tell us 
anything new, but rather can reinforce already held beliefs. In which case, does this approach not 
mean that the thought experiment device can sometimes fail to reveal truths about the world, 
but rather only reveal the emotions and already held beliefs of the enquirer? In terms of the 
conception of person this can only continue to abstract the idea of the person from the cultural 
settings in which we in fact operate. However, I would not wish to rule out all thought 
experiments given that so many offer highly unique ways of looking at a situation, and this is 
something this dissertation would strongly endorse. It is important to recognise the plurality of 
forms of engagement with the issues in this context, a plurality that can be enhanced by certain 
types of thought experiments. I do, however, also believe that certain though experiments have 
been most unhelpful within philosophical ethics, most particularly when a contextual setting is 
lost.  One of the most famous thought experiments within abortion writing is Judith Jarvis 
Thomson’s ailing violinist, and this analogy seems to devalue the role of relationships within the 
abortion dialogue and it also fails to appreciate the complexities of the abortion situation. Both 
Tooley and Thomson are guilty of not making enough of the uniqueness of each abortion case 
and its particular contextual settings and in the way that writers such as Noonan focus solely on 
the status of the foetus, Tooley and Thomson could be seen as overly focussing on the status of 
the female.  
 
As I will argue later in Chapter Three, Care Ethics, Phenomenology and Abortion I think 
that thought experiments must not become tools to reinforce certain moral reasoning skills (at 
the expense of others) that are deemed superior by some authors. The thought experiment can 
help someone see the world differently, but authors need to be alert to the dangers of dislocating 
the enquiry from the very facts to which I believe we should be giving our full attention. I will 
explore further and summarise the major pitfalls relating to the personhood rhetoric below in 
section 1.2 Problems with Personhood: Hermeneutics, Language and Practicalities and 
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the use of thought experiments and the reliance on intuitions and analogies are my main sources 
of concern.  
1.1.3 Substantive accounts of Personhood 
 
Lynne Rudder Baker navigated the concerns relating to the psychological accounts and 
functionalist position by arguing that the person is neither equivalent to the human organism and 
not just simply a functional specification of a human organism, but rather as a relation between a 
substance and a quality.138 In her paper ‘When does a Person Begin?’, she argues that rooting an 
understanding in the natural world is an important first step. She writes: ‘I believe that we are 
fundamentally persons who are constituted by human organisms. Since constitution is not 
identity, human persons may come into existence at a different time from the organisms that 
constitute them.’139 She makes the distinction between our biology and our ontology and also 
seeks to remove the personhood debate from the issues of terminology. Something Sisella Bok 
also flagged up when she wrote: ‘a number of concepts are at times used as if interchangeable. 
‘Humanity,’ ‘human life,’ ‘life’ are such concepts as are ‘man,’ ‘person,’ or ‘human individual’ or 
‘human person.’’140 Rudder Baker stresses that she would prefer to use the term ‘human being’ 
when referring to the human person, but steers away from this in order to avoid ambiguity.  
 
The substantive view argues that persons are constituted by human beings and subjectivity is 
essential to persons and relational factors play a key role in their constitution. Because of their 
essential psychological, moral and cultural nature, persons are not reducible to their biological 
status, although very much informed by it. This approach immediately makes relevant not just 
our biological status as a human being and facts about the body, reproduction and pregnancy, 
but a whole range of factors relating to our feelings and emotions, social context, parenting and 
also gender and cultural constructions relating to these ideas.141 
 
The constitutional view of human persons holds that human persons are constituted by bodies 
(i.e., organisms) without being identical to the constituting organisms. Rudder Baker fully 
embraces our biological nature but does not think our animal nature ‘exhausts our nature all 
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things considered.’ Rudder Baker wrote in her paper ‘Persons and Bodies’ that a human person 
comes into existence when a human organism develops a robust first-person perspective or the 
structural capacity for one, she has spoken of and defined this rudimentary first person 
perspective elsewhere: Rudimentary FPP. A being has a rudimentary first-person perspective, if 
and only if (i) it is conscious, a sentient being; (ii) it has a capacity to imitate; and (iii) its 
behaviour is explainable only by attribution of beliefs, desires, and intentions.142 
The onset of a first-person perspective marks the entry of a new entity in the world. The view 
has important implications when thinking about beginning of life ethics and abortion in 
particular. The consequence is that a foetus is not a person. ‘Just as a hunk of marble is in an 
ontologically distinct category from a statue, so is a foetus in an ontologically distinct category 
from a person. Thus, the constitution view gives one an ontological reason to deny that the foetus 
is a person. Anyone who takes it to be morally abhorrent to force a rape victim to bear the 
rapist’s child has in addition a good moral reason to deny that the foetus is a person. Anyone who 
believes that there is even a possibility of morally relevant differences among pregnancies should 
welcome the thesis that follows from the constitution view: A foetus is not a person.’143 
 
So, for Rudder Baker a human foetus is an organism that does not constitute a person. By taking 
the personhood argument off the agenda, she then leaves spaces for a consideration relating to 
the woman’s circumstances and context. In terms of my concerns regarding the focus on the 
relational and subjective nature of our identity and the abortion debate, Rudder Baker’s position 
can certainly respond in that for her subjectivity is essential to personhood. She argues that 
persons cannot exist independently of their having, and being related, to other beings with 
propositional attitudes.  
 
1.1.4 Theological accounts of Personhood 
 
The personhood dialogue played a key role in many central theological accounts including 
Boethius’ writings seeking to extrapolate the meaning of persons within a Trinitarian framework. 
Boethius’ definition of personhood, ‘the individual substance of a rational nature,’ was an effort 
to explain the idea of the theological ‘person’ to a more general audience. In many ways this 
definition dislocated personhood from essential theological and Trinitarian ideas and instead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Lynne Rudder Baker, ‘The Ontological Status of the Persons,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65, 2, 2002, pp.370-388. 
 
143 http://people.umass.edu/lrb/files/bak05wheaP.pdf 
	  
42	  
	  
personhood became equated with the possession of a particular quality or set of qualities. As we 
have seen this approach and his identification of personhood with rational capacities has been 
enormously influential. 
 
The theistic worldview certainly offers a startling contrast to certain biological arguments or 
those that endorse naturalism or a type of reductionism. A theological worldview starts with a 
view of human beings that are made in God’s own image, and it is humans that are the pinnacle 
of this creative process and this view gives humans (as opposed to animals) inherent dignity. A 
theological view of personhood could take a varying set of approaches focussing on the idea of 
ensoulment, sanctity of life or a distinctly theological reflection of personhood. Ensoulment 
considers our spiritual dimension but it has also often been linked to the conception stage. 
Aquinas writes: ‘And after the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle of the semen, 
has been produced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated, the sensitive soul of the 
offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, by nourishment and growth. 
The active power which was in the semen ceases to exist when the semen is dissolved and its 
spirit vanishes.’144 Aquinas held that the human soul is created directly by God and that the soul 
is created and infused into the body only when the human parents have, by their generative act, 
produced a material substance that is disposed to receive and to be informed by a human soul.145  
 
The debate was extended further by the Roman Catholic Church, which has taught since the 
sixteenth century that the soul enters the body at the point of conception and they refer to 
various scriptural quotations to support this claim. For example, in Jeremiah it is written that 
‘Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you. God tells the prophet that his prophetic purpose 
has been decided before he was conceived’146 and in Psalm 139 ‘For thou didst form my inward 
parts, thou didst knit me together in my Mother’s womb.’147 Such references are seen to support 
the idea that a ‘child’ is valued by God from conception. Popes have added pronouncements to 
the body of scriptural and Church support for the life and personhood from conception 
argument: ‘Endowed with a spiritual and immortal soul, the human person is the only creature 
on earth that God has willed for its own sake. From his conception he is destined for eternal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Notre Dame, Christian Classics Press, 1981, 1a, q.118, a.1, ad 4. 
145 John Haldane and Patrick Lee, ‘Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, Abortion and the Value of Life’, Philosophy, 78, 2003, pp.255-278.  
146 Jeremiah 1:5  
 
147 Psalm 139: 13,15 
	  
43	  
	  
beatitude.’148 Though scriptural references undoubtedly affirm the value of persons before birth, 
nowhere does Scripture explicitly declare that personhood begins at conception. Attempts to 
make it do so commit the error of interpreting biblical data from a modern scientific framework. 
The ensoulment position has a long history, but the issue of how we are to test for a soul is 
certainly a major area of difficulty – how do we differentiation between beings that do or do not 
have souls? David Hume, after analyzing the mind through introspection came to the conclusion 
that no particular soul entity exists and that the mind is merely the sum total of its states.  
 
Now, whilst there are clearly many difficulties with the ensoulment account for personhood, 
given the absence of empirical evidence, that is not to rule out other theological visions of the 
person. Theological writings in recent years have, like certain writers who propose an ethic of 
care, criticised the emphasis on persons as individual and rational beings and the focus on the 
mind and the spirit opposed to the neglected body or the fleshy. There is a long history of 
mind/body or spirit/body dualist thinking which has been used to subjugate those regarded as 
more fleshy and less rational beings in society, for example, women and people with disabilities. 
Theologians Lisa Sowle Cahill, Hans Reinders and John Naudé take up these critiques arguing 
that a proper appreciation of human life as embodied is vital for Christian Ethics, particularly 
sexual and medical ethics. The dangers of naturalising the body, especially the female body or 
disabled body, is due to the slippery slope to essentialism and the fact that the essential or natural 
categories associated with the female or disabled have tended to exclude and marginalise them.  
 
Alistair McFadyen in his book The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social 
Relationships149 explores the question of what it means to be a person. He argues that the 
personhood debate needs to take a more practical and community focussed approach. He seeks 
to explore what it means to live as a human person in community with others. Human identity is 
most effectively understood in community terms and his account of personhood is rooted in 
compassion and care, and an awareness that we are all connected and relational beings. In a 
similar vein to this dissertation he believes that personhood conceptions emerge from our 
understanding of communities, in particular a Christian community. The theologian Ian 
McFarland roots the question ‘who is a person?’ within a biblical setting and in particular within 
the New Testament story of The Good Samaritan. McFarland argues that theologically the 
question ‘who is a person’ is like the question ‘who is my neighbour’ asked by the lawyer to 
Jesus. Rather, the ‘more important ethical question is how I, as one who is treated as a person by 
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Jesus Christ, relate to others in their particularity as the person I have been called to be.’150 The 
most important Christian ethicist to consider is perhaps Robin Gill’s work which combines 
sociology, moral philosophy and theology in order to develop the MacIntyre After Virtue debate. 
I will return to his reflections in Chapter Two: The Moral Community of Human Beings as 
Gill explores the ‘essential’ theme of moral communities and how communities and postmodern 
societies can nurture and promote care even in our fragmented settings. Gill’s understanding of 
moral agency is similar to the view espoused in this dissertation and he writes that ‘moral 
communities are an essential ingredient in understanding moral agents.’151 His vision of a moral 
community is theocentric and rooted in a belief that there is a God who cares and wants us to 
care. For Christian ethicists such as Gill and Michael Ramsay, we come to know this truth 
through worship and worship makes demands upon humans. Humans are spiritual beings and 
relational beings, they are beings of activity and they are, as McFarland says, called to love, to 
serve and care.152    
 
Trying to grasp and define a theological account is somewhat complex in that such an approach 
could take many forms as we have seen. Here too we see the complexities relating to 
terminology, with Wennberg defining one part of personhood in a very narrow sense (but 
including a spiritual capacity to his list of abilities), but stressing that there are degrees of 
personhood with both stages of development reveal a right to life.153 Where I have been most 
influenced and impressed by theological contributions, is within the field of relational spirituality, 
which defines itself in opposition to vertical spirituality and a human understanding that focuses 
on the individual in abstraction from the relational basis of human life. John Heron is a leading 
writer in this area of theology and he writes that ‘persons are transformed through their relations 
with others.’ The merit of this approach is that it allows for personhood or our human 
development to be just that, a development and a process. The labelling of personhood at a 
particular stage is not something that works because the person is a transformative being by its 
nature and, as Noddings has also said, albeit with no mention of the spiritual nature of the self, 
one cannot develop on their own but only through mutual co-inquiry.154 Heron proposes a 
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model to the self that hinges around eight characteristics including some of the central elements 
outlined here: a relational spirituality that embraces a developmental nature to the self through 
relationships; a psychosomatic and an embodied nature;  an approach that is epistemologically 
holistic, embracing many ways of knowing but knowing through co-inquiry and empathy and it is 
ontologically holistic, ‘open to the manifest as nature, culture and the subtle, and to spirit as 
immanent life, the situational present, and transcendent mind.’155  
 
Heron acknowledges the informative work and writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and his belief 
that people are both their bodies and subjects of thought, but this is far from a traditional mind-
body dualism. In Merleau-Ponty’s The Phenomenology of Perception, he developed his argument that 
humans are ‘situated’ within their environments. His overall contention was that science and too 
much abstraction had resulted in a philosophical tendency to reduce every phenomena, every 
object, every person to nothing more than collected data. He would suggest that we are only able 
to know ourselves based upon the input of others, all our actions, thoughts, and statements 
define us and have historical consequences.156  
 
Mike Proudfoot’s important philosophical edition The Philosophy of the Body explores how in 
philosophy the body has been neglected in favour of the mind and he stresses how human 
embodiedness needs to be more firmly and centrally placed within any discussion relating to the 
self. Merleau-Ponty was very much a pioneer in this regard and I return to his work and feminist 
sociology and embodiment and the sociality of women in sociological discourse in later chapters 
of this dissertation, most notably when considering the writings of phenomenologists in Chapter 
Three and sociologists such as Judith Butler in Chapter Four.  
 
1.1.5 Existentialist accounts of Personhood  
 
Many different philosophers have espoused existentialist accounts of personhood, or rather the 
human condition, with Merleau-Ponty very much part of this post-war cultural movement. 
Existentialists vary enormously on which part of existentialist thinking they emphasise but 
common agreement rests on the uniqueness of the individual and their situation in life. There are 
some clear parallels with the existentialist position and the argument forwarded within this 
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dissertation, and I would certainly reject positions that seek to grasp or establish generalities 
about the self or those that build around an objective human ‘essence.’ 
 
Sartre says ‘man makes himself’157; once we realize that we ‘exist’ we can then define who we are. 
Personhood emerges, therefore, at the point of self realisation and self awareness – it is the 
human body that becomes the locus for personhood and subjectivity through this self awareness. 
Sartre uses the term human being in that this is a reminder of our humanity and the fact that we 
cannot transcend our humanity. For the existentialist, the concept of the person is understood as 
a being in a situation. The person is a part of the world, conscious of that world and experiences 
it from a particular and unique point of view.  Existentialism and phenomenology lend 
themselves to one another quite intricately, but for the purposes of this piece I am more 
interested in a phenomenological approach due to the way that relationships and their role for 
the abortion debate can be recast and understood.  
 
Phenomenology urges that the world of immediate or concrete ‘lived experience’ takes 
precedence over the objectified and abstract world. The movement gives a central importance to 
bodily experience in our exploration and understanding of our self as selves in the world. 
Phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty characterises one’s own body as a sensible sentient158 being. He 
writes that our body is ‘a being of two leaves, from one side a thing among other things, and 
otherwise what sees and touches them.’159 
 
 
Having reviewed certain personhood theories we can see that far too many authors have 
focussed on one aspect of our nature at the expense of others. Yet so many cases challenge their 
conceptions of the person, not just the human embryo and the brain dead body, but a range of 
human beings lacking certain capacities either indefinitely or in the short term as they develop. 
We cannot expect to have a purely metaphysical and single-focussed nature160 of personhood, or 
rather if we maintain this approach we need to be clear that this approach refers to persons only 
and that the term ‘person’ is a very narrow and metaphysical idea that grasps our desire for what 
we as beings may become, as Scruton describes.  
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Instead, the term human being needs a central place within ethical dialogue and not in order to 
reduce the discussion to biological capacities – far from it. The idea of a human being in moral 
community does have a biological dimension, as I will go on to explore, but, more importantly, 
the human being is a socialised and cultural being. As Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer argues that to 
understand our nature, it is essential that we take part in a system of social practices but that this 
membership takes a very broad nature.161 Susan Sherwin has also been clear in her writings that a 
person is a social creature and that the person is a being of engagement.162 The idea of man as 
situated in a moral community is not a new one. Aristotle writes that man is a Κοινωνικό ζώο,163 
which has been translated as ‘political animal’ although it could be argued that this wrongly 
imports the rather narrow and modern notion of politics into the phrase. Some writers have 
instead argued that it should be translated as a ‘social’ or ‘community dwelling’ animal; polis can 
simply be applied to ‘organised community of human beings,’ not just the classical Greek polis.  
 
The notion of the socialised human being, a being in relationship with other beings, in a 
‘concrete’ moral community needs to be taken into account if we are to grasp our nature. 
Philosophy is ultimately philosophical anthropology and anthropological observations will help 
us more effectively flesh out conceptions of the self and moral communities. As Simone Weil so 
beautifully writes, human beings are beings of activity and relationships and beings in the 
world.164 Likewise, Gordon Allport reminds us that our nature is a dynamic organisation within 
the individual165and so to reduce it seems fundamentally flawed, and as such we must seek to 
understand the person and our nature as a human being in the broadest and fullest sense. Rather 
than single-focussed or competing claims, we should instead consider a more fluid definition and 
one that allows for a healthy tension and one that reveals our complex and layered nature.  
 
1.2 Problems with Personhood: Hermeneutics, Language and Practicalities  
 
Having reviewed certain personhood accounts, it has become clear that these definitions and 
accounts are far from lofty speculative positions, but rather arguments that have real and 
immediate practical significance. The question of personhood and what it is to be a person, and 
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what is necessary for something to count as a person is also unveiling what it is to be a non-
person; it is a process of ascertaining what certain beings, ‘persons’, have that others do not. It 
has been suggested that we have obligations to persons that we do not have to other beings and 
there are things we do to non-persons which we ought never do to persons. The significance of 
these questions for abortion debates is glaring: if foetuses are persons, abortion is then seriously 
called into question. Any definition of the beginning of personhood is caught in a hermeneutic 
circle; we define personhood and its starting point, because we want to act in a certain way and 
thus we act according to how we have defined it. As Ruth Macklin referred ‘the antecedent 
values writers embrace determine the definition or criteria they arrive at by way of conclusion.166  
 
When considering biological accounts of personhood in the previous section, we were 
confronted with some of the difficulties of trying to grasp the ‘moment’ when biological 
personhood occurs and we considered some particular positions such as neurological 
functioning, quickening or implantation, to name a few areas of discussion, as the starting point 
for ascribing personhood. By ascribing personhood at such a particular stage we are saying that 
we are free to use the embryo prior to this stage - each definition has a clear practical intent. 
Once we ascribe personhood to a being, via a particular stage, we ultimately protect it by virtue 
of the moral community we therefore construct. A writer can give either maximal or minimal 
protection. I would recommend that this approach is abandoned by those writing within the 
abortion ethics; it is an approach that either reduces the discussion to the purely scientific or just 
as unsatisfactory is the argument that is non or rather pre-scientific in tone. Whilst I would wish 
to endorse the status of the lived experience, and I recommend this is best done alongside the 
social sciences.  
 
I have tried to show that we are exacerbating  the problem of personhood by distinguishing 
categories of person opposed to human being; this results in the marking and labelling of special 
characteristics for inclusion in the category ‘person’ which are not universally applicable to the 
category of human being. On such an account only human beings, who meet the criteria of 
personhood, are members of the moral community, that is, those to whom we owe obligations 
and for whom we recognise the rights traditionally attached to persons. Rather than continue 
with this line of approach, we must abandon the metaphysical term ‘person’ in the context of 
abortion debates and instead unveil human nature by virtue of context – a moral community of 
human beings is an actual and concrete moral community of beings that we can consider. 
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Callahan is right to stress that any approach that asks us to pick out a particular feature of 
‘humanhood’ or personhood is flawed, and instead we should consider and embrace the 
relevance of the biological, psychological and cultural interrelationship ever present and evolving 
in every human being; in short, he asks us to take a holistic approach to any analysis of what 
makes us human.167 Sisella Bok says that fundamentally the question of who shall ‘count’ as a 
person is a ‘treacherous question’ ethically168 as it is about seeking to include certain beings and 
exclude others.   
 
1.3 Moving on from personhood: Persons and Human Beings  
 
Bok sees the debate as mired in intractable disputes and the interchangeable usage of the terms 
person and human beings. Ironically these disputes rarely attend to the facts of our human lives 
but rather operate around the language employed. The language of the personhood debate has 
been created in part by the contestable and inherently vague nature of the concept of the person. 
The term person carries affective potency and its incredible emotional power is understandable 
given its protective power and practical significance. If we continue to conduct the debate in 
terms of contested concept of the person then we will fail to see the full range of ethical issues 
surrounding the abortion dialogue and the more implicit ways we exclude and fail to attend to 
many members of existing moral communities.    
 
‘Not all persons are human and not all humans are person.’169 Tristram Englehardt reminds us of 
this point and a key area of controversy concerns the scope of the concept of persons as we have 
seen.  It is unsurprising that there is much overlap between the two terms as the concept of the 
person has been developed in the context of human cultures and human practices. Thus the 
concepts have been developed in a way that makes it ‘fit’ humans although often they are about 
the most exceptional characteristics associated with human development. As John Harris 
observes, person is often used for shorthand for all the reasons we have for thinking that 
particular individuals, usually humans, are morally important. Human beings are often our least 
controversial example of a person and so become ‘model’ persons and yet the literature review 
above revealed how in fact many of the positions were highly exclusive and demanding in terms 
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of human abilities. As stated above, MacIntyre finds the history and evolution of the term 
‘person’ quite remarkable and likewise Oksenberg Rorty reflects on how it is a concept that 
cannot stand still.170She writes that our vocabulary for describing ourselves is a very rich one and 
yet controversies have arisen due to certain concepts having undergone radical historical 
changes. She explores how our idea of persons derives from two main sources: the theatre and 
the mask and actor ‘wears’, his per sonae, and secondly it has its origin in law and we are reminded 
of Locke’s famous forensic definition. She says that a person comes to stand above and behind 
his choices; the idea of the person is the ‘idea of a unified centre of choice and action, the unit of 
legal and theological responsibility.’171 She reflects on how if judgement and accountability 
summarises a life, as it does so in a Christian or legal/forensic context, then personhood as a 
unified individual, on this understanding, is an accurate understanding of that life. The concept 
of the person therefore should be used ‘just where it belongs,’172 in locating the unity of choice 
and for considering the development of certain capacities and traits. It is about the thinking 
about the sort of traits and capacities we ought to have and develop, and their benefits for a 
group of beings, it is therefore very much a top down approach and ethically demanding 
concept. Personhood thus takes on this metaphysical idea of advancement and excellence to 
which Dennett and Scruton refer. However, on this model, which is not an unimportant model 
of inquiry to be abandoned entirely, we see that agency moves above and away from the very 
factors demanding our fullest attention – the complexities of our social settings, relationships 
and our lives in the broadest of senses.   
 
We cannot promote a conception of the self that abstracts beings from their context – a context 
which creates the moral settings for within which they will operate. The use of the term ‘person’ 
is to stress the individual and accountable being and it is a conception that has evolved due to a 
desire to develop capacities. Thus the conceptions of personhood elevate the person from the 
very factors that really count. We must not look to see what type of being should be accorded 
membership within a moral community and what a person could be, but rather we must look at 
varying moral communities and see that human beings are in a moral community and that this is 
the moral context that should inform the debate moving forward. The human being existing in a 
moral community and thereby situated in a complex web of relationships will provide the most 
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fruitful framework when responding to ethical issues such as those generated by the abortion 
dialogue.  
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Chapter Two: The Moral Community of Human Beings 
 
2.1 Defining ‘The Moral Community’   
 
We can consider the idea of community, and indeed a moral community, from varying 
disciplinary perspectives, and in this chapter I make use of philosophical, sociological, 
anthropological and theological writings on communities and more specifically writings about 
moral communities. Raymond Williams writes that the term community ‘unlike all other terms of 
social organisation (state, nation, society, for example.)....seems never to be used unfavourably.’173 
The term community carries incredible emotional power and undoubtedly denotes a scale or 
mode of social life. It is clear that a social dimension is inherent to any understanding of 
community and morality. Interestingly, the word community is something that has been seen as a 
predominantly female consideration and cultural traits for many writers working towards a more 
feminist ethic. Whilst traditional ethics (such as Kantian and Utilitarian perspectives) have 
overrated male cultural traits such as ‘independence, autonomy, intellect, mind’, a female set of 
traits would instead espouse ‘interdependence, community, emotion and the body.’  
Kantian ideas about rational moral agency or moral autonomy means that agents with such 
capacities can be the bearers of moral obligations and as such can function in a type of moral 
community. Kantian philosophy focuses on rationality and, therefore, all rational agents with the 
capacity for autonomy are included within the moral community. The Utilitarian philosophy 
focuses on the minimising of suffering and the maximising of happiness and so, the type of 
being within the moral community is one who is sentient. Many writers consider the idea of 
moral community in a similar way to how they approach personhood conceptions; they consider 
who qualifies for membership within the group and they tend to focus on a set of abilities 
required for that being’s inclusion. Instead I believe that we should be considering moral 
communities from the perspective of context in the sense that moral communities are concrete 
and they emerge from our various social and cultural settings.  
As we have seen, personhood for many writers denotes a being, or a moral agent, that is a 
member of ‘the moral community.’ We all belong to a moral community, I would argue that we 
belong to many interlocking moral communities, but the nature of such a moral community and 
how to define such a conception is likely to cause considerable debate. Conceptions of the moral 
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community will also be present in many authors’ ethical writings and yet their definition may not 
be explicitly discussed or defined. Michael Allen Fox sets out the following definition of ‘the 
moral community’: ‘most generally it is a group of beings, that share certain characteristics, and 
whose members are, or, consider themselves to be bound to observe certain rules of conduct in 
relation to one another because of their mutual likeness.’174 Another philosopher who has 
referred specifically to the idea of moral community in their writing is David Shoemaker and he 
states that ‘the “moral community” is a term of art in philosophy, but it is often taken to refer to 
the collection of moral agents, that is, those agents eligible for assessments of moral 
responsibility.’175 A moral community is a society in the broadest sense of the word. As Pirmin 
Stekeler-Weithofer argues, to be a person is essentially to be part of the human world, to take 
part in a moral community and a system of social practices and institutions;176 we can see that we 
are immediately confronted with the question of what sort of beings belong to a moral 
community.  
Entrance criteria for ‘the moral community’ is intimately linked to the type of definitions authors 
have forwarded for both their conception of moral community and the type of agent that 
belongs to such a community. Just as I challenged the approach which looked to see what kinds 
of entities ‘qualify’ for personhood, I would also recommend that we avoid the same pitfalls 
when seeking to define a moral community and its members. Surely the dangers of the 
‘hermeneutic circle’ loom large here too, in that authors will define the moral community and 
membership criterion for the moral community because of the types of being one may wish to 
include or exclude, and thus we act according to how we have defined it. Again, these definitions 
and conceptions are far from lofty, each definition has practical intent, and how we view a moral 
community takes on urgent meaning. We should recall Kittay’s comments about the range of 
morally repugnant exclusions currently resulting from the way philosophers approach ethical 
membership and agency. In short, often, how we define and understand the moral community is 
really a dialogue about the limits of the moral community and its margins. The boundaries of the 
moral community should be an area of robust attention for the philosopher, as should the subtle 
and more varied ways we exclude humans from what really matters – their moral context and 
their moral communities. I recommend that we move away from the language of the moral 
community, as if there is just one ideal and mythical realm, and instead explore just how complex 
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the idea of a moral community, among many, is. We need to appreciate the complexities of 
talking about any moral community, but also embrace the idea of lots of different moral 
communities in different contexts. As Seymour Mandelbaum writes, we belong to many 
overlapping communities; we are part of a ‘great cast of others....we are entangled.’177 
 
The language of membership and inclusion is somewhat peculiar, and I would agree with 
Shannon M. Jordan when she writes that ‘human life is always lived in a community’ and it is 
within this context that we will find out what it means to be a moral agent.178 The human being 
therefore is already in a moral community, and we need to embrace our social identity and 
‘agency’ and see ourselves as members of varied human communities, as socialised beings in the 
world of other beings. We should not ‘test’ to see who belongs to a human moral community or 
forward particular qualifications for membership. Instead we should explore a range of moral 
communities, this is where philosophical anthropology can assist our enquiry, and we must stay 
alert to the marginalisations that a moral community can create. I recommend the approach 
adopted by Jarrett Zigon, among others,179when he argues that whilst a dialogue between 
anthropologists of moralities and moral philosophers is essential, philosophers need to be careful 
not to impose a certain Western philosophical view on the beings in a moral community. Zignon 
writes that importing ‘Habermasian rational communicators, Taylorian agents and Aristotelian 
social virtuosos’180 into the dialogue will limit both disciplines’ progress and their related 
enquiries. We need to explore concrete human communities and understand the ‘intersection of 
the various spheres of morality in the daily lives of persons and also the multifarious ways that 
human persons work on themselves not only to enact, but also to alter their social worlds in 
which they are firmly placed.’181 
Fox and Shoemaker offer particular philosophical definitions of the moral community on which 
to hook our initial reflections, and both writers also explore the idea of membership within a 
moral community. They argue that for a being to be a member of a moral community they must 
be beings that by their very nature possess certain characteristics which make them able to 
operate within such a community. Shoemaker stresses that philosophers use the term moral 
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community to understand who is responsible and why,182 and he explores the importance of 
those beings capable of moral address and engagement. Members within his conception of the 
moral community are ‘those agents eligible for assessments of moral responsibility.’183 Fox lists 
the sort of characteristics we might come to expect from a being able to operate within a moral 
community for example: ‘critical self-awareness; the ability to manipulate complex concepts and 
to use a sophisticated language… and the capacity to reflect, plan, deliberate, choose and accept 
responsibility for acting.’184 Fox says that it is these capacities that make humans ‘autonomous or 
self-directing and capable of functioning as rational moral agents.’185 He goes on to say that the 
capacity for such abilities goes a long way to explaining what we mean when we talk of ourselves 
as persons. It is not one sole capacity or characteristic that entails personhood, but rather a 
‘whole cluster of interrelated capacities’186 and this is what marks us out as an autonomous moral 
agent and a morally superior being or person. Fox argues that rights emerge from a moral 
community and ‘thus rights belong to beings because they are moral agents functioning within a 
community of which responsibility and accountability are central features and where they are 
acknowledged to be such.’187  
 
Fox’s article explores the ‘circles’ within a moral community with certain beings viewed as 
members of the inner circle and thus entitled to a full set of rights, due to the possession of 
certain capacities. Whereas the outer circles are the locations for those beings that have a 
modified set of rights by virtue of the fact that ‘we’ are connected to them through a ‘chain of 
love and concern’188 and because agents in the inner circle would have a duty to protect such 
beings, if they had the sort of moral agency suggested. Animals are not included in Fox’s inner 
circle, but a Martian might be, if they were to possess the types of characteristics listed above. So 
whilst animals are not full members of the moral community ‘because they lack autonomy, they 
must nevertheless fall within the most immediate extension of the moral community and as such 
are subject to its protection.’189 Here we see the well known distinction between moral agents 
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and patients emerge, with moral agents being labelled as such due to their rational capacities, and 
because they can be held morally accountable for their actions, whereas the moral patient is an 
object of moral concern, and, therefore, moral protection, but they cannot be held morally 
accountable for their actions and so lack agency. I would suggest that this reveals a very narrow 
conception of agency and the many varied ways that we can be in a relationship with another.  
Shoemaker’s definition forwards the idea that the moral community is a community of agents 
with whom we can engage in moral address. He writes that the moral community is ‘made up of 
only those who are capable of meeting the accountability face of responsibility, those capable of 
holding, and being held, accountable to one another.’190 Shoemaker’s moral community endorses 
the very traditional philosophical forensic idea191 of the moral agent who has reason and can he 
held accountable. His understanding of a moral community is one that centres on particular 
types of moral address and rather than focus on animals and animal rights, as Fox does, he 
considers the example of a psychopath and an adult person with a mild type of mental or 
intellectual disability. Fox also refers briefly to humans who suffer psychopathic and sociopathic 
disorders, but notes that they are not members of the moral community as they simply cannot 
recognise standard rules of conduct ‘even by virtue of recognising and acknowledging that others 
share important characteristics with them.’192 
 
Shoemaker would include an adult with a mild type of mental disability within the moral 
community and, like Fox, he argues that psychopaths are not members but could be at the 
margins given that he does concede that, in terms of the members continuum, they are closer to 
membership than other beings given the interrelated nature of certain human characteristics. He 
writes that in relation to psychopaths that ‘someone for whom the plight of others makes no 
emotional dent surely lacks the capacity to be appropriately sensitive to the moral reasons 
deriving from their plight.’193 As Kittay and Licia Carlson write, ‘the ability to empathise is a 
capacity that is unimpaired in many with cognitive disabilities and is dangerously absent in the 
psychopath.’194 Shoemaker’s argument hinges on accountability and so, for Shoemaker, the 
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psychopath cannot be held accountable to other members of the moral community, but that a 
person with mild mental disabilities could be – thus seeing the importance of the range and web 
of relations that each human being finds themselves in.195 Similarly to Fox’s reference to 
sensitivities and our ‘chain of love and concern,’ Shoemaker focuses on emotional maturity and 
emotional powers in explaining whom we should and should not treat as accountable, as ‘the 
capacity for certain sorts of emotional responses is necessary for the development of the 
‘intellectual capacity for sensitivity to, appreciation of, and responsiveness to moral reasons.’196 
He adds that the factors for accountability are ‘sensitivity and arousal to the distress of others, 
emotional maturity and empathy.’197  
 
Both Fox and Shoemaker cling to the capacity-driven approach to personhood membership 
which I have recommended needs abandoning, although they do at least see that different 
capacities are very much interrelated and that there is not just one distinguishing ability that 
bestows personhood, and therefore membership on the individual. We need to appreciate that 
human beings in a moral community is essentially one word, and rather than consider or test for 
membership, we must look to learn from actual moral communities and see that human beings 
are always in a moral community regardless of their capacities, as we are all intimately related to 
each other. As Mandelbaum writes, ‘communities are composed of human beings....this is a 
moral fact.’198 Mandelbaum also appreciates the dangers of communities and community 
membership and writes that ‘the other side of membership is exclusion and difference.’199 This 
‘difference’ is seen in the ‘moral agents and patients’ dichotomy and is, I believe, a dangerous 
ethical approach and part of the ‘us-and-them’ distinction present within much ethical dialogue. 
In Shoemaker’s writings, we do see some sense of a shift away from the focus on the rational 
being opposed to the emotional being, and in fact it is the need for robust emotional responses 
and, more specifically, empathy that forms the essential part of his membership criterion. 
Likewise abstract reasoning is not elevated above the contextual and the varied other ways that 
human beings can have agency, as Shoemaker does see that the mildly disabled person can be 
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morally related and accountable to some people, but not all, thus seeing that agency can be 
activated at a concrete level through certain relationships and more intimate moral communities. 
The psychopath could have a very detached type of empathy, and he could certainly be highly 
rational and have impressive powers of abstraction, and yet the psychopath is not emotionally 
engaged within the community in which they are situated and this is why they fail to be included.  
 
Our relational status as a socialised human being situated in a moral community is both a social 
fact and the understanding I believe we must forward within ethical dialogue. Whilst Fox does 
write beautifully about extending the moral community and seeing that we are beings in a chain 
of relations, and his alertness to speciesism is also an important strength to his writing, by 
endorsing a list of particular characteristics for ‘full’ membership, he is guilty both of falling into 
the us-and-them rhetoric and also the dangers observed within a nominalist account for 
personhood, in that the author can often come down too hard on certain capacities and as such 
the lines for inclusion are drawn too tightly. Instead we need to be prepared to adopt an 
approach that allows for some blurring of the boundaries, as Mary Midgley suggested when 
speaking about the philosophical fascination with differentiating between humans and animals200 
at the edge of moral communities and when considering membership and agency therefore. 
Shoemaker is correct to say that the most important task when considering the nature of the 
moral community is to consider not just the fully fledged members of that community, or those 
that are excluded, but to consider those beings that occupy a boundary position.  
 
2.2 ‘The Moral Community’ and blurring the boundaries for inclusion 
Fox’s reflections on non-human animals and Shoemaker’s reflections on people with disabilities 
and sociopaths reveal that much philosophical work on moral communities centres on the 
margins and boundaries of such a moral community. As Shoemaker himself writes, if we want to 
have a clearer ‘grip on the nature of the moral community,’ we need to focus on ‘the nature of its 
boundaries.’201 As referenced regularly already in this dissertation I am concerned, like Kittay, by 
the range of morally repugnant exclusions a moral community can create and urge that we 
reconsider the way we treat a range of human beings, such as women, non-white males and 
people with disabilities, and that we also consider the more subtle ways we fail to include human 
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beings from ‘their’ moral communities. Our inability properly to include a range of human 
beings, not just animals, into the moral community demands attention and reveals a lack of 
philosophical imagination and sensitivity when it comes to an understanding of membership and 
agency.  
As Mandelbaum writes, humans can find a kind of nourishment, support and meaning in 
communities and in their relationships with others. He calls this a ‘moral order in the discipline 
of membership.’202 However, we also see appalling marginalisations, oppression and uncertainty 
in our relational status and communities can create stigma, isolation and they can be things to be 
fled. Awful things have been done in the name of ‘the community’ or the ‘good of the 
community.’ The term community does not, therefore, always have the positive valence that 
some sociologists observe. There is, as some writers suggest, ‘a current seduction by the concept 
of community’203 as if some sort of conceptual haven, but the term community and moral 
community is not a lofty analytic tool, but rather a broad term that has emotional relevance that 
encapsulates a focus on social settings, communal ties and concrete existence. The ‘thickness’204 
and depth of the term ‘community’ and ‘moral community’ means that whilst we may not have 
the abstract and precise definition that some may see as necessary, we do allow for a more 
accurate, layered, and nuanced understanding or our moral context(s). A more broad, variable, 
fluid, or non-fixed understanding of a moral community, will ensure that the ‘bottom-up 
thinking’ approach directs the enquiry and this allows the field of anthropology to influence the 
dialogue; this understanding will also have far more emotional resonance in that membership or 
loss of membership within a moral community is what really matters and I will explore the ways 
that a moral community can isolate and exclude women from their moral communities in terms 
of the abortion context in detail in Chapter Five: Abortion Stigma and Other Exclusions.  
Val Plumwood, referenced in my introduction,205 has written extensively about Western 
Philosophy, opposed to Eastern ideas, and its focus on ‘reason-givers’ and certain dualisms that 
she believes creates privileged ‘in’ groups and therefore marginalised ‘out’ groups as a result.206 
By creating such a group of humans, this then dismisses or ignores the status of other human 
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beings and it also leads to a division in nature where humans, although, not all humans, are the 
sole possessors of reason, and are active, knowing, subjects and agents, as opposed to passive, 
knowable, objects and patients, although if not a patient (and thus excluded fully) such an 
‘object’ can be abused and eliminated by virtue of this distinction.  Such an approach clearly fails 
to grasp the notion of interconnection and the contextual relationships human beings have to 
each other and to other living beings and their settings. So much of philosophy, claims 
Plumwood, fails to see the existence of humans and animals as an embodied existence; we look 
at the world from the approach of the ‘philosophy of mind, an abstraction that renders our daily 
existence inconsequential.’207 Animals and the environment come come to represent the limits of 
the moral community and this is worth being alert to, as it has been part of the way that we have 
justified excluding others from our community, i.e. those beings with less rational capacities are 
thus seen as animal, fleshy or earthy.  
Marginal cases for personhood and membership within the moral community have often taken 
the form of animals, comatose patients, foetuses or very young infants, but also at the borders 
we also have had psychopaths and sociopaths and people with disabilities. Interestingly for some 
writers the inclusion and protection of animals is quite remarkable, given that we still do not fully 
include non-white males and women. Kelly Oliver reflects on the ambivalent status of animals in 
a moral community when she observes the ‘American ethical response to the dogs of hurricane 
Katrina.’ She writes that the ‘the sympathy that could have, or should have, been directed at 
African Americans’ suffering of loss and death is displaced onto their dogs, seemingly because 
many white Americans can feel more sympathy towards dogs than they can toward African 
Americans.208 Oliver refers to another important dichotomy that emerges within ethical 
discussions about the status of animals, a discussion which she thinks reveals something telling 
about how we include and exclude certain humans, when she considers the distinction between 
monsters or innocents. Some animals, and, therefore, humans, are too cruel or beastly and 
lacking in emotional sensitively to be ‘in’, whereas some animals are seen as sharing certain 
capacities with us, but more interestingly they are seen as innocent and genteel animals.  The 
reference to the idea of an innocent being reminds us of the frequency this term is bandied 
around in abortion debates. The innocent life of the foetus and its suffering is pitted against the 
‘choice’ of the mother, as if the mother is somehow pro-death and ‘choosing’ to cause suffering. 
This again reveals how exclusions can be subtle, as some women in abortion contexts are 
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excluded from their communities due to their decision, since the decision is seen by many in 
their communities as unnatural, selfish and morally abhorrent. Highly stigmatising categories and 
labels contribute to this exclusion for the mother. Discussions about pregnancy and motherhood 
often veer from being wanted or unwanted, sacrificial or selfish, natural or unnatural and 
essential or unimportant and very much secondary to a woman’s life project. Diana T. Meyers 
writes that sadly rhetoric about motherhood ‘oscillate between contempt for it or reverence and 
sentimentality.’209 This oversimplification and extremist approach to what is, in fact, a very 
complex experience and decision naturally results in marked categories, dangerous stigmas and 
the creation of an out-group; discussions about pregnancy, motherhood and abortion cannot be 
reduced and instead, we must allow for a plurality of experiences and responses. 
At the boundaries of the moral community we have many marginal and subtle cases to consider. 
Animals and the dialogue concerning their inclusion within a moral community offers an 
interesting insight in that, for some writers, animals are, in fact, offered the hand of care and 
protection in a way that certain human beings are not. In terms of the marginalisations faced by 
women, Josephine Donovan writes that women need to be careful that in their rush to be seen 
as ‘persons,’ they must not forget the plight of other victims210 and they must keep alert to these 
exclusions, exclusions which can be highly subtle in nature. The dialogue about animals and the 
moral community is really about the limits of the moral community and the question of where 
we draw lines for inclusion. Animal theory and feminist theory have important parallels in that 
they focus on care and relationships, but more importantly they focus on the fullest extension of 
care and creative ways to view relationships and this has important implications for disability 
ethics as well.  
As we have seen thus far in this dissertation, and as Donovan states explicitly, ‘rationality has 
been constructed by most Western theorists as the defining requirement from personhood’211 
and for membership in the moral community and women, along with non-white men and 
animals, have long been excluded. Thus women often wish to deny their animal status, and we 
previously referenced the fear of essentialism for certain feminist writers, as they believe that 
they need to reject their ‘animal status’ to move beyond the fleshy level of existence towards 
‘male transcendence.’212 Even many liberal feminists have written that women should embrace 
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their intellectual and rational minds; women should be seen as just like men and nothing like 
animals. And yet focussing on animals does not divert from human need, although my 
predominant concern in this dissertation is to address the types of exclusions a moral community 
can create in relation to abortion debates and for men, women and societies facing that particular 
situation. Looking at vulnerable cases, reminds us that we can respond and we should consider 
other objects of subjugation, other exclusions and other types of victims. Abandoning the 
rhetoric of persons was due to the hierarchies and orthodoxies so embedded within the term; it 
was a term of elevation rather than the equaliser and grounder needed.  
Animals are not, in fact, part of the moral community of human beings, but not because they are 
not intimately connected to us, and this is not to say that animal communities do not overlap 
with human ones. We should not have an aversion to our biological heritage or animal layer, but 
we should also recognise that it is only a part of our layered identity. Our human capacitates and 
human tendencies vary enormously as human beings, and Midgley is right to impress upon us 
the importance of seeing the line that divides humans and animals as blurred. There is not 
something in particular that unites or distinguishes us from animals, but it is worth noting that 
we are human beings, an animal of the species Homo sapiens, just as other animals belong to 
their own species. As one scientist so astutely said when interviewed on such an issue, ‘chimps 
are chimps are human beings are human beings and, whilst there is overlap, you don’t do chimps 
or humans any good by muddling this up!’213 Sue Savage-Rumbaugh has sought to create a 
human culture for bonobos as part of her research and, whilst this is an actual example of two 
moral communities permeating each other, it is a community of bonobos interlocked with a 
community of human beings and more specifically, it is humans importing bononos into a 
human culture and ‘giving them’ a human culture. However, that is not to say we cannot learn a 
great deal about our relationships with animals. 
We need to protect the borders, more specifically those beings at the borders, of the moral 
community in a range of ways and we need to be alert to the subtle exclusions we make. The 
suffering of animals and the environment requires a response - likewise the exclusion of so many 
humans requires an urgent response. Both practical and mental exclusions result in status loss for 
the human being, but they will also face ‘real’ and unequal outcomes, and discrimination 
necessarily follows labelling, stigmas and exclusions.214 This loss of status within a social network 
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is ‘fundamentally a moral issue in which stigmatised conditions threaten what really matters.’215 
The being at the heart of any moral community is a socialised human being and any 
understanding of a moral community must draw on social groups and the work of 
anthropologists in this field.  
 
2.3 A Moral Context and Anthropological understandings of ‘The Moral 
Community’ 
  
Alistair MacIntyre’s oft-quoted loss of cultural context and the shrill and barren state216of moral 
dialogue, have considerable bearing on this debate, as without awareness of our particular 
cultural setting I do not think we can adequately explore the ethical dilemmas we might face. 
MacIntyre’s references to this barren age reveal that in our current postmodern era we face the 
sort of deadlock to which Ruth Macklin referred, and he too refers to the abortion debate as in a 
type of stalemate and refers to it as ‘interminable.’217 In his famous final paragraph in After Virtue, 
he writes: ‘What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within  
which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages 
which are already upon us. And, if the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of 
the last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope. This time, however, the 
barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us for quite 
some time. And it is our lack of consciousness of this that constitutes part of our predicament. 
We are waiting not for Godot, but for another – doubtless very different- St Benedict.’218 He 
suggests that the enlightenment project has failed and we have been unable to resolve areas of 
ethical disagreement through purely rational means.  McIntyre holds that the tradition of the 
virtues, and the moral context or communities from which they emerge, provide a more suitable 
setting for solving moral dilemmas. Robin Gill writes, ‘the glimmer of hope offered by McIntyre 
that moral communities might survive the ravages of secularization is evidently not large.’ 
Malebraum and Gill both also make reference to sociologist Robert Bellah’s definition of a moral 
community in their books; Bellah in his book Habits of Heart continues the critique of rational 
individualism and instead, forwards an ethical approach that values communities. He views them 
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as socio-historical products and he believes that this social context offers renewed vigour to the 
role of moral communities in society. Bellah’s definition of a moral community is that it is ‘a 
group of people who are socially interdependent who participate together in discussion and 
decision making and who share certain practices that both define the community and are 
nurtured by it; such a community is not quickly formed. It almost always has a history and so is 
also a community of memory, defined in part by its part by its past and its memory of its past.’219  
 
Ethics and our sense of morality must be seen in the full and varied context of our human life, 
grounded in human experience.220 I believe that any ethical approach needs to springboard from 
human experiences and from our complex and diverse situations and relationships. The 
philosopher Abraham Edel and anthropologist Mary Edel in their book Anthropology and Ethics, 
sought to embrace the widest possible information about various existing moralities, and they 
lamented the limited ethical outlook taken by so many writers.221 The spirit of the Edels’ 
approach to ethics is that they wished to access as much information as possible about various 
existing moralities; their book is a bold attempt at a ‘moral map of the globe in historical 
depth.’222 When approaching the idea of a moral community from an anthropological 
perspective, it is worth noting initially that anthropologists often refer to a culture as a morality. 
The dissertation endorses a bottom up approach and one that deals with the ethically given and 
hence anthropological writings are essential in that they can help to unveil a more accurate 
description of what a moral community is and how they vary. Anthropologists such as Clifford 
Geertz and Abrham Edel have stressed that a full understanding of the human being lies in the 
presence of the culture that surrounds that human being and the communities that emerge. The 
importance of a varied and comparative approach to studying ethics was one of the central 
hallmarks of Edel’s recommendations. Edel suggested that to understand the human spirit, 
required an understanding of the cultural and socio-historical life of man. Our understanding of 
man does not lie in universal codes or behaviours or in linguistic structures and understanding; 
Edel objects to the overemphasis that modern analytical ethics places on language. Now whilst 
Edel fully acknowledges that man is a ‘symbol making animal and that a great deal of moral 
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training takes place through talk,’ talk is and cannot be the only instrument of morality.223 
Language may well be an essential part of the jigsaw puzzle that is human nature, but it can only 
be understood in light of this context and for Edel this would require us to draw necessarily on 
the essential co-ordinates of his historical, social, psychological circumstances. In ethics, what we 
face within our reflections are not objects as such, although the human body is certainly a unique 
object, but rather a social product, a man-made culture phenomenon or morality; ‘to pursue 
certain common goals and to avoid some types of acts, to praise members of communities for 
some forms of conduct and to blame them for others.’ 224 Morality becomes learnt in the process 
of socialisation, we as human beings in a moral community are situated in direct moral 
experiences.225 The more we study our cultural and social context, the more we will understand 
the content of ethical theories and concepts.  
 
Geertz also argues that our understanding of personhood and an approach to moral dilemmas 
must be firmly positioned within the presence of each human beings distinct human moral 
community or moral culture. He quite rightly stresses that man is what he is, and what he 
becomes, by virtue of his culture.226 He writes that a human being is an animal suspended in a 
web of significance which he himself has spun and that the human being is essentially dependent 
on a culture to order his or her survival. He goes on to say: ‘The Ice Age appears not to have 
been merely a time of receding brow ridges and shrinking jaws, but a time in which were forged 
nearly all those characteristics which are most graphically human; his encephalted nervous 
system, his incest taboo social structure, and his capacity to create and use symbols. The fact that 
these distinctive features of humanity emerged together in complex interaction of human 
mentality, because it suggests that man’s nervous system does not merely enable him to acquire 
culuture, it positively demands that he do so if he is going to function at all.’ 
This reveals again the point stressed by Malebraum and so many other writers referenced in this 
dissertation, that humans are always situated and live their lives in a moral community. We are 
social creatures and beings of activity and we are tied together by our relationships and our 
actions, and this forms our moral obligations – we are human beings in a moral community and 
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we are relational beings in moral relationships with one another due to these obligations. The 
relational bonds that tie us together emerged through our context and through the circumstances 
of our distinctly human lives. Anthropological understandings, therefore, attend specifically to 
the idea of the relational and social human being in a moral community. Anthropology unveils a 
moral community that views its inhabitants as beings in context - they are in a moral community 
and a moral culture. In terms of abortion debates, this framework and approach would start with 
us as relational human beings in context and it would situate the debate firmly in the lives of 
those facing the dilemma. Shoemaker concluded that it is the power of interpersonal 
relationships that makes one eligible for moral responsibility and membership within a moral 
community. As Carol Gilligan reminds us, moral problems and dilemmas are problems of human 
relations.227 The abortion dialogue, therefore, would not just be about the life of the woman, but 
about her family and the unique context she finds herself in. Likewise, although there will often 
reveal a rhetoric of human and infant survival and nurture in anthropological writings, this is also 
a theme that is situated within and would also take account of contextual and wider factors 
relating to the issue. The nature of a moral community is highly complex, and ‘we thwart an 
understanding of ourselves as moral agents when we pay insufficient attention to the 
complexities.’228  
 
2.4 Theological Understandings of Moral Community  
 
The theologian and moral philosopher Robin Gill has written about the idea of the moral 
community. Gill sees communities as dynamic organisations and the setting for human beings. 
He also endorses the idea of many varying moral communities, all interlocking in various ways 
and all having a great influence on each other. Like Mandelbaum’s reflection, that with moral 
communities comes both membership and nourishment but also exclusion and difference,229 Gill 
writes that the moral community can be a ‘treasure trove’ of moral excellence and  wisdom but 
he also sees that they can be centres of sin and dangerously exclusive. Gill forwards the idea of a 
relational being and argues that human beings can be both united and divided by their moral 
context. Gill is particularly interested in the practice and function of moral communities; he 
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argues that care and morality is about doing230 and dynamic action, and so agrees with the line of 
thought in this dissertation that the moral community is something fluid but also about 
relationships first and foremost. He does proffer a definition of a Christian moral community 
and does not shy away from presenting a definition. He writes that ‘being a Christian in moral 
community is about sharing together with others...sharing in worship, sharing together in care 
and sharing together to heal a broken world.’231 The judgemental, polarised, prejudiced 
community actually runs counter to Christianity’s essence.  
 
Gill’s reflections are somewhat more optimistic than those of McIntyre and he believes that it is 
our varying moral communities that can transform our fragmented society into one that nurtures 
selfless care. He sees that morality is passed through communities and is not acquired through 
rational abstraction; it emerges through relationships and from individual to individual. Gill 
writes that there is a moral symmetry between a caring individual, as part of a community as a 
relational being, and that the world, and our moral communities, are caring; human caring is seen 
as an expression or mirror of God’s caring nature.232 Again, we see that some of the themes of 
relationality, vulnerability and care found in certain theologian’s writings really fight against 
focusing on the individual in abstraction and instead fully embrace the relational basis of human 
life where care can be nurtured and help to heal a fragmented society. In the next Chapter, I will 
go on to argue that an ethic of care, coupled with a phenomenological approach, will not only 
provide an excellent framework for developing ideas about the human being in a moral 
community, but will also provide the most fruitful framework when responding to ethical issues 
generated by abortion debates.  
 
2.5 Human Beings in a Moral Community: An Overview  
 
Taking account of our nature as socialised beings in relationship with other beings, is both a 
moral fact and key to understanding our moral existence more broadly. Membership within a 
moral community is a moral issue where certain experiences and conditions can nourish, but also 
threaten, what really counts. Far too many authors have focussed on the idea of a moral 
community in terms of tests and qualifications for memberships; the philosophical approach of 
distinguishing and demarcating seeks to respond to the question of who is included in our moral 
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community and where we are to fix the boundaries. Yet we don’t ‘enter’ a moral community, we 
find ourselves entangled and nested in a moral community, and in many overlapping moral 
communities; this is the reality of society, we are in a web of intersecting and highly varied 
communities. With ever expanding moral communities we need to work towards an ethic that 
allows for a plurality of responses and one that seeks to consider a range of social and cultural 
communities. 
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Chapter Three: Care Ethics, Phenomenology and Abortion  
 
3.1 Care Ethics and Phenomenology as a framework for navigating Abortion debates 
 
As stated in my introduction, I recommend that an ethic of care, coupled with a 
phenomenological approach, will provide the most fruitful framework when responding to 
ethical issues generated by abortion debates. As Robin Gill writes in his short book Moral 
Communities, ‘all sorts of groups are thinking seriously about care at the moment.’233  Gill refers to 
both ‘care’ and ‘selfless care’ in his work and believes that it is moral communities, and their 
ability to foster selfless care, that will help to heal what he refers to as a broken and fragmented 
society.234 Likewise, Paul Halmos235 in his book The Faith of Counsellors argued that at the heart of 
good counselling is a notion of care as care is about action and transformation. Virginia Held is 
aware that many theorists dislike the term ‘care’ and have tried, instead, to replace it with ideas 
such as love, empathy and compassion, and some have wished to call the approach ‘relational 
ethics,’ and yet the ‘discourse keeps returning to ‘care.’236 Like Held, I would agree that ‘care’ has 
many advantages as a term in that care encompasses and grasps both theory and practice. Nel 
Noddings focuses on caring as an attitude but one that is connected to, and, accompanying the 
activity of caring.237 ‘Care is for Noddings, an attitude and an ideal manifest in activities of care in 
concrete situations.’238  
 
Care is certainly about doing, or what Joan Tronto refers to as attentiveness and 
responsiveness.239 As Gill also writes, care is about action and our call to respond and care is, by 
its very nature, uncomfortable, he writes, ‘it is when care becomes uncomfortable that it 
becomes morally interesting.’240 It becomes interesting, in part, because it cannot float in a moral 
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vacuum and because abstract rules serve a limited purpose.241 Similarly, and as I have argued, 
abortion ethics cannot operate within a moral vacuum; it is the ethics of human relationships in 
context. Abortion is not a unique and objective dilemma that can be sundered from a social and 
cultural setting and one’s views on abortion are likely to be intimately related to views on other 
issues generated within bioethics.  
 
Care Ethics naturally encourages sympathy, empathy and a care for others. It stresses the 
interdependence of human beings and thus takes relationships seriously. As an ethical theory, 
therefore, it lends itself to being considered alongside a phenomenological approach in that a 
person’s own internal existence requires reflection, but also that we value relationships as we 
should learn from one another and listen to their reflections and descriptions of their subjective 
experience. It, therefore, has come to endorse a far richer way of looking at the world and our 
experiences – it is a ‘lived world.’ As we saw, many authors writing about personhood and the 
self came to dislocate the person from the very factors we should be giving our full attention, 
our cultural setting, but they also focussed on one aspect of our nature and often took a 
reductionist approach to the dialogue. Phenomenologists would share such concerns and, rather 
than viewing the world, and the persons situated within it, as reducible, material, measurable, 
instead they embrace the lived experience and the idea of the co-enquirer wishing to understand 
another person’s worldview through their experiences and social reality. The ethical position, 
therefore, becomes a socio-cultural view,242 people need to be active within a daily life, as beings 
amongst other beings, and human activity is as much about the ethical and the cultural as it is 
about the merely physical. The phenomenologist sees that society and social reality are always 
composed of beings in society and beings in a situation.  
 
The abortion narrative simply cannot be resolved in anything but a contextual setting. Many 
writers have failed to grasp the uniqueness of the abortion dilemma and the variety of potential 
scenarios within their philosophical arguments. When approaching the abortion issue, we must 
have a framework that allows for a plurality of responses. Human beings and their moral 
communities vary drastically and the discourse on abortion, but also pregnancy, needs to make 
space for subjectivity as it has so often been omitted from the dialogue. As Marion Iris Young 
writes, ‘the specific experience of women has been absent from most of our cultural discourse 
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about human experience and history.’243 The abortion rhetoric cannot languor in the realm of the 
abstract, and conceptual puzzles and analogies are unhelpful as they assume a commensurability 
of worldviews. And yet abortion debates are situated, as Gilligan stresses, within a web of human 
relationships244 and within the context of ‘genuinely incommensurable worldviews.’245  
 
What follows is an overview of Care Ethics and Phenomenology and their central themes drawn 
out and these are discussed alongside some possible issues generated by the abortion dilemma.  
 
3.2 Care Ethics: Central Themes Moving Forward  
 
As stated in my introduction, persons have come to be viewed and understood as beings that are 
rational, autonomous and independent agents and this is the description of the moral agent that 
we find at the heart of the dominant ethical theories such as Kantian Deontology and 
Utilitarianism. Care Ethics, however, springboards from a critique of this liberal individualism 
and instead sees persons as relational, interdependent and embedded in society. An ethic of care 
also values emotion rather than rejects it, as certain dominant rationalistic approaches do. ‘The 
values of separation, independence and autonomy are so historically grounded....that they are 
often taken as facts....and yet this is not at all the case.’246 The danger with the dominant ethical 
theories, and their understanding of the human being, is that certain ethical dilemmas such as the 
abortion debate become discussions about conflicting principles between the individual and 
more universal principles. In terms of the abortion debate, and as Joel Feinberg writes: 
‘questions about the morality of abortion can be divided into two groups; those concerned with 
problems about the moral status of the unborn and those concerned with the resolution of 
conflicting claims – in particular, the claims of the mother and those of the foetus.’247 Yet these 
questions are far from exhaustive and fail to grasp the intricacies of human relationships, which I 
believe are at the heart of the issue. This two-fold approach to the abortion issue also clearly 
takes the dangerous ‘us-and-them’ approach, to which Plumwood refers, as a writer either 
accords full moral status, and, therefore, a more elevated and protected place within the moral 
community, to the unborn or does not, and, if they see the debate hinging on the issue of 
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competing claims, they either say the claims of the foetus superseded those of the mother or vice 
versa.  
 
First and foremost, an ethic of care values and takes relationships seriously. The theory views 
human beings as beings in a web of complex relationships and our relational status is essential to 
our agency. Gilligan places human life and human relationships at the centre of ethical dialogue; 
the ‘different voice’ is a relational voice and a voice of connection.248 Relationships require 
connection and they require certain skills and capacities such as listening skills, a capacity for 
empathy and the ability to learn from other voices and to build relationships further. Gilligan 
draws attention to the role of relationships and different types of moral reasoning in the famous 
Heinz dilemma, a hypothetical dilemma that Lawrence Kohlberg put to two eleven year old 
children, Jake and Amy. A man named Heinz is deciding whether or not to steal some medicine 
which can help his dying wife, he is considering stealing this drug because he cannot afford to 
buy it himself. When Jake is asked whether or not Heinz should steal the drug he replies: ‘For 
one thing, a human life is worth more than money, and if the druggist only makes $1,000, he is 
still going to live, but if Heinz doesn’t steal the drug, his wife is going to die. (Why is life more than 
money?) Because the druggist can get thousands of dollars later from rich people with cancer, but 
Heinz can never get his wife again. (Why not?) Because people are different and so you couldn’t 
get Heinz’s wife again.’249 Amy’s reply, however, is markedly different and she answers: ‘Well I 
don’t think so. I think there might be other ways besides stealing it, like if he could borrow the 
money or make a loan or something, but he really shouldn’t steal the drug – but his wife 
shouldn’t die either. (Why not?) If he stole the drug, he might save his wife, but if he did, he might 
have to go to jail, and then his wife might get sicker again, and he couldn’t get more of the drug, 
and it might not be good. So, they really should just talk it out and find some other way to make 
the money.’250 Whilst Kohlberg views Amy’s response as lacking in moral maturity, Gilligan 
views her response as astute in terms of how she perceives human beings and human nature and 
in that she views the dilemma in terms of human relationships and the maintaining those 
relationships.  
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The world is conceived of connections, humans are always in web of relationships251 and human 
beings are always situated in a very particular context. This hypothetical dilemma, like the 
abortion dilemma, cannot be viewed as an isolated and disconnected problem that can be 
resolved by dealing with competing claims; in the case of Heinz, the boy sees the issue in terms 
of deciding between property rights and preserving life. Similarly the abortion debate has come 
to be viewed, by many, as a debate about protecting the ‘innocent foetus’ or upholding a 
woman’s right to choose. This is to radically misunderstand and to omit the real thrust of the 
abortion narrative; the failure to link the debate to other social concerns such as abortion stigma, 
sexual behaviours and activity, pregnancy rates etc. results in dangerous ethical implications as I 
will go on to explore in Chapter Five: Abortion Stigma and Other Exclusions.  
 
As Gilligan writes: ‘The truths of relationship, however, return in the rediscovery of connection, 
in the realisation that self and other are interdependent and that life, however valuable in itself, 
can only be sustained by care in relationships.’ A relational approach, and the role of 
relationships, has been present within certain philosopher’s writings on the issue of abortion; 
Susan Sherwin and Marjorie Reiley Maguire have been two such writers. As we referenced in 
Chapter One: Moving on from Personhood, Sherwin sees that a person is a social creature 
and that the person is a being of engagement,252 and Reiley Maguire also refers to the human 
social community as the setting for the abortion debate.253 Sherwin’s relational approach to 
personhood and the abortion debate leads her to make the following conclusion: ‘Foetuses are 
not persons, because they have not developed sufficiently social relationships to be persons in 
any morally significant sense... Newborns, although just beginning their development into 
persons, are immediately subject to social relationships.’254 Reiley Maguire also suggests that 
foetuses become persons when the mother accepts her pregnancy because then the potentiality 
for relationality and sociality is activated, ‘because it is brought into a personal relationship with a 
human person, with the only human person who can actuate this potentiality while the foetus is 
still in the mother’s body and in a previable state.’255 These approaches, however, focus on 
relatedness rather than inter-relatedness which, I would argue, grasps the idea of relationships 
more effectively; relationships are not entirely in the hands of the more ‘activated’ member. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 ibid. p.98. 
 
252 Susan Sherwin, No Longer Patient, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1992.  
 
253 Marjorie Reiley Maguire, ‘Personhood, Covenant and Abortion,’ American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, Vol. 6, 1, 1985, p.38. 
 
254 Susan Sherwin, No Longer Patient, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1992; http://www.ucs.mun.ca/~alatus/2803-
Winter03/Lecture7Personhood&Abortion.htm 
 
255 Marjorie Reiley Maguire, ‘Personhood, Covenant and Abortion,’ American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, Vol. 6, 1, 1985, p.38. 
 
74	  
	  
Likewise this argument could be seen as focussing too much on the female or the mother and 
not drawing in the role of the father, or partner, and the unborn. Although I do fully agree with 
Reiley Maguire, and writers such as Susan Gibson,256 that, whilst the baby is inside the mother, 
writers need to accept that there is nothing we can do to the unborn without doing something to 
the mother and as such the baby is most fully in relation to her. The foetus is in a very unique 
relationship with the woman in that it is ‘in her and of her.’257 
 
Valuing, and taking seriously, the role of human relationships within the abortion debate is not 
entirely the same as ‘the relational approach to personhood’ and again I would stress the urgent 
need to cut the abortion rhetoric loose from the personhood debate, as described in my first 
chapter. Relationships and our sociality are highly complex ideas, because, whilst the foetus is 
certainly most fully in relation to the mother, as the foetus approaches viability and/or full term, 
the boundaries do begin to blur in that society would wish to protect an infant as soon as it was 
born, and even before, in terms of medical intervention to assist the infants quality of life. 
Society, or rather health care professionals, often step in, to some extent, in order to protect an 
unborn in the womb and might even overrule the mother on certain medical decisions. Paul 
Gomberg’s258 interesting article on the morality of nurturance reflects on the strengths of the 
gradualist position, rather than a ‘defining moment’, approach to personhood. For Gomberg, the 
morality of nurturance starts only when the woman accepts her pregnancy. He writes that there 
‘is no precise point at which it is clear that the morality of nurturance must apply to the foetus, it 
is clear that the longer we wait to abort, the more like a baby is the thing we destroy.’259 Agency, 
for the care ethicist, is not criteria driven and would not just appear or indeed depart, and thus 
viewing the moral agent as either having capacities or failing to have them, rather agency is seen 
as existing on a continuum and very much within the context of relationships.  
 
Another central theme within Care Ethics is that of ‘attending’ and caring for others. It is a 
theme that Joan Tronto refers to as ‘attentiveness’ and ‘responsiveness’ and what Tove Petterson 
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terms ‘co-feeling.’ Gilligan herself stated that her work is grounded in listening260 and likewise a 
fellow psychologist, Daniel Kahneman, in his popular book Thinking Fast and Slow writes that, 
‘caring for others often takes the form of listening, and the concern for the quality of their 
stories.’261 The focus on ‘attentiveness’ within Care Ethics marks the shift in approach and moral 
perspective from the question of ‘what is right and just?’ to ‘how are we to respond?’ As Gill 
stated, care is about ‘doing’ and the serving and responding to others. Attentiveness and 
responsiveness demands that we value a contextual, opposed to abstract, approach to moral 
dilemmas, and our private and cultural settings are as important as our public and political status. 
To be attentive is to be alert to, and then respond to, a person’s needs, and such needs are only 
ascertained when we connect with another and appreciate that persons feelings and their unique 
situation. Care is the practice of responding to needs, it requires constant enquiry, reflection, 
improvement. Attentiveness is intimately linked to our relational status and the central role of 
relationships in Care Ethics; one cannot be attentive to another without a connection. This 
theme demands that we speak relationally and contextually about our human nature, rather than 
abstractly, broadly and speculatively.  Gilligan’s ‘different voice,’ is a voice that insists on staying 
in connection. Gilligan writes that it is good ‘to be responsive to people, to act in connection 
with others and to be careful...about people’s feelings and thoughts, empathetic and attentive to 
their lives.’ In terms abortion debates this would mean that the foetus, the mother and the father, 
or partner, and their feelings would all be considered in full, as would the contextual issues 
surrounding that particular abortion decision, not the abortion decision. However, Gilligan was 
always keen to promote a theory which would make more room for the female voice and one 
that would reconnect with women. Gill’s focus on selfless care from a theological perspective is 
part of his Christian framework for responding to and serving others, as caring societies reflect 
in part the care God has for his creation, however, Gilligan and Pettersen would be wary of the 
idea of selflessly showing care. They would argue that attentiveness and responsiveness, and care 
for others more generally, cannot and should not be at the cost of caring for oneself. Gilligan 
stresses that women have sometimes taken on too much selfless caring, as part of the sacred 
mother stereotype,262 and that this is often at the detriment of their own needs and health; 
women need to pay attention and respond to themselves as beings in connection.263 As stated 
above, you cannot do anything to the foetus without doing something to the mother, and I do 
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not think this connection ends at the ‘moment’ of birth in that many women report to feeling 
both emotional and sensory pain when their child suffers.264 Gilligan speaks of the importance in 
particular of ‘mature care’ which sees that authentic living requires there to be some moral 
equality between caring for the self and caring for others. In terms of abortion debates, the 
dilemma is not so straightforwardly about a decision to care or not to care, or to nurture or not 
to nurture as Paul Gomberg discusses, for the foetus, as care for the mother and her health, her 
feelings and her contextual settings all need to be considered.  
 
Attentiveness and responsiveness demand an approach that also focuses on our situation and 
subjectivity. Noddings speaks about the importance of ‘face-to-face care’ and the personal and 
intimate nature of care, a type of care that she also believes can extend beyond the realm of the 
personal, intimate, private. Michael Slote believes that caring as an approach can take the caring 
of all humanity into consideration and this is a view that is also echoed by Robert Goodin and 
explored in the next chapter, Chapter Four: Vulnerability, Liveable Human Lives and 
Inclusivity.  Gill writes about how caring societies cultivate not just care, but caring 
relationships and vice versa. By cultivating caring relations, you cultivate a plurality of caring 
relations and care as a moral emotion extends and become recognisable and transferable. We are 
all dependent and require care for large parts of our lives and we are certainly left vulnerable by 
our social nature. The role of vulnerability for ethics and abortion debates is an essential factor 
for this dissertation. Tronto states that responsiveness and responsibility is not the same as 
reciprocity, instead it is ‘another method to understand vulnerability and inequality by 
understanding what has been expressed by those in the vulnerable position.’265 It is more than 
putting oneself in another’s shoes, and this particular point is taken up further in the section 
below on Phenomenology and Ethics.  
 
Subjectivity is essential for ethical dialogue and understanding our identity as the context of one’s 
gender, class, ethnicity etc, are all important aspects to consider. As stated before, to many it 
seems that communal ties play a more substantial role in the experience of morality. The cultural 
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constructions of men and women’s moral identities have significant implications for the way in 
which they reflect on themselves as moral agents and in the way they are treated by others in 
abortion contexts. Abortion debates need to be removed from the realm of the abstract and the 
belief that philosophers would ‘solve’ the difficult abortion issue in an arena of rational and 
impartial thinking is, I believe, unfounded. The abortion dialogue is a dialogue centred on human 
relationships and as such we should ‘respond’ to the abortion issue, we cannot ‘resolve’ it! 
Feinberg writes that philosophy was deemed the setting for responding to the abortion dilemma 
because of the belief that philosophers would be able to avoid the bias that so regularly crept 
into the rhetoric.266 The belief that the abortion debate could be ‘solved’ implies that the dialogue 
can be steered towards some sort of consensus and this is clearly to misunderstand the role of 
relationships, and relationships in context, within abortion contexts. It is essential to attend to 
the contextual details of each individual abortion situation in order to safeguard and promote the 
actual specific interests of all those involved. Any approach that lacks these central concerns is 
impoverished and will lack the empathy and care espoused by the Care Ethics approach.  
 
In order to care we must take it upon ourselves to care, because, as Gill says, care is 
fundamentally about doing and action and thus a very particular type of responsibility emerges 
from a focus on care. Responsibility is understood as embedded in a network of relationships. 
Shoemaker’s conception of ‘the moral community’ and his focus on agents that are capable of 
moral address is illuminating here. He argued that our relationships help to define our agency 
and our responsibilities. Agency, for the care ethicist, is not criteria driven, and thus viewing the 
moral agent as either having capacities or failing to have them, but agency is seen as existing on a 
continuum and very much within the context of relationships.267 Carol Gilligan and Nel 
Noddings astutely reflect on how capacities and abilities do not develop as an individualised 
activity or process, but rather in relation with others.268 Our agency is defined by our 
relationships. The fostering of caring relations will help to ensure that we hold ourselves 
responsible to not just our nearest and dearest, but also to others within our wider circle of 
networks. We will consider how an ethic of care and Goodin’s vulnerability ethic can spread 
more broadly to accommodate and respond to the lives of others in the preceding chapter. 
Goodin’s approach encourages an open and inclusive rather than closed and exclusive circle; 
because the networks we find ourselves in should be viewed as open, we are therefore part of 
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this broader web of social relations. The more vulnerable and the more dependent others are to 
your actions, the greater your responsibility is.269  
In terms of abortion debates, this vulnerability and responsibility theme reveals interesting areas 
to consider. Our call to care, and to the responsibility of care, through our relations with others 
brings the unborn and the infant sharply into focus. We do need to consider the developing 
human foetus gradually approaching human birth and the very particular relationship between 
the mother and the foetus. We cannot feel too comfortable, and spokespersons from Marie 
Stopes International share this view, about the rising number of women having repeat or 
multiple abortions or the fact that for some women abortion is being used as a contraceptive.270 
However, it is no more acceptable that a woman may face shame, stigma and therefore often a 
very severe type of exclusion because their decision to have an abortion. We do need to take 
responsibility for the foetus, but the foetus resides within the mother; the mother is the human 
being and moral agent, at the centre of the abortion decision, and her emotional response, her 
relationships, her health needs and the unique contextual considerations surrounding this 
decision all need to be taken into consideration. As we will explore in the final chapter of this 
dissertation, Chapter Five: Abortion Stigma and other Exclusions, there are a range of subtle 
marginalisations and exclusions that can result due to an abortion decision and the unique moral 
community a woman finds herself in. We need to take responsibility for such exclusions and 
then we can refuse to enact such exclusions as part of our desire to build caring moral 
communities.  
 
3.3 Phenomenology and Ethics  
 
Care Ethics naturally lends itself to being considered alongside a phenomenological approach in 
that a person’s own internal existence requires reflection. A phenomenological approach requires 
that we value relationships in a very particular sense in that we should learn about another 
person by listening to their descriptions of what their subjective world is like for them on the 
inside, together with an attempt to understand this in their own terms as fully as possible, free of 
our preconceptions and interferences. Noddings writes that our ability to empathise with others 
is the finest and most important quality to being human.271 Empathy is fully fostered within the 
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phenomenological approach which stresses that we need to continually examine and re-examine 
our biases and presuppositions. The approach seeks to find the fullest possible understanding, 
but it starts with the co-enquirer wanting to understand another person’s world through 
experiences and social reality. In terms of abortion debates this approach can help to give some 
value to the father or partner within the pregnancy and abortion dialogue, as this is an area that 
ethicists and society need to navigate more effectively and as such seek to include his voice in the 
process of decision making. If we recall Shoemaker’s reflections on empathy and emotional 
maturity, he argued that the psychopath was not a member of the moral community due to a lack 
of empathy, or at best a detached type of empathy which allowed them to seek enjoyment from 
the pain of victims as they would know how it feels on some level. . He writes about both this 
detached empathy, but also what he calls ‘identification empathy,’ something akin to the 
phenomenological idea of advocacy recognition and the idea of ‘making them our own and 
defending them.’272 Shoemaker writes that ‘to engage in identifying empathy with you is for me 
to be emotionally vulnerable to the up-and down fortunes of the very objects to which you 
yourself are emotionally vulnerable.’273 I will speak more on this idea of our exposed and 
vulnerable nature in the next chapter, Chapter Four: Vulnerability, Liveable Lives and 
Inclusivity.  
The phenomenological process of paying attention implies a process of communicating, and 
therefore there is a sort of fundamental existential and social quality to everything we experience. 
The phenomenologist sees that social reality is always composed of persons in society, people are 
always in some sense in a society, and are also always in a situation. As we have seen, the 
abortion debate is set amongst a variety of competing descriptions of the self and human life. 
Therefore, embracing a phenomenological approach to moral dilemmas is essential given these 
competing descriptions. How we describe something makes all the difference as to how we 
decide we are permitted to act. In a post-modern world we need to take account of these 
complex descriptions and the ‘messy’ nature of human life; many writers promoting a 
phenomenological approach would argue that certain strands of philosophy have failed to 
appreciate the reality of the human condition and human emergence.274 
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I have already referenced the writings of Iris Marion Young and Robert Spaemann in this piece, 
two writers who support a phenomenological strand within moral philosophy. Young’s work on 
pregnancy and embodiment develops the idea of the ‘lived experience’ within pregnancy rhetoric 
and this can offer important insights for our current and related discussion about abortion 
contexts. Young writes about the ‘privileged relation’ between the foetus and the pregnant 
female. The mother has a highly unique relationship the woman has to the foetus and her 
pregnant body.275 Human lives begin in the womb of another human being, we are all born of a 
mother, and yet these moral facts have been somewhat neglected from the abortion dialogue. 
Likewise Spaemann, a writer referenced in Chapter One, stressed the need to see more diversity 
within accounts of human nature and spoke of appreciating the healthy tension that needs to 
exist in any understanding of the self. The tension exists because one cannot so neatly place ideas 
about the self in one category opposed to another category; the human being is, I have argued, a 
layered entity. Spaemann developed Merleau-Ponty’s view of being-in-the-world when he writes 
that we are ‘subjects and objects at once.’ 
James Mumford puts forward a phenomenological approach to beginning of life ethics and 
argues that a phenomenological framework is essential if we are to allow for descriptions of 
worldly experiences and indeed entities, such as ourselves, to be richer and more importantly, 
accurate. Mumford would challenge the idea of their being a set moment at which a person 
appears and the decisive moment for personhood explored in Chapter One. A 
phenomenological viewpoint would not expect everything in the world, including ourselves, to 
just appear and indeed phenomenology has always been more attentive to the way things appear 
over time.276 We should recall Callahan’s important point about descriptions of the self needing 
to grasp the life span and variance of capacities that a human being possesses over time. 
Phenomenology also attends to the varying questions surrounding our nature, as explored in my 
introduction, in that the approach does not just ask, ‘what am I?’ in a strictly material sense, but 
instead also asks, and this is highly relevant for abortion debates, ‘where am I?’ in terms of 
context.  The abortion discussion is therefore also tied into the phenomenon of pregnancy and 
parenting and the parent-child relationship more broadly.   
In a similar vein to writers supporting an ethic of care and also vulnerability ethics, an approach 
which will be explored in more detail in the next chapter, phenomenology would also embrace 
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the following ideas: that we are entirely dependent for large periods of our lives; that autonomy, 
and the role it has played in moral philosophy, is something of an illusion and that relationships 
are not contractual but rather they are founded on context and a heightened sense of emotion 
and inter subjectivity. Mumford challenges the model of the rational, autonomous being at the 
heart of moral philosophy. A phenomenological framework has much to offer ethical debate 
and, as Mumford writes, the abstract, lofty and orthodox nature of beginning of life ethics and 
enquiry fails ‘to do justice to the world;’277 it fails to situate the debate in context and within our 
social settings. He argues that the decision by philosophers to present our human reality as social 
or not simply cannot be optional – it is essential.278 He too sees the great irony in the fact that the 
model and definition of the rational, autonomous, thinking individual, developed as part of the 
liberal egalitarian backdrop, has, in fact, become a definition that has become a device, both 
explicitly and implicitly, for exclusion.279 
Mumford argues that the foetus first appears in the world as a dependent, and likewise babies 
and young infants are vulnerable and dependent for long periods and given this powerlessness he 
views the viability argument for personhood as unfounded; viability simply tells us that a foetus 
might survive outside the womb, and it only does so with large amounts of care and medical 
support. This reinforces the role of the female and privileged role and relationship that Young 
explores. The child is dependent on the female entirely during pregnancy and after birth this care 
either continues, and it is an essential type of care, or the care giver becomes, if not her, another 
person such as the father, adoptive parents and/or medical practitioners.  
The privileged status between the woman and the foetus is not to over emphasise the claims of 
the female at the expense of the foetus but rather, in my view at least, grasps the intricacies of 
the complex dynamic of relationships. Amy Mullin gets to the crux of this complexity when she 
writes, often those who are assumed the care givers, and those called upon to care, often become 
more vulnerable than the cared for in that their own needs become neglected or face being 
ignored.280 Mumford picks up this line of thinking when he distinguishes between the types of 
relationship a pregnancy might imply. A pregnancy could well be an attack on the woman’s 
health or life, and it could also be the start of a relationship. Now, whilst he sees that a 
pregnancy being unwanted is perhaps the least acceptable reason for an abortion he 
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acknowledges that an attack and a relationship may take many forms. He views pregnancy as the 
opportunity for encounter, a similar idea to Gomberg’s morality of nurturance and the 
opportunity for nurture. Mullin’s point about the threat of dependency relationships however is 
essential and a dangerous pregnancy may take many forms. The woman who has a cancerous 
uterus or a pregnancy in her fallopian tube is certainly at risk but so too is the depressed woman, 
a woman who has been raped, a woman fleeing an abusive relationship, a woman who simply 
cannot for a plethora of complex reasons take on pregnancy but more accurately motherhood.  
Mumford’s phenomenological framework to beginning of life ethics centres on the belief that we 
enter life as weak, vulnerable, dependent and ‘in encounter’ and this is the reality of human life, 
this is the context of human life - these are the moral facts.  
3.4 A Feminist Ethics of Care?  
 
By proposing an ethic of care and phenomenological framework for the abortion debate is not, I 
believe, to forward a solely female perspective when considering the ethical considerations 
surrounding the abortion debate. Gilligan and others281 have generated a general account of 
feminine identity which could be criticised as being ‘essentialist’ and as elevating the sacred 
mother282 metaphor as a defining experience for women. I do however acknowledge Held’s point 
about respecting the feminist tradition from which the Care Ethics theory emerged; it is, she 
writes, ‘a theory of feminist progress.’283 However, there are also other important contributions 
to the discussion about care within ethics and society that add further dimensions to the 
discourse as we have seen in Gill’s writings on caring moral communities. Whilst the female 
voice is central to the abortion dilemma, I wish to use an ethic of care framework in order to 
consider a wide and varied range of social and cultural communities and moral identities. It is an 
approach that will build from the lived experience of individuals in connection. An ethic of care 
approach values caring and interpersonal relationships – full and varied types of relationships 
must be acknowledged and valued. Care Ethics, like Communitarian Ethics, stresses the 
interdependence of human beings and thus takes relationships seriously, especially relationships 
within the family and a range of communities if developed effectively. The importance of taking 
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relationships seriously cannot be underestimated, in that relationships are essential to agency and 
our moral lives. The cultural constructions of male and female moral identities have significant 
implications for the way in which they reflect on themselves as moral agents and in the way they 
are treated by others in abortion contexts. The idea of relationships in context has to take 
account of both the experiences of both men and women.  
Gilligan’s ‘abortion decision study’ involved interviewing only women about their decision and 
this suggested and reinforced the generally held belief that abortion is typically a female dilemma. 
Whilst this is predominantly the case, abortion is situated amongst other related ideas and facts 
about the body, reproduction and pregnancy and a whole of factors relating to our emotions, 
sexual behaviours, parenting and also gender and cultural constructions relating to these ideas.284  
If abortion, and Care Ethics, is also truly about human relationships, as Gilligan has suggested, 
then much of the issue surrounds the very particular relationship that the woman is in at that 
time. As Ruth Chadwick astutely reflects, an essential part of the story of reproduction, 
pregnancy and abortion, is the decision to have a child with someone, or not in many cases. This 
is echoed, in part, Gomberg’s morality of nurturance and the decision to nurture or not 
nurture.285 Surely such a decision is rooted, often, in the particular relationship someone 
considering an abortion finds themselves in. Care Ethics considers the full range of possible 
relationships, both intimate or within the wider community, but the approach also considers the 
context of a particular relationship and this is essential. 
As stated above, Gilligan speaks of the importance of ‘mature care’286 which sees that authentic 
living requires there to be some moral equality between caring for the self and caring for others.  
In terms of abortion debates an ethic of care could add some complications in that this approach 
could perhaps reduce the ethical decision to that of deciding whether to nurture or not nurture, 
and given the value placed on the sentiment of care and nurture it may appear as if care ethics 
would foster an opportunity for this type of experience.  However, if we consider abortion in 
terms of Gilligan’s mature care, we should be reminded of the reality that you cannot do 
anything to the foetus without doing something to the mother and as such her lived experience, 
feelings, emotions and contextual settings are of paramount importance.  
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Tove Petterson takes up this strand in Care Ethics when she develops Gilligan’s mature care and 
says that co-feeling is essential for ethical dialogue.287 Co-feeling is the seeking to understand the 
full complexity of the other person’s situation. To return to the woman within the abortion 
dialogue, we ought to ask ourselves how we would respond to a woman who does not want a 
child. The care ethicist would stress understanding, support and guidance - there is no room for 
chastising and prescribing set behaviours. We are not the knowing agent that knows best; care 
would involve participating and engaging in that person’s feelings and that person’s life project 
and subjective and lived experiences. Petterson steers away from a solely feminist ethic and I am 
in full support of such a move, as it is essential to consider the situation and complexities facing 
men in society today, as Gilligan has since gone on to write about. Care needs to be appreciated 
and fostered by both boys and girls and men and women. Abortion is not a ‘typical’ or solely 
female dilemma because abortion is a connected and complex choice, and whilst the woman’s 
role is undoubtedly unique, there are still important factors related to masculine identity and 
parenting needing to be considered. Reproductive narratives and technological developments 
have transformed attitudes towards men and women and their roles and value in society and it is 
imperative that we reflect fully on these affects.288  
 
The feminist narrative, however, is strong within care ethics in that it espouses nothing objective 
or devoid of the cultural. It is the cultural and contextual, ‘not abstract rules or rational 
calculation of individual unities’289 that drives the approach. As Jean Keller writes, the feminist 
insight that the moral agent is an encumbered self who is always embedded in relations with 
flesh and blood others and is partly constituted by these relations is here to stay.290 Revising 
certain traditional stronghold ethical systems to make more of the female experience is essential, 
but I think we need to speak of both male and female experiences within the abortion debate 
and as Hursthouse notes, it is a debate that is interlocking with other debates; abortion dilemmas 
are often intimately linked to reflections on our particular relationships, gender roles, pregnancy, 
parenting, and health to highlight just a few areas.  
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3.5 Care Ethics, Phenomenology and Application  
 
A care based approach has commonly been misunderstood as a framework that would attend to 
women’s issues and it was seen as an ethical approach that belonged and attended to the realm 
of the private. However, Care Ethics can of course have important implications for our social, 
political and economic lives. I believe that it can offer the most fruitful framework for addressing 
the abortion dialogue given that the theory focuses so sharply on relationships, paying attention, 
responsibility and contextual settings.  Attentiveness can reveal that all pockets and domains of 
society need transforming not just the public setting. The household could be seen as an intimate 
moral community and as such this moral community spills over and is interrelated with a larger 
scale public setting in part.291 And yet, Care Ethics is not just a type of ‘family ethics,’ and an 
approach that helps address behind the scenes day-to-day dilemmas, care is relevant to all areas 
of life and human life in the broadest social sense.  
 
Care Ethics can have important implications for ethical and political reflections, for example on 
the morality of war and achieving peace. Sarah Ruddick develops this implication for Care Ethics 
and her writings and the work of Butler on non-violence are picked up in the in the next chapter, 
Chapter Four: Vulnerability, Liveable Human Live and Inclusivity. It is often economic, 
not humanitarian, factors in relation to war that dominate governmental and foreign policy. Held 
writes ‘instead of abandoning culture to the dictates of the market place, we should make it 
possible for culture to develop in ways best able to enlighten and enrich human life.’292 Society is 
often dominated by greed, violence and conflict, not care, charity and empathy, and as we 
reflected upon above, moral communities are often violent places to be fled, not caring beacons 
of nourishment. Noddings believes that caring and the related activity of showing empathy is the 
highest moral attribute. She also laments that care is not the primary consideration in society, far 
from it and in fact caring activities and skills are hugely undervalued in the workplace, and yet it 
could be a central consideration with caring skills fostered. Care, if a primary consideration for 
society, would elevate education for all, the raising of children, the caring for the elderly, peace, 
the fostering of liveable lives (as will be explored in the next chapter), non-violence and would 
see a radically restructured society.293 Tronto argues that care and meeting the needs of others is 
the highest social good.294  
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Caring for the vulnerable in terms of the abortion debate is often screamed about, as Dworkin 
reflects, opposed to being acted out!  Care is uncomfortable and complex but it is clear that the 
woman at the centre of the abortion dilemma requires care and consideration.  
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Chapter Four: Vulnerability, Liveable Human Lives and Inclusivity  
 
4.1. The concept of vulnerability  
 
The word ‘vulnerability’ has its roots in the Latin vulnerare, ‘to wound’295 or to harm.  Daniel 
Callahan argues that human beings are intrinsically vulnerable and, therefore, it is an essential 
concept for navigating central dilemmas within bioethics.296 Vulnerability as an idea is having a 
huge amount of attention within popular writing through the work of research professor and 
writer Brené Brown and her writings on the power of vulnerability.297 Much of her thinking on 
vulnerability resembles the ethic of care approach, in that vulnerability is relational and best 
understood through the idea of connection; connection, she stresses, is why we are all here.298 
Being born vulnerable, or to be vulnerable, is our nature and our and purpose and this 
connection is to share in other people’s feelings, or stories as Kahneman suggests, and respond 
with care and kindness.  She is therefore adopting a message of relational power and connection. 
Brown pulled this central message from a decade involved in social work, but it is not just in this 
particular field that the idea of vulnerability so strongly resonates. The vulnerability concept, and 
the notion of protecting the vulnerable, remains an area of focus for bioethics and ethics within 
the nursing profession in particular. Ruth Macklin views a focus on vulnerability in bioethics as 
essential, because the vulnerable are fundamentally exposed to exploitation and exclusion and 
this is morally unacceptable.299 The moral patient – moral agent dichotomy, therefore, needs to 
be recast with an understanding of vulnerability, vulnerability as a great equaliser, and a relational 
power with others not power over others. 
 
As with so many other areas explored within this dissertation, the concept of the person as an 
individual and autonomous unit is embedded unhelpfully here too! Often those writing about the 
concept of vulnerability have done so ‘through the lens of individualism.’300 As Laura Tomme 
writes, when considering the centrality of the concept of vulnerability for nursing ethics the idea 
of vulnerability is considered from an ‘epidemiological perspective....that is the patient is 
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examined for causative agents that underlie health issues...the concept of environment is not 
analysed as social landscape.’301 In short, conceptualisations of vulnerability have emerged from 
an individualistic perspective and have tended to focus on the characteristics of those individuals. 
How social, economic and political factors intersect and shape people’s ability to be healthy and 
also impact upon their vulnerability has been considerably neglected. Vulnerability needs to be 
viewed as situational within health care.302  
 
In Christian Ethics references to the innocent and the vulnerable abound. The Christian tradition 
understands human life as a gift and that we should do all we can to treasure and preserve it. 
Jesus’ message focussed on the weak and the vulnerable in the community and, as Helmut 
Thielicke writes, ‘even the most pitiful life retains its dignity’303and incalculable worth. Weak, 
vulnerable and oppressed groups should always be valued and drawn into our moral 
communities. Vulnerability has also been present in the work of theologian Jonathan Wyn 
Shofer, who considers vulnerability from a Jewish rabbinic perspective and stresses the need to 
embrace our frailties and vulnerabilities rather than reject and deny them. Rabbi Bradley Arston 
has even made a case for God’s divine vulnerability; God is the ultimate example of vulnerability 
and, therefore, rejects the idea of God Almighty.304 Shofer reflects on how the Jewish narrative 
and history is one that grasps vulnerability in that it has been a history of exclusion, expulsion 
and risk. Delfour and Hubert and the Jewish sociologist Judith Butler also explore the terms 
associated with vulnerability, such as victimization, marginaltisation, insecurity and risk.305 
Blacksher and Stone note that, until recently, bioethics largely has overlooked vulnerable groups. 
The term ‘vulnerable populations’ has its detractors, but the term also captures a significant 
aspect of marginalized groups.306 
 
Butler, like Brown, writes about living with and accepting our vulnerability, as opposed to 
transferring it from oneself to another. Whilst certain writers are encouraging us to embrace our 
vulnerability, others have written about the dangers of labelling people and groups as people as 
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vulnerable in that it runs the risk of viewing them as ‘different’ or alien and worthy of pity.307 
Butler, however, argues that our fundamental vulnerability, and the extent to which we are all 
given over to one another from the start, forms the basis of our responsibility to respond 
ethically to one another. This ethical responsibility arises due to our common vulnerability or our 
‘corporeal vulnerability.’  We are vulnerable because of our embodiment and our needs and 
vulnerability springs from our material and bodily nature. Our vulnerability, for Butler, is part of 
our moral agency. She stresses that our vulnerability is linked to our bodily and social nature and 
this nature leaves us exposed to violence. She writes: ‘the body implies morality, vulnerability and 
agency: the skin and the flesh expose us to the gaze of others, but also to touch, and to 
violence.’308 Certain members of our moral communities are therefore more exposed and at risk 
because some human beings and bodies are ‘constituted politically in part by virtue of the social 
vulnerability of bodies.’309  
 
Human beings are, as Callahan observes, essentially vulnerable and this vulnerability emerges due 
to human sociality. Likewise, Robert Goodin’s vulnerability principle is a relational notion and 
he, like Butler, focuses on the vulnerable ‘Other’ who deserves our attention. Butler, Goodin and 
other writers proposing an ethic of care all espouse the belief that moral agency, and also our 
responsibilities, is intimately linked to our relationships - relationships characterized by 
dependency and vulnerability. For Goodin, ethics is about protecting the vulnerable. The care 
ethicist Noddings, has also written about vulnerable groups, such as the homeless, and she sees 
vulnerability as an essential concept when linking an ethic of care with social policy.310 What 
follows is a more detailed look into Butler and Goodin’s conceptualisation of vulnerability and 
how this might play out in terms of the abortion dialogue.  
 
4.2 Robert Goodin’s Relational notion of Vulnerability  
 
Robert Goodin, in his book Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities, argues 
that our vulnerability and the vulnerability of others form the very basis of our special relations 
between our nearest and dearest but also our wider circles and networks. In a similar vein to 
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Butler and those writers promoting an ethic of care, Goodin views human beings as embedded 
and interrelated due to our common vulnerability and the fact that we are all dependent. He 
argues that, if anything unites the human being, it is the principle of vulnerability, ‘what is crucial 
is that people depend on us.’311Goodin’s theory closely resembles the ethics of care approach in 
that vulnerability is relational and in opposition to stronghold consequentialist and deontological 
ethical theories which view moral agents as independent, individual and autonomous units. An 
ethic of care, however, ‘conceptualises persons as deeply affected by and involved in 
relationships with others.’312 Unlike a consequentialist and deontological view of the person, 
agents are not always free and equal and thus an ethic of care acknowledges the care between 
persons of unequal status and power and they are often in relationships that are not chosen, for 
example, within certain social and cultural groups and more specifically between parent and 
child.  
 
When considering our moral responsibilities towards others what really matters, is that others are 
depending on us. They are particularly vulnerable to our actions and choices. That, I argue, is the 
true source of all the standard special responsibilities that we so readily acknowledge. The same 
considerations of vulnerability that make our obligations to our families, friends, clients and 
compatriots especially strong can also give rise to similar responsibilities toward a much larger 
group of people who stand in none of the standard relationships to us.’313For Goodin, charity 
may begin at home, but it does not stop there,314 and whilst, we of course acknowledge the 
special responsibility we feel towards our family and friends, we must also acknowledge our 
broader social responsibilities to the vulnerable in society at large. We have a duty to prevent 
harm – and this harm can take on a psychological and emotional nature, as a physical one. This 
duty to prevent harm and nurture health is therefore seen in the social and cultural sense that 
Tomme and Ada Rogers advocate.  As David Thomasma writes: ‘The principle of vulnerability 
can be stated this way: In human relations generally, if there are inequities of power, knowledge, 
or material means, the obligation is upon the stronger to respect and protect the vulnerability of 
the other, and not to exploit the less advantaged.’315 In a similar vein to Goodin, Thomasma is 
arguing that we have a special commitment to the vulnerable and the sick, and these groups 
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require special protection therefore, and our care and response to the vulnerable should be 
steering our healthcare goals and commitments. Both Goodin and Thomasma argue that it is our 
vulnerability that informs and creates our responsibility and our duty to care, not social 
contracts.  
 
In terms of the abortion debate, Goodin would endorse a focus on the emotions and feelings 
generated by the dilemma. Some of the most important vulnerabilities are those associated with 
feelings and emotions and given that for Goodin vulnerability is relative, he sees it as natural that 
we favour those close to us. Our vulnerability is therefore tied to our social nature because we 
are emotionally and psychologically vulnerable to others. Goodin references Gilligan’s work and 
her abortion study project in his book and he acknowledges that within abortion contexts, 
emotional considerations are often ‘the heaviest considerations bearing on the minds of women 
presented with abortion decisions.’316 Therefore, the relational element means that the woman’s 
vulnerability needs and deserves our full attention. Again, the writings of certain theologians 
have been highly informative for this dissertation, and how one attends to the self within a 
framework of vulnerability has been picked up by Catherine Keller in her writings about the 
embodied life. In a similar vein to Gilligan’s mature care, Keller refers to the relational self, the 
idea that we are kind to ourselves as well as others. Keller’s feminist position further develops 
the idea of relational personhood, an idea she refers to as entanglement,317 and a relationality 
form intimacy to infinity. For Keller humans are bound to their social contexts and live by 
intersection and in interdependence.  
 
It is clear from Gilligan’s survey that women grappled considerably with their contextual setting, 
their existing relationships and their feelings when making their decision to have an abortion. 
Women felt a great sense of guilt, often, for even contemplating their own needs. But to 
contemplate one’s own needs is to understand that people, and their situations, deserve our 
attention and response. Care for others springboards from a care for oneself and this is what 
Keller, Brown and Gilligan would see as a healthy vulnerability, an ability to balance concerns for 
self and other. In terms of considering existing relationships, this may take the form of a mother 
who already has children and simply feels unable to raise another child due to a range of factors 
including economic, health and emotional considerations. A woman’s relationship with the 
foetus may feel remote, or even completely void, in terms of other commitments that may be 
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pressing. Many women do not feel attached to their pregnancy in the early stages and some may 
even view pregnancy as parasitic and unwanted, or as an attack as Mumford explored, rather 
than fulfilling. There are many pregnancies that pose considerable physical and social health risks 
for women. A woman’s relationship with the father, or indeed lack of one, may be one of her 
most pressing concerns. For many women, a pregnancy is ideally fostered within a very particular 
type of relationship where the partner’s support makes continuing with a pregnancy a viable 
option viable, without this support it may be untenable. As Chadwick writes, much of the story 
of procreation is about the desire to have a child with a very particular ‘other’ and this point is 
often forgotten within the rhetoric. The other side of this narrative is how we respond and feel 
about the woman who aborts a foetus with scant regard for her supportive partner who is 
desperate for parenthood or indeed the woman who continues a pregnancy and demands 
support from the father who feels completely unable to take on the responsibility of fatherhood. 
I am still overwhelmingly in support of Gibson and Young’s salient point about the reality of the 
foetus being inside the mother, and the fact that we cannot do anything to the foetus without 
doing something to the woman, however, the father’s voice needs more attention within the 
debate. We cannot claim to take relationships seriously within ethical dilemmas if we only listen 
to some voices and not others, and here health care professionals can import a more situational 
support as Tomme and Rogers suggest.  
 
The thrust of this dissertation has been focussed on trying to forward an idea of open and 
inclusive moral communities, communities where caring attitudes are fostered. A difficulty 
emerges when we consider the foetus within Goodin’s framework, in that the foetus is entirely 
dependent on the mother for survival, the ‘child’ is in the weaker position and so there is 
undoubtedly a responsibility to respond. However, our responsibilities and the call to respond 
emerges from our relationships and it is not a given, as so many writing within the pro-life camp 
assume, that the foetus is the only vulnerable party. The foetus, or embryo, may feel so remote 
to the woman that the accepting of her pregnancy is not something she feels or considers, and as 
Sherwin and Reiley Maguire have suggested, the foetus is only a person when accepted by the 
mother. I would suggest that many women do in fact feel able to accept their pregnancy and 
acknowledge that the foetus is a developing human being, but they also feel that there are other 
important considerations and factors to consider. Many women and couples may feel unable to 
take on the demands of parenting, which assumes that they have thought about what good 
parenting entails and hence they are concerned that they, and their situation, means they fall 
short. 
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Some Doctors who perform late abortions have suggested that, despite arguments to the 
contrary, they feel they are doing the act for the good of the child. In the Channel 4 
Documentary My Foetus, Doctor John Parsons of Kings College Hospital London is interviewed 
about his reasons for performing abortions up to the 24 week limit. He feels that both the 
mother and the infant need his care. He says he often performs late abortions for the infant. He 
feels when he is faced with a woman at a very late stage of their pregnancy requiring an abortion 
then she has often had a long time to think about the decision and the reality is that if she he 
doesn’t perform the abortion then woman will undoubtedly seek other options such as going 
abroad to have an even later abortion or pursuing dangerous abortifacient methods.318 As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the mother may feel that her pregnancy is something of an 
attack and something that puts enormous pressure on her. As Amy Mullin has stressed, the 
burdens of dependency should not be forgotten.  
 
An open moral community may well need to keep alert to the developing foetus approaching 
birth, but more importantly we need to consider the subtle ways we include and exclude people, 
such as women in the abortion context. Such marginalisations are explored in the next chapter, 
Chapter Five: Abortion Stigma and Other Exclusions. As Delfor and Hubert have stressed, 
vulnerability is intimately related to marginalisations in society. Being vulnerable means one is at 
risk of being harmed, both physically and psychologically and emotionally and as Butler explores, 
women are often more susceptible to harm. Our social nature leaves us vulnerable and exposed 
to exclusion and as Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds write: as socio-political beings, we are 
vulnerable to exploitation, manipulation, oppression, political violence and rights abuses.319 
 
4.3 Judith Butler’s understanding of Vulnerability and her Liveable and Unliveable Lives  
 
Butler's work Precarious Lives, on mourning after the 9/11 tragedy, asks us to consider which lives 
we consider ‘grievable.’ She calls upon us to widen our ethical focus to realise that we are all 
related and connected to one another. ‘It is not as if an ‘I’ exists independently over here and 
then simply loses a ‘you’ over there, especially if the attachment to ‘you’ is part of what composes 
who ‘I’ am.’320 In her Giving an Account of Oneself she asks: ‘And is the relationality that conditions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 My Foetus documentary screened on Channel 4 on April 20th, 2004.  
 
319 Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers and Susan Dodds (eds.), Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, p1. 
 
320 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence, London, Verso Books, 2004, p. 22.	  
94	  
	  
and blinds this ‘self’ not, precisely, an indispensable resource for ethics?’321 This tie is bound up 
with our intrinsic vulnerability. 
 
Vulnerability reveals very generally a susceptibly to being harmed. Butler’s argues that all human 
beings share this susceptibility because we are embodied and because our bodies are social in 
nature. Our bodies exist in the world and are susceptible to injury and exclusion. Her reflections 
on the ethics of vulnerability reveal that it is often women who are the most vulnerable, and 
therefore marginalised, members of our societies and moral communities. Butler, like many 
writers promoting an ethic of care, speaks of human beings as dependent and embedded in 
society. Our dependence exists in part because the ‘I’ is dependent on the ‘Other’,322 but because 
from the very start we are entirely dependent in terms of our survival. She writes that our 
dependency ‘incurs and sustains some of its most important ethical bonds.’323 
 
This particular ethical bond has implications and for Butler’s an ethic of vulnerability implies an 
ethic of non-violence. Violence is a violation of these bonds of existence and violence destroys 
not only our bodies but also the trust that emerges from our dependency. As discussed above, 
there has been concern from some writers that the labelling of some groups as vulnerable is 
damaging for that groups moral status, however, Butler is more concerned about the alarming 
ethical implications of not recognising some groups as vulnerable and therefore requiring 
protection. Such groups would often include women and sexual and ethnic minorities. As 
Agrawal324 and Gnanadson stress, it is women and their children who have been, and remain, the 
most vulnerable members of their own communities.325 The effects of poverty and gender 
inequality are often linked to the body of a woman: the ways in which policy makers’ attempts to 
control women’s bodies politically and culturally serve to preserve their highly vulnerable 
positions in society.326 As will be explored further in the next chapter, Chapter Five: Abortion 
Stigma and Further Exclusions, certain groups face exclusion because of their bodily nature 
and the prohibited nature of their sexual relations and bodily relations.  
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For Butler, there is the stark recognition that some societies construct bodies that ‘do not matter’ 
and they are not recognised as being human (having lives that are worthy of protection) and so 
not all lives are seen to be liveable lives. The domain of liveable lives thus constructs the realms 
of unliveable lives. Those lives that are not afforded respect or the right to live according to 
one’s own way of being. Thus Butler emphasises the importance of considering: ‘…what humans 
require in order to maintain and reproduce the conditions of their own liveability, and what are 
our politics such that we are, in whatever way possible, both conceptualizing the possibility of 
the liveable life and arranging for its institutional support.’327 In practice this demands that we 
seek to build moral communities and societies that are fully inclusive, as consideration must also 
be given to how society can provide the space and support for different forms of ‘liveable lives’ 
to develop and be recognised.  
 
Vulnerability is what is common to the human being and Butler stresses that all human bodies 
are social and exposed to varying degrees of violence: ‘the body implies morality, vulnerability 
and agency: the skin and the flesh expose us to the gaze of others, but also to touch and 
violence.’328 We are united by this exposure, but we are left vulnerable due to the fact that we are 
social in nature. Our social nature and certain social, cultural and political conditions need to be 
constantly reflected upon given that our ‘vulnerability becomes highly exacerbated under certain 
social conditions.’329 Certain human lives are certainly excluded according to Butler in that she 
recognises that whose lives matter depend on certain social and cultural norms and certain 
human bodies are not recognised as being human or as having lives worthy of protection and 
nurturing. Thus she questions: ‘Who counts as human? Whose lives count as lives?’ Butler 
reminds us of the uniting truth of violence and vulnerability and that we are all bound together 
because of this. She writes that the human condition of interdependence and vulnerability should 
be the very basis of reimagining – instead of destroying – the possibility of community.330 
 
Vulnerability is the most important aspect of our humanity and our ethical responses therefore; 
the general state of fragility and physical vulnerability that humans live in should be the basis for 
ethical considerations.331 
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4.4 Vulnerability, Liveable Lives and Implications for Abortion Debates 
 
‘Human life is conditioned by vulnerability.’ 332The bodily and social nature of human beings 
leaves us exposed. Certain groups, often women, are more vulnerable to exclusion. As will be 
explored in the next chapter, young females in certain cultures are facing the double 
complication of concealing an abortion, but also therefore, a sexual relationship. Sexual activity, 
and specifically female sexuality, is often at the heart of abortion stigma, a dangerous exclusion 
that can result from certain moral communities, and an area of research that needs to be drawn 
into the abortion rhetoric. There is a range of power dynamics within abortion dilemmas and 
these are part of the labelling of females that forms part of the stigma and marginalisations that 
can occur because of their decision to have an abortion. Abortion stigma is a social phenomenon 
that results at community level and due to our social nature. The impact of abortion on women, 
their partners, families, communities, societies differs drastically depending on cultural setting. 
Stigma and status loss emerge at community level and within our moral communities and this 
phenomenon is ‘a moral issue....that threatens what really matters’; what matters is our 
membership and inclusion within a moral community as we can only flourish if our social 
relations and settings allow for this.  
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Chapter Five: Abortion Stigma and Other Exclusions  
 
5.1 Abortion Experiences  
The research reveals that abortion experiences vary dramatically,333 as does the language of 
abortion, pregnancy and parenting. Each human being is set within a unique social moral 
community where their individual challenges and considerations vary enormously. I have 
recommended that we approach the notion of moral community from the point of view that 
there are, and we may belong to, many moral communities. I have argued that it is crucial that 
we understand the ethical consequences of choosing to see someone as being either a member or 
not a member of the moral community and as Kittay argues, there are a range of morally 
repugnant current moral exclusions. This has, I believe, considerable bearing on abortion 
debates, given studies into abortion stigma. 
Bruce. G. Link and Jo. C. Phelan334 have investigated the way that stigma can be produced and 
reproduced at community and society level and how this process manifests in practice. In the 
first stage of the process differences between human beings are labelled. This then forms the 
springboard for further exclusions, as the labelling then leads to a secondary stage where 
dominant cultural beliefs link these now labelled persons to highly unattractive and 
disadvantageous characteristics, and thus detrimental stereotypes emerge. What then follows is 
the creation of the ‘us-and-them’ culture referred to already in this investigation, in that these 
labelled persons are effectively replaced within a separate category outside of the in-group and 
their moral community. This then leads to practical exclusions, given that the person will feel this 
status loss, but they will also face ‘real’ and unequal outcomes, and discrimination necessarily 
follows.335 This loss of status within a social network is ‘fundamentally a moral issue in which 
stigmatised conditions threaten what really matters.’336 What matters, of course, is a ‘liveable life’ 
and space within one’s moral community.  
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We cannot universalise the feelings, emotions and behaviours relating to abortion and the type of 
abortion stigma and exclusions a woman may experience. As Kaposy stressed, the moral 
worldviews in which abortions take place are incommensurable,337 and so, the controversies and 
complexities surrounding abortions will vary. It can often appear when reading certain abortion 
literature that the central issue revolves around the beginning of life, foetal viability, foetal pain 
and reproductive physiology in general. However there are also many other areas to be navigated 
for example the issue surrounding who is the decision maker (woman, partner, family, or health 
professional) as well as policies related to abortion and also some of the social, cultural and 
political trends explored in part in this dissertation. Abortion stigma is a type of exclusion in that 
it is a negative attribute ascribed to women who seek to terminate a pregnancy. The stigma and 
the feelings of exclusion that result mark these women and they are perceived to demonstrate 
inferior ideals of motherhood and parenting.  
 
5.2 The Language of Pregnancy and Motherhood 
Definitions of womanhood and motherhood will vary depending on local cultures and histories. 
A woman who seeks an abortion may well be inadvertently challenging widely held assumptions 
about the essential nature of women. This essentialist language, and indeed biological and 
metaphysical essentialism, has been explored previously in this dissertation. Associating women 
with certain common features such as their child bearing capacities, their wombs or breasts for 
example, is certainly a dangerous approach. Whilst these facts are certainly important biological 
features to be considered, in that it is only women who can have babies, this is not the essential 
feature of being female, and many authors are clear to differentiate between being female and 
being a woman. The reality of female pregnancy is what creates the ‘privileged position’ that 
Young referenced; it is the woman who is most directly in relation to the foetus. However, the 
bodies that we ‘live in’, phenomenologically, are both biologically informed, but also socially and 
culturally informed. We are all, as this dissertation contends, bodies and human beings living in 
socio-historical and cultural context. Women, therefore, have vastly different lived experiences 
because of these settings. Young has stressed that women are an ‘internally diverse series’ and 
they are a social collective. The fundamental social dimension to the idea of womanhood and the 
female is, therefore, ‘vast, multifaceted, layered, complex and overlapping.’338 
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Amy Mullins in her book Reconceiving Pregnancy and Childcare, reflects on the ideology of sacrificial 
motherhood.339 Ideologies invoke very particular goals and expectations about what something is 
like and what it should be. In the case of motherhood Mullins explores the idea of it being a 
sacrificial act which is often viewed as essential, natural and private. This dissertation has also 
explored the creation and elevation of master themes or one element of traditional and current 
dualism being forwarded whilst the other is demeaned. There is a long history of body/spirit or 
body/mind dualism which has been heavily criticised by certain feminist writers on the basis of 
the subjugation of those who are seen as more bodily, fleshy and less rational. Thus discussions 
about pregnancy and motherhood often veer from being wanted or unwanted, sacrificial or 
selfish, natural or unnatural and essential or unimportant and very much secondary to a woman’s 
life project. Meyers writes that sadly discussions about motherhood ‘oscillate between contempt 
for it or reverence and sentimentality.’340 This oversimplification and extremist approach to what 
is, in fact, a very complex situation and decision naturally results in marked categories, dangerous 
stigma’s and the creation of an out-group; discussions about pregnancy, motherhood and 
abortion cannot be reduced and instead, we must allow for a plurality of experiences and 
responses. I have argued that the framework of a moral community of human beings attends to a 
plurality of responses and a variety of scenarios and life projects (or ‘liveable lives’ as Butler 
would refer), and this would mean that we approach the abortion issue within and from an actual 
and emerging moral context and not a perceived or fixed one.  
The decision to have an abortion is not only about motherhood and the female voice and, as I 
have argued, I believe a truly relational approach involves the father or partner and healthcare 
professional to some degree. The desire to have a child with someone in particular, as Chadwick 
has argued, is an important part of the reproductive and abortion narrative. It brings into focus, I 
believe, the reality and importance of the relationship, or lack of one/them, that the woman 
faces in her particular abortion context. Some relationships can embrace the transformation that 
a child will bring in the way that others simply cannot.   
There are archetypal constructs surrounding the ‘feminine’ and this impacts the abortion 
experience and rhetoric. In many cultures, female sexuality is a highly complex area and for many 
women their cultures may view sexual activity as solely for procreation. As stated previously, the 
woman in certain abortion contexts is, therefore, facing the added complication of concealing 
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not only an abortion, but also their sexual activity. There is often an assumption that, in certain 
social environments, motherhood, and a very particular type of motherhood, will be the choice 
and activity that all women will choose for their lives. ‘It is a mercy to the child that she lost her 
mother, I do believe! How she ever survived that kind of treatment beats all. Why that mother 
never seemed to have the first spark of maternal feeling to the end!’341 The mother in Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman’s story is perceived as unnatural due to her ‘abandoning’ of her child in favour of 
saving the maximum number of people possible when her village is faced with a disaster. The 
passage certainly doesn’t reduce pregnancy to a physical condition, rather it reveals how 
pregnancy, and in particular motherhood, is elevated into something transformative and creative; 
thus, a physical infant becomes something that demands nurturing and protection, regardless of 
the stage of development and regardless of all other possible choices. It thus serves as a powerful 
metaphor of the choices facing women and how society will possibly judge these choices. The 
piece selected for Singer’s anthology reveals how the community creates exclusions and the story 
is a type of illustration and myth that is told in order to foster and project the metaphor of the 
‘sacred mother,’342 where the other mother in the story takes on the role of the ‘surrogate 
moralist.’343  The decision to continue with a pregnancy or not becomes the decision to nurture 
or not to nurture, and this is laden with ideological judgement and, as like all ideologies, it makes 
claims about the way things are and what the subject is, but also what it ought to be.  
The idea that a mother would quite literally sacrifice her children, opposed to sacrificing her own 
life and life choices for them, is explored in Euripides play Medea and in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. 
Medea is described by Ovid as ‘seiz’d with fierce desire,’344 trying to control herself through 
reason, telling herself that it is absurd to love Jason and to violate the obligations she has to her 
children. Ultimately Medea’s humiliation at being left by her husband Jason overwhelmingly 
triumphs over her motherly side. Some see Medea as representing the very worst in mothers and 
daughters and yet some can sympathise with her, although not condone her for her actions. This 
is an interesting and clever play that reveals how a woman’s body, and her facets, is both 
vulnerable and also a weapon; her children are all she has to fight back with.  
There is often the assumption that motherhood will not only be something desired, but also 
likened to a sacrificial and unconditional act, and thus Medea is seen as the worst of mothers. We 
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should recall how Gilligan and Petterson were sure to include the idea of mature care into their 
writings, or what Keller has referred to as a ‘healthy vulnerability’, as selfless caring can put the 
caregiver at risk and it is important that the woman is able to make caring choices for herself and 
her own life project. However Gilligan perhaps overstressed the different outlooks of males and 
females, although she went on to remedy this somewhat, in that she argued that women had a 
relational and contextual approach to moral reasoning and this outlook was seen as something 
that women share. The reasons behind this moral outlook, however, are due to social 
phenomenon345 and the history of developmental trends in males, and what is needed is a social 
context that fosters caring relations in males and females. 
Reproductive decisions are clearly far more complex than certain descriptions of motherhood 
and parenting allow. The phrase ‘having children’ may seem deceptively simple and yet we now 
face something of a reproductive revolution346 and the story of procreation and parenting has 
transformed in many significant ways.347  
5.3 Abortion Language 
‘Abortion raises subtle problems for private conscience, public policy and constitutional law. 
Most of these problems are essentially philosophical requiring a degree of clarity about basic 
concepts that is seldom achieved in legislative debates and letters to newspapers.’348 Feinberg 
views abortion language and rhetoric as something that has become heated, emotional and 
untenable and that clarity and a highly rational approach is needed. However, I have argued that 
it is the highly rational and abstract language that has been part of the reason that the debate has 
reached a ‘stalemate.’349 We have already explored the pitfalls relating to the language of 
personhood and the related abortion debate. Kaposy views the abortion dialogue as deadlocked 
in large part due to the language, intuitions and analogies used and he challenges the idea that 
philosophy will draw the debate towards some sort of consensus, as Feinberg claims. Kaposy 
writes that analogical arguments work by building a kind of consensus and such a consensus is 
virtually unimaginable.’350 The abortion debate seeks to find shared understandings of 
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personhood, of values and of beliefs and the ability to achieve this is, he feels, overstated and as 
stated previously in this dissertation abortion debates are ‘unfolding in a context of genuinely 
incommensurable moral word views.’  
In some cultures an abortion procedure is viewed and described as a ‘dropped’ or ‘lost’ 
pregnancy351 and at the other end of the spectrum the procedure is viewed as murder. Likewise 
whereas as some Doctors and abortion providers are seen as saviours352 to the women they assist 
(and the Doctors also perceive themselves in this light), others are labelled abortionists (even 
when they perform many other health care procedures as well) and murders. The women who 
have an abortion may not face stigmatisation and marginalisation at all and yet they may be seen 
as tainted (as this can impact the females marriage options) and promiscuous, since their sexual 
activity has been revealed and exposed353 or they may be seen as selfish given their decision not 
to nurture ‘their child.’ 
Abortion experience, and the labelling that can occur, will vary enormously depending on 
cultural context, and it is important to note there is vast gap between women able to access safe 
abortions and those who do not. The World Health Organisation have suggested that one-third 
of all abortions worldwide are illegal and estimates of the number of women who die worldwide 
from unsafe abortions each year range from 70,000 to 200,000. This means that between 13 and 
20% of all maternal deaths are due to unsafe abortion - in some areas of the world, half of all 
maternal deaths.354 Therefore an abortion not only threatens as human beings moral agency and 
status within their moral community but also their health in the most profound of senses. It is 
important to consider female health as part of the abortion dialogue and the social health 
surrounding an abortion.   
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
351 E. P. Renne, The pregnancy that doesn’t stay: the practice and perception of abortion by Ekiti Yoruba women’, Social Science and Medicine, 42, 
no.4, 1996, pp.483-94. 
 
352 G Pheterson and Y Azize, Abortion practice in the northeast Caribbean: ‘Just write down stomach pain’, Reproductive Health Matters, 13, no.26, 
2005, pp.44-53.  
 
353 George Devereux, A study of abortion in primitive societies, New York, International Universities Press, 1976. 
 
354 http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs334/en/ 
	  
103	  
	  
5.4 Guilt, Shame and Stigma within Philosophy  
Guilt, shame and stigma emerge from social networks and the context surrounding the woman 
making the abortion decision. The role of shame and stigma in society is a controversial debate. 
Communitarian scholars see an important role in guilt shame for society and in public life; shame 
punishment has a long history.355 Guilt and shame can be seen as an important part of our moral 
development part; feelings of guilt formed part of Shoemaker’s understanding of the mature 
emotions required for membership in the moral community. The danger with shame is that it 
creates an in-group and it is really a tool to say how we should do things, for example, this is 
how we do sex, this is how we parent, this is how men/women behave, and so when people step 
outside those norms they are either penalized by law or they are marginalised by the community, 
often a fate far worse than legal sanctions.356 Shame and disgust, therefore, create and bolster the 
dangerous ‘us-and-them’ culture we have seen to be so stifling within in ethical dialogue. 
Nussbaum argues that shame and disgust are deeply suspicious because they are fundamentally 
hierarchical in that they elevate different types of humans. She argues that their use in any ethical, 
political or social system that deems itself to be fostering equality and liberality is deeply 
suspicious.357  
Part of the danger of shame and disgust is that they cannot just be directed at the act, it almost 
always transfers to the whole person. Shame is our daily companion358 and part of our human 
lives. Nussbaum quotes Erving Goffman in her book; he writes that ‘the stigmatised and the 
normal are part of each other.’359 Some people are more marked out or susceptible to shame, in 
the way the Butler sees some lives as more vulnerable and unliveable. Nussbaum explores some 
of these marginalised groups, such as the mentally and physically disabled and those beings 
where a disease becomes visible. In the way the that Butler asks us to make more space for a 
range of liveable lives, Nussbaum asks us to make more space for shame in our lives, and by this 
she means we need to draw in those groups that society has so often sought to shame. Society 
needs to acknowledge that this shaming process emerges because of human vulnerability 
(something all human beings share). Humans often have a pathological wish to be invulnerable, 
an invulnerability that Keller and Brown have stressed, and we explored in the previous chapter. 
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Nussbaum argues that human vulnerability has failed to be accounted for within moral theory 
‘our dignity just is the dignity of a certain sort of animal.360 Nussbaum's view that to respect the 
dignity of each person, society absolutely must refrain from certain ways of shaming and 
humiliating its members and rendering them objects of communal disgust - because communal 
damnation is the worst kind of exclusion. This shame and stigma is what Goffman calls a spoiled 
identity361 and what Nussbaum refers to as the dehumanising of a victim.362 
5.5 Abortion Stigma and other Exclusions    
Every human being is situated in a moral community and they will generally be aware of the 
norms by which their moral community operates. Many human beings do not fit those norms 
and as such they can become the victims of stigma. Stigma is the mark of abnormality.363 
Abortion stigma is multi-faceted and context specific but in some cultures the decision to have 
an abortion can lead to dangerous exclusions and health risks, both physical and mental.  
Link and Phelan write that ‘stigmatisation is entirely contingent on access to social, economic 
and political power and that allows the identification of differentness, the construction of 
stereotypes, the separation of labelled persons into distinct categories and the full execution of 
disapproval, rejection, exclusion and discrimination.’364 The threat of such a rejection leads to 
large numbers of women keeping their abortion decision a secret and this social fact is connected 
to the 3 million illegal unsafe abortions that take place every year among teenage girls. Women 
from all racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, and religious backgrounds will seek an abortion for a 
plethora of reasons. There are, therefore, a range of social stigmas associated with abortion, in 
some cultures an abortion may be sought in order to hide early sexual activity, such exposure 
could lead to the woman being viewed as ‘tainted’ and no longer fit for marriage, whilst in other 
cultures the reason for the abortion is due to the stigma surrounding teenage mothers and the 
decision to continue with a pregnancy results in exclusion from certain lifestyle choices and 
social groups.  
Exclusions can occur in a range of explicit and more subtle ways for human beings. We are all 
intrinsically vulnerable and we all face exclusion from our moral communities. As Kittay notes, 
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there are range of morally repugnant exclusions that can result from our conceptions of a moral 
community. Our common vulnerability should compel us to reflect on these marginalisations 
and then respond. We are all vulnerable and some bodies are even more exposed. She writes, 
‘when we consider the aged adults we may become or need to care for, the decisions we or our 
children, friends or others close to us may have a child diagnosed with autism, and that, at any 
moment, through illness or accident, we or those we love may develop a significant cognitive 
disability....we should view disability as a feature of the human condition that philosophers 
should take seriously.’365 
We are all vulnerable and as Butler argued, some of us are made more vulnerable by the societies 
we find ourselves in. As Shakespeare has noted, it is not the person and their body that makes 
the person disabled but often it is the society that exasperates and elevates the disability. Given 
that we are all vulnerable and prone to increasing vulnerability under certain conditions this is 
surely reason to transform society. A truly caring society fosters relationships, and through such 
relationships we come to see the varied and diverse ways that people enhance their communities, 
often in entirely non-rational, non-economic and non-measurable ways  
If we recall Shoemaker’s article about the cognitively disabled and the moral community we can 
see the essential role of empathy. Empathy leads us to see agency and conceptions of agency that 
are dependent more on our social and relational nature opposed to autonomous highly rational 
actions performed by the individual.  Noddings reminds us that all our many and varied skills are 
gained in collaboration not in a vacuum. Shoemaker’s article stressed the importance of learning 
from the process of identifying ‘members’ from ‘non-members’, the process of seeing who is ‘in’ 
and included and who is ‘out’ and therefore excluded. This labelling process366 reveals the fully 
fledged members of a moral community but Shoemaker also shed light on the boundaries of our 
communities to those beings that are ‘just inside’ and ‘just outside.’367 I have also been keen to 
shed light on the more subtle exclusions a moral community can create through abortion stigma 
and female sexuality. 
Many human beings are excluded from their moral communities, the woman who has an 
abortion, the woman who is exposed for having sexual relations outside of marriage, the woman 
because she is a woman and therefore perceived as inferior. Certain groups are labelled as ‘out,’ 
just outside or in, but through their connection with a more fully fledged member, because they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365 Eva Feder Kittay  and Licia Carlson (eds.), Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p.3.  
 
366 ibid. p.120.  
 
367 ibid. p.202. 	  
106	  
	  
lack the capacities some regard as necessary for moral agency and functioning with a moral 
community. This can include people with disabilities, but also comatose patients, foetuses, young 
infants, and animals. There are those human beings who have excellent mental capacities and yet 
are also labelled as ‘out’ through shaming practices. These groups might include those who have 
a particular sexual preference and lifestyle, those with certain diseases, racial groups and refugees, 
perhaps one of the most vulnerable groups of people. And yet, and as I have tried to show, if we 
look at our varied moral communities and our concrete operations368 within these communities, 
these beings are in fact firmly situated in our moral communities and they reveal so much about 
what it is to be human.  
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Conclusions 
 
 
As Kittay writes, philosophers have so often wanted to say a person is ‘such and such’, and that a 
person is a being that has a particular characteristic, or set of characteristics, which enables them 
to function within the moral community. However, in practice we tend to find that this ‘such 
and such’, is not what we learn about the nature of persons through our concrete relations with 
persons and through our concrete operations within actual moral communities.369 In Kittay’s 
case, this insight was brought home to her through her own experiences through her caring 
relations with a dependent other. Through interaction within her most intimate moral 
community, the family unit, she concluded that personhood and moral agency, and our 
understanding of it, needs to be entirely recast in relational and concrete terms.370  
I have argued that rather than place personhood at the heart of abortion debates, we should 
instead emphasise our relationships and our membership in an already-existing moral context 
and community. Rather than considering what kinds of entities qualify as ‘persons,’ we should 
instead consider the notion of the human being existing in a moral community and thereby 
situated in a wide and complex web of relationships. ‘The abstract arguments about personhood 
threaten to obscure the reality at stake in the personhood debate.’371 Rather than offering a new 
discourse of persons understood as human beings qua social, community bound beings, I feel it 
is essential to use the term ‘human being’ and not the term ‘person.’ I have argued that the term 
‘human being’ best attends to our layered nature; it equalises, rather than elevates, certain groups 
of human beings. The term ‘human being’ works with the bottom-up approach to ethics 
forwarded within this dissertation; our social-cultural-historical context forms and creates our 
nature. The human being is always in a moral community and if we wish to understand our 
nature, we must position the inquiry within the presence of each human being’s moral culture.  
The layered approach to our identity requires that we hold together varied aspects of our nature 
and it demands that we acknowledge that our moral agency develops through relationships. 
Agency exists on a continuum and there is not one single characteristic that accords us with 
personhood status and moral agency. The gradualist position remains the most convincing 
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argument when exploring when human life begins, in that it allows space for the fact that the 
relationship between mother-embryo/foetus is developing and evolving. The decision to 
continue or discontinue a pregnancy has a huge impact for the mother and the decision lies with 
her first and foremost. The developing foetus is in direct relation to the mother and the 
relationship develops with her and her wider nested dependencies; the foetus is not necessarily 
the only vulnerable being to which we must attend within the abortion dilemma.  
I have argued that an ethic of care and phenomenological approach can provide an essential 
framework for abortion debates in that it demands a caring disposition that responds to the 
needs of the dependent and the vulnerable. I do not agree that care ethics promotes a kind of 
‘slave mentality’372 and as such women are trapped within certain caring relationships, such as the 
mother – foetus relationship. The moral status of the foetus is undoubtedly unique in that the 
foetus exists only in relationship with a particular ‘other’ and the dependence is total; this 
relationship and dependence is direct in the sense that whatever is done to the foetus is done to 
the mother. Care ethicists clearly address the fact that certain caring roles and relationships are 
stifling and as we have seen it is important to examine the social context of care.373 Likewise the 
phenomenological approach starts with the position that a social reality is composed of human 
beings in society; human beings are socialised, in relation and always in a very particular situation.  
Abortion dilemmas need to be seen within the context of our human lives and from the context 
of our own particular moral community. Care ethics has conceded that certain carers are in fact 
the more vulnerable than those being cared for and many writers fully acknowledge the 
burdensome nature of care and push towards a fuller understanding of empathy as a result.374 
Pregnancy, like motherhood, is seen as something which is wanted and unwanted, where in fact 
the debate is far more nuanced than that and the issue is very much bound up with modern 
discussions about reproductive opportunity and choices rather than contempt for the foetus. 
Care ethics and a phenomenological approach requires us to take relationships seriously and 
therefore we also need to consider the mothers relationship to the father; whilst the woman’s 
role is undoubtedly unique there are still important factors relating to masculine identity and 
parenting that need to be considered. Fathers and partners can often feel excluded from a 
pregnancy and abortion rhetoric and we need to navigate the concerns of men more effectively 
in these areas.   
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‘The abortion debate’ continues to rage and as such we must adopt an approach informed by 
sensitivity, and one that allows for a range of emotional responses to very particular and nuanced 
dilemmas. Butler’s approach elevates the importance of our vulnerabilities and she emphasises 
the need for a more open ended engagement and understanding of making human life more 
bearable and ‘liveable’. In order to do this we have to attend to the actual, and the concrete, and 
the varying complexities of our own lives. Butler’s position starts with the varied ways human life 
is ‘lived’ and her position therefore allows for a plurality of responses: all human lives should be 
considered of worth and made ‘liveable.’ I have argued that as well as valuing relationships we 
ought to embrace human life as embodied and believe this is vital for sexual and medical ethics. 
Often, when a woman seeks an abortion, an important and interlacing issue is her request that 
we see her life as valuable and it may well be that this procedure is essential if she is to regain a 
‘liveable life’; care ethics and a phenomenological approach to the abortion dialogue is essential if 
we are to value relationships and the if we are to engage with how our unified bodies, acting in 
the world, may have a range of needs.  
As Butler argues, ‘if a community could learn to abide with its imperfections and vulnerability, it 
would know better what its ties to other people are’375 and as such we must promote moral 
communities that foster the importance of caring relationships and inclusivity. Both the foetus 
and the mother are dependent beings, and for large stages of our lives we are more patient than 
agent, more excluded rather than included and so the debate is far from clear-cut as some 
suggest. To flatten out the abortion dialogue into warring camps and into a personhood debate, 
that must reach consensus, is to avoid the real thrust of the abortion narrative. We should 
appreciate the complexity of our relational ties and come to see that our feelings of self worth 
are embedded and inherent within our varied relationships. A moral community can be 
transformed through acceptance and inclusion. We should always seek to avoid exclusions and 
the mother’s exclusion from her own pregnancy, or her own life project, is a real threat to bear in 
mind, as is the aftermath of abortion stigma.  
The research into abortion stigma simply cannot be separated from ethical reflections on 
abortion; for many women the decision to have an abortion results in a highly damaging 
exclusion from her moral community. Abortion stigma will of course emerge from a web of 
complex factors and will likely build upon a range of other context specific marginalisations and 
discriminations. It is clear, therefore, that to approach the issue of abortion without a contextual 
springboard is to leave the dialogue lacking and impoverished as a result; to see human beings as 
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something distinct from the cultural and moral settings in which they operate sunders and 
reduces what it is to be a human being; throughout the piece I have argued for a more layered 
understanding of the nature of human beings.  
Recognizing ourselves as human beings, participants in a moral community and moral context 
must be our starting point and our framework for navigating a range of ethical dilemmas. It is 
not only essential for the abortion debate, which simply cannot languor in the abstract any 
longer, but also any debate where there is a risk of human exclusion and stigmatisation. The 
dissertation encourages further thinking in a range of areas, for example: our membership and 
our own role in a community; accountability within the community; the judging others and the 
effect of our own prejudices on the current abortion debate, and in fact any kind of 
philosophical debate. The avenues this investigation has opened are methodological and 
applicable to any community-ethical debate, not just the abortion dialogue. We need to rethink 
what a community collective mind is at practical and social levels. I believe such a framework can 
offer insights into gender politics, poverty responses, human rights debates, peace talk and 
conflict resolution. It can also extend from the abortion rhetoric to discussions about pregnancy 
and gender, and also certain debates within bioethics such as reproductive technologies. In short, 
it is a framework that demands we make a concern for all human lives a real and valid ethical 
concern.  
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